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INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY IN
AMERICA
Carl Tobias*
Interspousal tort immunity remains an untidy corner of the law.
That rule prohibits husbands and wives from successfully pursuing
a civil cause of action against each other for personal injuries. Immunity has a rich and instructive history; it spans Blackstone's
enunciation of the unity fiction that women's legal identities
merged into their husbands' upon wedlock and the modem
women's movement. The immunity doctrine, first recognized in the
United States during the 1860s, was maintained intact nationwide
for the succeeding half century. But it was abolished by seven jurisdictions between 1914 and 1920, eroded gradually in the ensuing
fifty years, and has been transformed dramatically from a majority
to a minority rule since 1970.1
Despite increasing judicial willingness to abrogate immunity, few
courts have analyzed carefully why it should be abolished, and a
number of jurisdictions retain the doctrine in whole or in part.2
Most tort law commentators have denounced the rule since its ini-
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Mary Lonergan, Ricardo Nunez, Tammy Plubell, Kathy Rightmyer, and Pat Seddon for
valuable research assistance. Errors that remain are mine alone. I also appreciate the generous support of the Harris Trust and of the Cowley Endowment.
' "Rule" and "doctrine" are used synonymously to mean "interspousal tort immunity,"
which is immunity from suit for interspousal torts inflicted negligently or intentionally.
"Abolition" and "abrogation" are employed interchangeably to mean elimination of immunity. "Complete" and "total" are used synonymously to describe abolition and abrogation
and mean elimination of both negligence and intentional tort immunity.
• The states that appear to retain interspousal tort immunity completely are Delaware
and Hawaii. The following states have partial immunity: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Nevada, and Vermont.
For recent listings of the nationwide status of interspousal tort immunity, see Burns v.
Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1211-12 (Miss. 1988); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987)
(citations to cases). See generally W. PROSSER & W.P. KEET'oN, THE LAw OF TORTS § 122
(5th ed. 1984).
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tial abrogation but have failed to assess incisively either the history of immunity or the reasons for its elimination. Thus, a standard historical treatment developed and a stock litany of
arguments favoring abolition has come to be recited. Moreover, the
doctrine has not evoked recent scholarly interest; no comprehensive, critical evaluation of immunity has been undertaken in the
last quarter century.3 Nonetheless, there has been burgeoning research, in fields such as women's legal history and feminist jurisprudence, that has important implications for tort immunity. It is
appropriate, therefore, to apply this new work to the longstanding
doctrine, while exploring the rule's history, reexamining the rationales that underlie the doctrine's continued application and abrogation, analyzing whether immunity should be eliminated fully,
and considering the consequences of total abolition.
The first Part of this Article is a review of the origins and development of interspousal tort immunity. It initially examines the legal status accorded women in the United States before 1840 and
passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, while discussing
the consequences of both for immunity. The century and a quarter
of case law then is analyzed by emphasizing evolving currents in
judicial decisionmaking, developments in tort jurisprudence and
societal views of women, wedlock, wives, and the family, as well as
their interrelationships.
Although the question of whether interspousal tort immunity
should be abrogated or retained has become today a debate over
the public policy reasons for the respective positions, those rationales have their origins in earlier developments. Because the policy
concepts now are so significant, but have been accorded inadequate
evaluation by judges and writers, Part II of the Article provides an
assessment at once more systematic and rigorous. This examination yields the conclusions that, although the arguments favoring
abolition are only somewhat more persuasive than those against it,
the continued application of immunity serves little useful purpose.
• The last comprehen~ive, critical piece was Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family,
L. REV. 823 (1956). The seminal article was McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1930). See generally Casenote, Alone at Last:
Oregon Abolishes lnterspousal Immunity for Negligent Torts in Heino v. Harper, 25 W1L·
LAlllETIE L. REV. 429 (1989); Comment, lnterspousal Tort Immunity: The Rule Becoming
the Exception, 27 How. L.J. 995 (1984); Note, Piercing the Marital Veil: lnterspousal Tort
Immunity After Harris v. Harris, 36 MERCER L. REV. 1013 (1985).
9
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Accordingly, complete abrogation appears advisable and probable
by the year 2000.
The :final Part of the Article explores important implications of
totally eliminating the rule. This analysis indicates that abolition
would vindicate numerous purposes of tort jurisprudence, benefit
wives in specific situations, and afford females certain advantages.
The evaluation also demonstrates, however, that abrogation may
have some adverse impact on the tort law system and is unlikely to
increase women's power, improve significantly the conditions of
wives, or enhance substantially male-female relations.
I.

THE HISTORY OF !NTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY

Interspousal tort immunity has a lengthy and interesting history.
This Part descriptively analyzes significant aspects of the rule's
history by examining its origins and early relevant developments,
wives' legal status in America before 1840, implications of the Married Women's Acts for the doctrine, and case law development in
the United States.
Origins and Early Developments
The origins of, and nascent developments pertinent to, interspousal tort immunity warrant only brief treatment." At common
law unmarried females' legal status was similar to, but somewhat
less favored than, that of single males. 11 The women could contract;
litigate and be sued; own, manage and convey realty and personalty; and were entitled to the fruits of their labor and income derived from their property. 6 Marriage drastically altered the legal
status of women, however. Upon wedlock, husbands acquired possessory rights to their wives' property and could use its rents and

A.

• This section briefly summarizes the common-law origins of interspousal tort immunity.
For a more thorough treatment, see generally W. PROSSER & W:P. K!il:roN, supra note 2, §
122; McCurdy, supra note 3.
• See L. KANowITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 35 (1969); Johnston, Sex and Property: The
Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum and Developments Tou:ard Equality,
47 N.Y.UL. REv. 1033, 1045 (1972). This was true in both mid-nineteenth century England,
see J. WHARTON, AN EXPOSITION OF THE LAws RELATlNG TO THE W01. tEN OF ENGLAND 173
(1853), and mid-nineteenth century America, see Walker, The Legal Condition of Women,
in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAw 317 (C. Haar ed. 1965).
• See H. CLARK, DoMESTlC REI.ATlONS CASES AND PROBLEMS 57, 725 (3d ed. 1980); L. KANOWITZ, supra note 5, at 35; Johnston, supra note 5, at 1045.
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profits. 7 A married man also was entitled to his spouse's chattels
and earnings as well as her choses in action, which became the husband's personalty once reduced to possession.8 Moreover, married
women, in their own names, could not contract, file claims or be
sued, or transfer real property. 9 Although some exceptions to these
incapacities developed in England and colonial America, principally through equity, the disabilities imposed at law remained
substantial. 10
Numerous practical and theoretical explanations exist for the
common law's relegation of women to this legal status upon marriage. One idea derived from Roman law is the position occupied
by the pater-familias, who as head of the family exercised almost
absolute control over its members. 11 Other explanations, feudal in
• See Griswold v. Penniman, 2 Conn. 564, 565 (1818) (holding that possession of estate
vested in intestate heir's husband); Beale v. Knowles, 45 Me. 479 (1858) (holding conveyance by wife void); Mattocks v. Stearns, 9 Vt. 326, 335 (1837) (holding that husband's inter·
est in wife's estate could satisfy creditor's claims); w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 122, at 860 (4th ed. 1971); McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1031.
• See Bell v. Bell, 1 Ga. 637, 640 (1846) (holding that wife was entitled in equity to what
the husband had not reduced to his possession); Wells v. Tyler, 25 N.H. 340, 342 (1852)
(holding that husband might reduce wife's bequest to his possession); Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa.
396, 399 (1858) (holding that wife could not maintain debt action against husband); W.
PROSSER, supra note 7, § 122, at 860.
• See Anderson v. Anderson, 74 Ky. 327, 330 (1875) (holding that wife could not maintain
battery action without husband); Concord Bank v. Bellis, 64 Mass. 276, 277 (1852) (holding
that wife could not mortgage land); Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781, 783 (1663) (holding
husband not liable to pay for goods for which wife had no right to contract); W. PROSSER,
supra note 7, § 122, at 859. For a discussion of the legal status of English wives throughout
history, see N. BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY IN NINE·
TEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 17-22, 27 (1982) (legal status of wives in England better before
the common law thus contravening "theories that locate the changing legal status of married
women on a path of steady improvement"); A OAKLEY, WOMAN'S WORK 28-30 (1974); W.
O'NEILL, THE WOMAN MOVEMENT 17 (1969). Cf. Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything
that Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819, 820 (traditional
American family law historians describe evolution of family law as progression from patrinr·
chal to egalitarian family whose members individually enjoy rights protected by the state,
but author advocates peering beneath traditional view by exploring social experience rather
than law on the books).
'° For a discussion of the separate estate, a typical equitable device, see M. SALMON,
WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 81-140 (1986). For more discussion of
equity, see N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 20-21, 72-74; L. KANOWITZ, supra note 5, at 38-39. For
more discussion of disabilities imposed at law, see M. BEARD, WOMAN AS FORCE IN HISTORY
92-95 (1946); P. RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF FEMALE EMAN·
CIPATION 25-30 (1980).
11
See McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1035. For further discussion of the concept of the paterfamilias, see M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW §§ 38, 40 (1927); Hollister, Parent-Child
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origin, include the notion of "natural male dominanceni 2 and the
character of feudal tenures, the "chief duties of which, suit and
service, were by their nature not readily performed except by
men.ms The superior physical strength possessed by husbands is
pro:ffered,14 as is the idea that a woman upon marriage became her
spouse's property, if not his slave. 111 Marriage also is said to have
been a unique type of contract, not governed by the rules that ordinarily apply to such instruments, but one which invariably benefited the superior party to the agreement-the husband. 10 Several
prominent commentators have contended that the concept of
guardianship is most accurate. 17
But the most influential reason, premised partially on the Biblical notion that wedded individuals are "one .flesh,"18 is that the
female's legal identity merges into the male's upon marriage. 19
Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REY. 489, 490-91 (1982).
22
See M RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO·AMERICAN LEGAL HlsToRY 524 (1936). Accord l J.
BISHOP, LAW OF 11-iARRIED WOMEN § 47 (1875). Cf. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130,
141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (concluding that "Man is, or should be, woman's protec·
tor and defender.").
13
M RADIN, THE COMMON LAW OF THE FAMILY, VI NATIONAL LAw LmRARv, LEGAL RELATIONS 177 (1939). Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 17; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 19-20.
" See Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in 1 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTIIAM 355·56 (J.
Bowring ed. 1838), reprinted in Johnston, supra note 5, at 1048-49; Mill, The Subjection of
Women, in ON LmERTY AND OTHER EssAYS 194 (E. Neff ed. 1936), reprinted in Johnston,
supra note 5, at 1051; McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1035. Cf. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,
420-23 (1908) (treating women's physical weakness as premise for upholding "special treatment" legislation).
'" See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 37-38; Johnston, supra note 5, at 1051. Cf. Tinker v.
Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485 (1904); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 522, 105 S.E. 206, 210
(1920) (judicial articulation of notion that wives were husbands' property).
16
See Johnston, supra note 5, at 1047-48. For a discussion or marriage as n contract, see
B. BABCOCK, A FREEDMAN, E. NoRTON & S. Ross, Sex Drscrut!INATJON AND THE LAw 561-66
(1975) [hereinafter B. BABCOCK]; L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT xix-xxi (1981). Cf.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1888) (stating that marriage is more than mere contract; rights and obligations depend upon law, not agreement or the parties).
17
See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 435 (2d ed. 1903);
Haskins, The Estate by the Marital Right, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 345, 346-47 (1949); Williams,
The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 Moo. L. REv. 16, 18 (1947). Cf. Abbott v. Abbott,
67 Me. 304, 307 (1877) (husband as guardian may put "gentle restraints" upon wire's liberty), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A2d 71 (Me. 1980).
16
See Johnston, supra note 5, at 1046; McCurdy, supra note 3, nt 1035; Williams, supra
note 17, at 16-18. Cf. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130, 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (common-law maxim that woman "had no legal existence separate from her husband"); M DALY, THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX 74-84 (1968) (Biblicnl origins or notion).
2 See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 614-16 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mc•
Curdy, supra note 3, at 1035; Williams, supra note 17, at 16-17. Cf. Carroll v. Reidy, 5 App.
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This idea is captured best by William Blackstone in his eighteenth
century Commentaries on the Laws of England: "By marriage, the
husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or
at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of her husband,
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything."20 Thus, the unity notion, and Blackstone's enunciation of
it, could be described most accurately only as maxims or fictions
created to justify and perpetuate the status quo and power relationships within the eighteenth century English family. 21 Although
a "general theory that will fully account for the common law system" has yet to be formulated, 22 the merger idea and Blackstone's
articulation were crucial in conceptualizing wives' legal status for
the purpose of treating interspousal tort immunity until the early
twentieth century. 23
The notion of the single identity of a wedded man and woman
had both substantive and procedural implications for potential interspousal personal injury litigation, suits which were unknown at
common law.24 Unitary legal status prevented one spouse from acquiring a tort cause of action against the other for harm perpetrated. 25 Even if a claim could have been stated, the husband
D.C. 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1894) (merger was feudal notion).
20
1 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442, reprinted in w. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 122,
at 859. For an oft-cited, remarkably similar yet considerably earlier articulation of this idea,
see THE LAWES RESOLUTIONS OF WOMENS RIGHTS (1632), reprinted in M. BLOOMFIELD, Ar.rnnICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at 94-95 (1976).
1
•
See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 43-54; D. BooRSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE
LAW: AN ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (1941); Chused, Married Women's Prop·
erty Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEo. L.J. 1359, 1385-89 (1983). Cf. L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 3
(1967) (discussion of Blackstone's use of legal fictions).
•• Johnston, supra note 5, at 1051.
•• See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. For additional discussion of Blackstone
and his effect on the development of American law, see N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 43-54; M.
BEARD, supra note 10, at 78-121; Chused, supra note 21, at 1385-89; Kennedy, The Struc·
ture of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979). See also Watson, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 97 YALE L. J. 795 (1988).
24
See Haglund, Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife, 27 GEO. L.J. 697, 704 (1939).
•• See Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 306 (1877) (holding that "real substantial ground"
for refusing to permit wife to sue husband was "general principle of the common law that
husband and wife are one person"), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me.
1980); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 69-70, 100 So. 591, 592 (1924); Schultz v. Christopher,
65 Wash. 496, 118 P. 629 (1911) (holding wife could not maintain action against husband for
communicating venereal disease to her), overruled, Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500
P.2d 771 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984); Phil-
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would have been plaintiff as well as defendant in any litigation
pursued. 26 Thus, at early common law, the
combination of the various incidents of marriage, some
substantive, some procedural, some conceptual, made it
impossible for one spouse ever to be held civilly liable as
a tortfeasor, in any situation, and without exception, to
the other for any act, antenuptial or during marriage,
causing personal injury which would have been a tort but
for the marriage. 27
In 1876, the Queen's Bench affirmed the validity of the common-

law immunity concept and thereby ensured its modern-day application in England.28
B. American Developments

1. Before 1840. Variations within and among colonies and states,
as well as between those entities and England, complicate generalization about wives' legal status in America prior to 1840.29 Yet

lips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436, 438 (1876) (concluding wife could not maintain assault action
against husband).
2
• See Abbott, 67 Me. at 308; W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 122, at 860; accord McCurdy,
supra note 3, at 1033.
27
McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 Vll.L. L. REv. 303, 307 (1959).
Accord 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS§ 8.10, 562 (1986) [hereinafter
F. HARPER]. Cf. Heino v. Harper, 306 Or. 347, 353, 759 P.2d 253, 256 (1988) (unclear whether
real impediment to interspousal tort actions at common law was substantive or procedurol).
26
Phillips, 1 Q.B.D. at 438. For discussions of interspousal immunity's subsequent history in England, see S. ATKINS & B. HoGGETT, WOMEN AND THS LAw 132-16 (1984); Williams,
supra note 17, at 26-27.
•• See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 22; M GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE liEARTH: LAw .um
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 5 (1985); l\l SALMON, supra note 10, at 3-13.
These and other recent works enhance the ability to generalize, especially with respect to
the period from 1780 to 1840. But more work is needed on the earlier period, particularly
the seventeenth century, before generalizations can be drawn with confidence. Cf. Chused,
supra note 21, at 1360 n.2, 1385 n.102; Salmon, The Legal Status of Women in Early
America: A Reappraisal, 1 LAW & HIST. Rsv. 129 (1983) (both present valuable suggestions
for more research).
The analysis of families and wives' legal status during this period o.nd through 1900 prin·
cipally treats whites, the upper and middle classes, and nonimmigro.nts. Cf. M BLOO?JFJELD,
supra note 20, at 122-35; J. TEN BROEK, FAMILY LAw AND THE POOR (J. Ho.ndler ed. 1964)
(the poor); E. Fox-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHJTE
WOMEN oF THE OLD SouTH (1988); E. GENOVESE, RoLL. JoRDAN, Rou.: THE WORLD THE
SLAVES MADE (1976) (blacks); J. JONES, LABOR OF LoVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN,
WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985) (blacks); Minow, supra note 9,
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more informed accounts than have been postulated can be
afforded.
a. The Colonial Period. The traditional historical view30 describes the legal status enjoyed by colonial married women, especially in commercial contexts, as considerably better than that of
English wives, a circumstance attributable primarily to burgeoning
commercial activity in the New World.31 For example, American
wedded females were said to have greater freedom to convey real
property and to contract than their counterparts in the mother
country.32 It also has been asserted that the different social and
economic conditions that prevailed in the New World rendered obsolete the "concept of the unity of husband and wife in marriage to
form one legal personality."33 The traditional perspective holds
that the "individual status of the married woman in the law of lia-

at 862-77 (working and working-class women); Minow, The Supreme Court 1986
Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 62-64 (1987) (problems en·
tailed in attempting to speak from one perspective for all women).
I realize that legal status comprised little of wives' experience, especially given the status
they were afforded, and that the story of that status reads like a march of progress from
patriarchal domination to enjoyment of individual rights. Thus, I have tried to treat somo·
what women's social and economic status by drawing on recent work on women's history,
much of which is controversial. See, e.g., infra note 49. I have also attempted to account for
variability, gaps, and departures from the traditional views of these issues. Moreover, I ap·
preciate that the realities of women's experience could challenge both legal status and ac·
cepted images of social and economic status. I understand as well that any effort to survey
such a long period for clues about tort immunity involves numerous subtle and complex
issues of law, society, and historiography. Furthermore, I am not necessarily adopting the
account provided, but trying to tailor it to tort immunity to best capture what is expressed
in the judicial articulations of this idea. For a recent valuable analysis of many issues of
historiography and other difficult questions raised above in the context of family law his·
tory, see Minow, supra note 9.
30
R. MORRIS, STUDY AND HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 126-200 (2d ed. 1959), was widely
accepted as the definitive work on wives' legal status in colonial America during the half·
century following its 1930 publication. See Salmon, supra note 29. Recent historical re·
search questions many of Morris' conclusions, although debate is ongoing and controversial.
See infra notes 36 & 49 and accompanying text.
31
R. MORRIS, supra note 30, at 128-29.
•• Id. at 128-29, 175-76. Accord G. LERNER, THE WOMAN IN AMERICAN HISTORY 13·14
(1971).
33
See R. MORRIS, supra note 30, at 129. Cf. N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 69 ("metaphor of
enormous power" that survived "dislocations of colonization and revolution .•• to penetrate
nineteenth century American thought"); M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 14 (unity represented
little more than ideal in Anglo-American law and as legal concept underwent almost contin·
ual change in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
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bility" increasingly was recognized, 3 ' although the "rights and liabilities in tort of the colonial woman followed upon her proprietary
and contractual rights, and at a much slower pace."3 G Recent historical research, however, questions the validity of these perspectives, especially their general and overly optimistic nature and the
failure to consider thoroughly geographic or temporal variations.30
The following account now appears more accurate. Married
women were somewhat less constrained at the beginning of the colonial period.37 "Early variations in colonial practice and different
traditions in colonial administration left opportunities open for
novel American practices to develop,'' 38 especially in specific locales, during particular periods, as to the various indicia of coverture, and at equity. 39 Few colonies permitted husbands to give
their spouses "moderate correction" or to administer "domestic
chastisement."' 0 Most American courts would have protected in-

R MoRRis, supra note 30, at 197. This assertion is premised on an early, but essentially
inconclusive, colonial case.
•• Id. at 185.
•• See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 22-25; Chused, supra note 21, at 1391 n.155; Norton,
The Evolution of White Women's Experience in Early America, 89 AM. HIST. Rl:v. 593
(1984); Salmon, supra note 29. Cf. M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 3-13 (helpful background
discussion); Minow, supra note 9, at 865 (need to consider familial variability and social
roles of wives, which indicate wives had more power in certain contexts and family was not
patriarchal enclave).
37
See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 23-24; L. FmEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AM&ruCAN LAw 185
(1973); Chused, supra note 21, at 1389·90; Johnston, supra note 5, at 1058-59.
38
Chused, supra note 21, at 1390. Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 23·24.
•• The best treatment of geographic and temporal variability is l\1 SALMON, supra note
10, at 3-13. For discussion of the indicia of property, contract, and others, see N. BASCH,
supra note 9, at 15-112; M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 14-57; Chused, supra note 21. Equity
concepts that developed as exceptions to the unity idea and permitted women "to own,
manage, convey, and devise property represented a radical breakthrough for women." l\1
SALMON, supra note 10, at 81. But the use of equity had certain limitations. For example,
because equity rules were supervised by equity courts and never defined by statute they
were inaccessible to most women. Cf. id. at 81-184 (full discussion of equity); Minow, supra
note 9, at 858-59 (need for more research on equity).
•• Blackstone stated that the "old common law" permitted a husband to restrain his v.ife
by domestic chastisement and to give her moderate correction but that in the "reign of
Charles the Second, this power of correction began to be doubted," and she could in 1770
"have security of the peace against her husband." 1 W. BLACKSTONE. Coi.WENTAJUES •443-45.
Moreover, a 1641 Massachusetts statute provided that "[e]very married woman shall be free
from bodily correction or stirpes by her husband." S. SPEISER. C. KRAUSE & A GANS, 2 Tm:
AMERICAN LAw OF ToRTS § 6:44, at 215 n.84 (1985). Cf. E. PLECK. Doi.IESTlc T\"RANm·: Tira
MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TJ!JES TO
THE PRESENT 21-27 (1987) (discussing that statute and other legislation against family vio34
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tentionally injured wives, at least when they suffered severe harm
or when their husbands seriously misbehaved;0
Nevertheless, the married woman's legal status was not "miraculously transformed when it crossed the Atlantic."42 Colonial
America generally followed English common law;' 3 and the law respecting married women apparently was one of the areas least altered." More specifically, the "traditional English pattern of the
husband's dominance certainly governed in most places during the
late seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth century."•G
The mother country's "common law model of marital property,
along with its ameliorating exceptions, did take root, grow and
:flourish until it eventually crowded out most informal non-English
practices" in the New World. 46 A married man also was entitled to
impose restraints on his spouse's liberty, a "right" with which colonial judges were reluctant to interfere." These factors as well as
the substantive and procedural disabilities under which married

lence). But cf. infra note 47 and accompanying text (husband's right to impose "gentle restraint" and other conflicting ideas).
41
One writer has observed that "should the colonial man be so foolhardly as to deal bru·
tally with his wife the colonial court would interfere in woman's behalf." M. RYAN, WOMAN·
HOOD IN AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 43 (1975). Accord s. BOTEIN,
EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 42 (1983). Cf. M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 77 (when
husband so cruel that wife forced to leave home, courts required husband to support her in
living elsewhere). But cf. infra note 47 and accompanying text (right to impose restraints on
spouse's liberty).
•• N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 22. Accord Johnston, supra note 5, at 1059.
•• See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 4-9 (1977);
Chused, .~upra note 21, at 1389 n.139 and accompanying text, 1385 n.102 and accompanying
text, and 1391-92; Johnston, supra note 5, at 1058 n.103 and accompanying text.
•• See 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 12, at § I, reprinted in Johnston, supra note 5; J. GOEBEL,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 1-2 (1946).
•• Chused, supra note 21, at 1390. Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 22-23; M. BLOOM·
FIELD, supra note 20, at 97; M NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERI·
ENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN 1750-1800, at 50, 61-65 (1980); W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF
THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY 1760-1830, at
103 (1975); Johnston, supra note 5, at 1058-59.
•• N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 22-23. Accord Johnston, supra note 5, at 1059.
•• Colonial "judges were reluctant to intervene in family affairs, even to protect a wife or
child from physical abuse." M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 97. Cf. 2 J. KENT, CoMMENTA·
RIES ON AMERICAN LAW *181 (12th ed. 1896) (recognition of husband's right to impose "gen·
tie restraints" on wife's liberty); 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW 1120 (12th ed. 1932) (refer·
ences in common law survey to right of chastisement and to criminal prosecution only of
husbands who were guilty of malignant cruelty or permanently injuring wives). Much more
work must be done before it will be possible to say with certainty what relief was available
to a colonial wife abused physically by her husband.
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females labored made it quite improbable that an American court
would have recognized a wife's tort suit against her husband.48
b. From Independence to 1840. Although it might seem that the
American Revolution, "which unleashed an aggressively egalitarian
ideology antithetical to the very concept of coverture," should have
created a favorable climate for enlarging the freedom of women,
wives' rights actually were not significantly expanded after Independence.49 Separation from Britain directly caused "only a few
changes," and these were "gradual, conservative, and frequently
based upon English developments"; the merger idea survived the
Revolution essentially intact.150 Thus, at the turn of the century,
the legal status of married women was improved little over that
enjoyed considerably earlier. For instance, husbands were entitled
to their spouses' personal property once reduced to possession, as
well as to the control and management of wives' realty held in a
legal estate. 151

•• None of the sources consulted above states that interspousal tort litigation was attempted. Moreover, one writer who comprehensively analyzed the question has observed
that such actions were "unknown at common law," a factor attributable to the "fiction of
unity" and the "impossibility of the same person being both plaintiff and defendant in the
same suit." Haglund, supra note 24, at 704. It is important to remember that a wife's social
and economic status and her position in the family may have been better than her Jegal
status, and the family environment was probably less patriarchal than previously thought.
See J. DEMOS, A LITrLE COMMONWEALTH: FAAULY LIFE lN PLYMOUTH CoLONY 94-95 (1970); L.
ULRICH. Goon WIVES: !MAGE AND REALITY IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND, 1650-1750, at 35-50 (1982); Minow, supra note 9, at 852-65. These views remain controversial, however. See, e.g., !t.finow, supra note 9, at 828 n.24.
•• N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 25. Accord M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 104; L. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY lN REVOLUTIONARY A!JEruCA 9-10,
115-55 (1980); W. NELSON, supra note 45, at 103. Indeed much said above respecting colonial wives' legal status applies to the period between 1776 and 1840, including the difficu)ty
of drawing definitive conclusions. One complication is attempting to treat such a long, important period of American histocy. Another is that after 1815, the situation of women depended in part on where they lived. See G. LERNER, supra note 32, at 54. There is much
helpful recent research, such as N. BASCH, supra note 9; l\t SALMON, supra note 10; Chused,
supra note 21. Much of the work is revisionist and contradictory.
00
See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 24; L. KERBER, supra note 49, at 10 (merger intact);
Salmon, "Life, Liberty, and Dower": The Legal Status of Women After the American
Revolution in WOMEN, WAR, AND REVOLUTION 86, 87, 99-100 (C. Berkin & C. Lovett eds.
1980) (quoted ideas). Cf. M SALMON, supra note 10, at xv, 118, 191 (finding the "law became
more willing to grant women independent rights to property"); Minow, supra note 9, at 85859 (world of legal practices in early republic period more fluid than recitation of Blackstone
would suggest).
•• See Chused, supra note 21, at 1361. Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 26·27; W. NELSON, supra note 45, at 104. It would be unfair, however, to characterize wives' legal status as
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From 1800 to 1840, however, certain changes in the legal status
of married women did occur. "The legal separateness of the wife in
specific situations was sharpened somewhat in both statutes and
judicial decisions," and a number of norms which had economic
effects on married women were altered. 52 "Several reforms, including the liberalization of inheritance rules and divorce laws and the
enlargement of benefits for widows and abandoned women, appeared in the early decades of the nineteenth century."Ga Moreover, quite a few jurisdictions explicitly limited the husband's right
to administer domestic chastisement. 54
Nonetheless, wives' legal status was not enhanced markedly during the four decades. Most judges and commentators continued to
treat married females as if their legal identities remained merged
with their husbands', reflecting Blackstone's influence. 66 A revealing illustration was Justice Story's pronouncement in the 1819
Dartmouth College case: 56 a "man has as good a right to his wife as

"declining" between 1780 and 1800. There were some slow, subtle improvements. See supra
note 50. Moreover, women's status within society and the family seems to have improved.
See s. LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A SOUTHERN
TOWN 1784-1860 (1984); M. NORTON, supra note 45, at 228-94; E. PLECK, supra note 40, at
34-48; M SALMON, supra note 10, at 118, 191. Cf. Minow, supra note 9, at 852-65 (women's
status appears improved but in reality the colonial period was better than previously
thought). For a discussion of "Republican Motherhood," which has been used to character·
ize wives between 1780 and 1800, see N. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S
SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND 1780-1835, at 104-06, 147-48 (1977); L. KERBER, supra note 49; M.
NORTON, supra note 45, at 228-94. Cf. M. GROSSBERG, supra note 29, 3-31 (the "Republican
Family," legal order, and law of domestic relations). See generally L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
37, at 93-98 (discussing English laws' reception during period).
02
N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 25. Accord M. GROSSBERG, supra note 29, at 24-27. For
discussion of numerous norms that affected wives, see Chused, supra note 21.
•• Chused, supra note 21, at 1361, 1397. Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 25-26; W.
NELSON, supra note 45, at 103-04; M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 58-184.
04
See Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156, 158 (1824) (holding husband must show chastisement
confined to reasonable bounds to evade liability to wife). See also Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala.
143, 147 (1871) (concluding husband may exercise "gentle restraint" but "barbarous custom" of "wife whipping" not state law); T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 65 (1st ed.
1816) ("the right of chastising a wife is not claimed by any man" in Connecticut). Develop·
ments in adoption and child custody were also said to herald the emergence of a modern
American family law during this period. See M. GROSSBERG, supra note 29, at 234-85;
Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption,
and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1038, 1084-89 (1979).
•• For discussion of merger, its strength and resilience, and Blackstone's influence upon it,
see supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text. For more on merger and for analysis of the
views of most of the authorities discussed below, see N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 15-69.
•• Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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to the property acquired under a marriage contract. He has a legal
right to her society and her future." 67 Other legal figures, writing
contemporaneously and as late as the 1840s, agreed with Story's
views and essentially recognized patriarchal arrangements, if not
unity. 6 8 Chancellor Kent, in his celebrated Commentaries on
American Law, stated that a wedded male was afforded "reasonable superiority and control over" his spouse's person and might
"put gentle restraints upon her liberty." 69 Courts in some jurisdictions expressly subscribed to these propositions,60 while judges in a
few states even refused to punish men who practiced domestic
chastisement.61 Most telling, however, is Tapping Reeve's observation in the initial, indigenous legal treatise on marriage, The Law
of Baron and Femme: The "nature of the connexion between [husband and wife is] such that no [battery] can give either a right of
action to recover damages. " 62
These considerations, especially the strength and resilience of
the merger fiction and the substantial disabilities imposed upon
wedded females, probably explain the absence of a single reported
case in which an American court was asked to permit an interspousal tort suit throughout the forty years. 63 Commencing around
07
Id. at 596-97. The pronouncement is particularly telling, given Justice Story's eminence
as a jurist and writer. For a valuable biography, see R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC (1985).
08
See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, THE LEGAL RIGHTS, LIABILITIES AND DUTIES OF WOMEN (1845);
Walker, supra note 5, at 318-20. For additional discussion of these writers and others, see N.
BASCH, supra note 9, at 43-54; M GROSSBERG, supra note 29, at 3-31. But cf. l\finow, supra
note 9, at 842 n.84 (questioning what legal fiction meant to wives in daily lives).
•• J. KENT, supra note 47, at *181. The Commentaries were written in the 1820s. Cf. N.
BASCH, supra note 9, at 60-69 (discussion of Kent's treatment of wives).
0
•
See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 589 (1858) (noting thnt, except in divorce
cases, wife cannot bring lawsuit unless joined with husband because "she is deemed to be
under the protection of her husband"); cases cited in N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 219; W.
NELSON, supra note 45, at 103-04.
•• The case most often cited for this proposition is State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 456-57
(1868) (state will not interfere with husband's moderate correction of \\ife even if there had
been no provocation for it), modified, State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61 (1874) ("husband has
no right to chastise his wife under any circumstances"). But cf. supra note 54 and accompanying text (states rejecting idea); Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 177 n.8 (1982) (most. states repudiated chastisement but refused to entertain routine assault cases).
•• T. REEVE, supra note 54, at 65. Cf. N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 57-60 (analysis of \\ives'
treatment in Reeve's treatise).
63
The first reported case seems to be Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 367-70
(N.Y. 1863) (wife sought to maintain assault action against husband based on Married
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1840, however, a complex mix of factors led to the passage of Married Women's Property Acts. These measures were enacted in
every jurisdiction by approximately 1875,6 " and this development
had significant implications for interspousal tort immunity. 66
Women's Property Act). Accord Haglund, supra note 24, at 704 ("no adjudicated prece·
dent" until "married women's acts • . . generally enacted" because of merger fiction and
impossibility of same person being plaintiff and defendant in same suit). Cf. Abbott v. Ab·
bott, 67 Me. 304, 308-09 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me.
1980); supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (substantive and procedural disabilities
under which wives labored until Acts' passage). It is also possible that there were unreported, unappealed adverse trial court decisions or settlements.
64
See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 27-28; M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 117; Chusod,
supra note 21, at 1398. Professor Chused observes that the "acts began to appear in 1835,"
but he considers 1840 as an appropriate "approximation of the beginning of a transition
period." Id. at 1361 n.3. See generally id. at 1398 n.204 (helpful suggestions for working
with Acts).
•• It is very difficult to generalize briefly about societal views of women, marriage, wives,
and the family for such a long, complex, and important period as 1800 to 1840. For helpful,
concise discussions, see N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 29-41; Chused, supra note 21, at 1412·23.
See generally M. GROSSBERG, supra note 29, M. SALMON, supra note 10; Minow, supra note
9, at 866-84 (fuller treatment).
During the late eighteenth century, women fashioned the notion of Republican Mother·
hood, marriage became somewhat more companionate and less hierarchical, and females'
social status improved somewhat. See supra note 51. Moreover, when industrial capitalism
forced production out of homes between 1800 and 1850, wives' special roles were "intensi·
fied, sentimentalized, and transformed into the cult of domesticity," whereby women occupied lofty spheres that were "complementary to but clearly separate from the world of men"
in which they redefined and expanded their roles. N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 40, 30. Accord
M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 191. But see Lerner, The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in
the Status of Women in the Age of Jackson, 10 MIDCONTINENT A. STUD. J. 5-15 (1969)
(women's status declined). For additional discussion of the cult of domesticity, see A. DouoLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1977); Welter, The Cult of True Woman·
hood: 1800-1860, in B. WELTER, DIMITY CONVICTIONS: THE AMERICAN WOMAN IN THE NINE·
TEENTH CENTURY 21-41 (1976). For discussion of the separate sphere ideology, see C. DEGLER,
AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 26·65
(1980); K O'DoNOVAN, SEXuAL D1v1s10NS IN LAW 59-158 (1985). Cf. Olsen, The Family and
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (reform
efforts to help women limited by separate spheres of market and family); Powers, Sex Seg·
regation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 55,
70-78 (legal recognition of public and private spheres). For more discussion of how women
redefined and expanded their roles, see N. COTT, supra note 51; Smith-Rosenberg, Beauty,

the Beast and the Militant Woman: A Case Study in Sex Roles and Social Stress in Jack·
sonian America, 23 AM. Q. 562 (1971). Cf. A. KoLODNY, THE LAND BEFORE HER: FANTASY AND
EXPERIENCE OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIERS, 1630-1860 (1984) (frontier women's experience at
odds with cult of domesticity and separate spheres); Minow, supra note 9, at 869 (working
women's experience at odds with cult of domesticity and separate spheres). For a discussion
of the transition from Republican Motherhood to the cult of domesticity, see M. RYAN,
supra note 41, at 139-91. The period between 1830 and 1840 has also been described as one
of "extraordinary ferment," characterized by a "generalized reform spirit," in which some
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2. After 1840.
a. The Married Women's Property Acts. The Married Women's
statutes were important because they provided a basis for recognizing personal injury actions between husbands and wives. The
typical legislation authorized a married woman to "maintain an action in her own name, for damages, against any person ... for any
injury to her person or character, the same as if she were sole." 66
The statutes, therefore, made it plausible to contend that coverture had been destroyed and independent legal status bestowed or,
at least, that common-law disabilities had been removed or indicia
of legal personality provided, so that interspousal tort litigation
should be permitted.67 Consequently, during the 1860s, the attorneys who filed the initial cases seeking recognition of wives' tort
suits against husbands seized upon the statutes. Indeed, the measures figured prominently in nearly every judicial determination
regarding immunity until the mid-twentieth century. 08 Thus, it is
important to analyze carefully the enactments because of the implications they had for interspousal tort immunity. 69
women participated, especially through religious organizations, in such activities ns abolition
of slavery. W. O'NEILL, supra note 9, at 18-21. Accord W. CHAFE. WOMEN AND EQUALITY:
CHANGING PATIERNs IN AMERICAN CULTURE 24 {1977);
CLINTON, Tm: OTHER CML WAR:
AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY 166·87 (1984); W. LEACH, TRUE L<>n: AND
PERFECT UNION: THE FEMINIST REFORM OF SEX AND SocIETV {1980); Minow, supra note 9, at
877-84 (women applied ethos of caring in public sphere through voluntary activities).
•• The quoted language is in an 1862 amendment to the New York Married Women's
legislation and was relied upon by an attorney who brought one of the first cnses seeking
recognition of an interspousal tort cause of action. See N.Y. Laws of 1862, ch. 172, § 3,
quoted in Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 642 (N.Y. 1865).
67
See Freethy, 42 Barb. at 642.
68
Modem courts generally do not treat the legislation as dispositive, although some rely
on it. See, e.g., Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 647-50 (Mo. 1986) (discussing
"overdue recognition that .•. General Assembly attempted to abrogate this common law
doctrine in the Married Women's Act"); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 306-10, 433 A.2d 859,
862-64 (1981) (concluding that words "separate property" within Married Persons Property
Act provided claim for tort damages).
•• This task is complex and controversial because the reforins effected by the Acts were
mammoth in scope, diverse in origins and purpose, and extended over space and time. Consequently, a comprehensive analysis has not yet been performed. Moreover, prior research
has engendered confusion. Some observers viewed the Acts ns instigated by women's rights
advocates for the purpose of modifying coverture. These perspectives now seem inaccurate,
especially in light of recent work. See, e.g., N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 113-99; P. RABKIN,
supra note 10, at 52-99; Speth, The Married Women's Property Acts, 1839-1865: Reform,
Reaction, or Revolution, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW 69 (0. Weisberg ed. 1982); Chused,
supra note 21; Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women's Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women's Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29 AM. J.
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The statutes were passed in at least three waves, which occurred
at different times for numerous, changing reasons and at the behest of shifting, diverse interests. The measures included varying
language both within and among states and were amended continuously, even as late as the twentieth century.70 Most Acts modified
one or more specific incidents of wives' legal status, but very few
enactments simultaneously changed a substantial number of
indicia.71
It is difficult to determine from the phraseology in most statutes,
even when all of the amendments in a jurisdiction are considered
together, exactly what implications the legislation had for immunity. The wording of the measures varied, but most statutes specifically protected wives' property from their spouses' creditors and
wives' earnings from their husbands. The enactments also provided
wives with independent ownership of and control over their property, permitted wives to contract, and enabled them to litigate and
be sued without joining their spouses. The language of the New
Hampshire statute is typical:
Every woman shall hold to her own use, free from the
interference or control of any husband she may have, all
property at any time earned, acquired or inherited by,
bequeathed, given or conveyed to her, either before or after marriage. . . . Every married woman shall have the
same rights and remedies, and shall be subject to the
same liabilities in relation to property held by her in her
LEGAL HIST. 3 (1985); Johnston, supra note 5, at 1061-69. Cf. E. WARBASSE, THE CHANGING
LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN, 1800-1861 (1987) (recent issuance of valuable 1960 doctoral thesis on married women's property rights).
10
See Johnston, supra note 5, at 1061-92. "The process was piecemeal and erratic; it was
also progressive and irreversible." M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 117.
71
A state legislature might first attempt to free wives' estates from their spouses' debts;
four years later to establish separate estates for wives; six years later to speak to proscrip·
tions upon wives conveying property; eleven years later to adopt other provisos pertaining to
wives' property; fourteen years later to treat their earnings or contracts; and twenty years
after first legislating in the area, to provide for wives' litigation. For example, the Connect!·
cut legislature initially adopted a Married Women's Property Act in 1845 and amended it
ten times during the ensuing 22 years. Not until 1877 were wives afforded complete domin·
ion over their property. See Johnston, supra note 5, at 1067-68 (description of Connecticut's
Act); cf. Speth, supra note 69, at 47 (descriptions of other states' Act). Moreover, there was
an astounding lack of cross-jurisdictional uniformity; indeed, "it was extremely unlikely at
anytime during the period of reform that any two states shared exactly the same law."
Johnston, supra note 5, at 1062; accord Chused, supra note 21, at 1398.
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own right, as if she were unmarried and may convey,
make contracts, and sue and be sued, in all matters in
law and equity, and upon any contract by her made, or
for any wrong by her done, as if she were unmarried.72
Some legislation specifically mentioned litigation between husbands and wives. For example, the South Carolina measure explicitly prescribed interspousal claims: "A married woman may sue
and be sued as if she were unmarried. When the action is between
herself and her husband she may likewise sue or be sued alone. "'3
The Hawaii enactment, in contrast, proscribed interspousal actions: "A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner
as if she were sole; but this section shall not be construed to authorize suits between husband and wife.""'
Quite a few statutes permitted personal injury litigation by wedded females, as the Maryland measure illustrates: "Married women
shall have power [to sue] for torts committed against them, as fully
as if they were unmarried . . ." 7 rs But no legislation, as originally
passed or even as amended until the twentieth century, specifically
provided both for personal injury actions and for such suits between husbands and wives.76
The Acts' imprecise phraseology and the paucity of legislative
history, such as committee reports or floor debates, that accompanied the statutes' enactment,77 make it difficult to discern whether
legislatures intended to alter immunity. Most legislators probably

72

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:1,2 (1983).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-170 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
?• HAw. REV. STAT. § 573-5 (1985), repealed by L. 1987, c. 46, § 4.
?• Mn. ANN. CoDE. art. 45, § 5 (1957), repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 296, § 1.
?• McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1050. In 1959, Professor McCurdy observed that Illinois,
New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin statutes specifically addressed interspousal tort
suits; however, these measures are all twentieth century amendments. See McCurdy, supra
note 27, at 312, 320-21. For similar amendments, see D.C. CODE ANN.§ 30-201 (1981); Mor.'T.
CODE ANN.§ 40-2-109 (1981); ND. CENT. CODE§ 14-07-05 (1981); VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.02-220.1
(1981).
" One explanation for the dearth of legislative history was the noncontroversial nature of
much of this legislation, so that no legislative history was created. Sec infra notes 97-99 and
accompanying text. Moreover, few states recorded, compiled or maintained that type of data
during the nineteenth century. See Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction,
24 IND. L.J. 335, 348 (1949); cf. J. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE, 1908-1940, at 73-74
(1981) (federal legislative history compiled throughout nineteenth century). Little of the
data that was prepared has been collected or analyzed, although the sources mentioned at
supra note 69 comprise a helpful start.
?>
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never considered the exact question. Had they thought about the
issue, few lawmakers, particularly during earlier periods, would
have meant to modify interspousal tort immunity, especially in
light of contemporary societal views of women, wedlock, wives, and
the family. 7 s The purposes of the Acts that are more readily identifiable, however, are analyzed below to ascertain the measures' implications for potential interspousal tort litigation.
(i) The First Wave. Much of the first wave of Married Women's
statutes was adopted almost entirely during the 1840s.70 Those
measures were directed primarily at protecting wives' assets from
their husbands' creditors, thereby creating a discrete fund for family use, while leaving coverture and marital estates essentially
intact.so
The Acts were commercial in the sense that widespread economic difficulties had led to many alterations of debtor's law and
had engendered great concern about exempting property from attachment by creditors.s1 A number of other commercial factors
may explain passage of particular pieces of legislation. Between
1780 and 1840, the development of a modern scheme of commercial law facilitated the rapid expansion and industrialization of the
American economy.s2 Moreover, there was considerable need for
readily available capital. This could be satisfied partially by freeing
wives' resources from common-law limitations and from what
78
Indeed, most Acts were compatible with and reinforced the views. See infra note 95.
For a discussion of the views, see infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
70
I rely substantially here on N. BASCH, supra note 9; P. RABKIN, supra note 10; Chused,
supra note 21.
80
See Chused, supra note 21, at 1361, 1398, 1400. Accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 226·
27; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 154-55; Speth, supra note 69, at 72-73. Professor Chused
observes, however, that "legislation chipping away at a number of the harsher consequences
of coverture law had been enacted in earlier parts of the century" so that "[i]f further reform was to occur, the institution of coverture had to become the focus of attention."
Chused, supra note 21, at 1400.
81
See Chused, supra note 21, at 1400; Speth, supra note 69, at 72-73. See also N. BASCH,
supra note 9, at 226 ("Precipitous dips in an increasingly complex economy encouraged
legislators to pass statutes that insulated the wife's property. From the creditor's perspective, clarity was preferable to ambiguity.").
82
See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 39-40; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 85-105, 153-54;
Johnston, supra note 5, at 1060-61; Powers, supra note 65, at 79 n.111. All of these sources
cite, and Johnston and Powers rely substantially upon, the research of K. Thurman, The
Married Women's Property Acts (unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Wisconsin Law
School, 1966). See generally M. HORWITZ, supra note 43 (discussing development of modern
scheme of commercial law).
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probably were seen as increasingly burdensome, costly, and ineffective devices, such as "powers of attorney, antenuptial contracts,
private laws, and equitable remedies," created to circumvent those
strictures.83 A related idea is that the statutes were one component
of a more comprehensive effort to defeudalize and modernize real
property law and make land an item of commerce.8 '
Another reason for passage of the statutes may have been the
desire of fathers to protect their daughters' inherited assets or
family funds from disadvantageous fluctuations in the economy or
from profligate sons-in-law who might squander these resources on
gambling, alcohol, or ill-advised investments.8 1i The passage of the
legislation, therefore, might have been responsive principally to necessities dictated by a commercial age.
Enactment of the statutes also may have been attributable to
the endeavors of women's rights advocates who envisioned the establishment of a separate legal identity for wives as one means for
enhancing their condition. As early as the 1790s, Mary Wollstonecraft protested the inferior legal status to which females had
been relegated.86 Moreover, the women's movement grew, so that
by the time of the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention, activists were
vociferously denouncing Blackstone, coverture, and wives' subservient status and were petitioning legislatures to adopt Married
Women's Acts.87 Although these proponents did not influence directly the enactment of most of the initial set of statutes,88 evolving societal views of women probably did provide a conducive cli-

83
Johnston, supra note 5, at 1060-61. See also N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 113·35; L.
FruEDMAN, supra note 37, at 186; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 85-105, 153-54.
.,. See P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 10, 153; accord Speth, supra note 69, at 76-77.
83
See C. DEGLER, supra note 65, at 333; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 12-13, 78, SS.89, 9596; K. Thurman, supra note 82, at 14-16; Chused, supra note 21, at 1403.
66
See generally M WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 109-69
(1792); M BEARD, supra note 10, at 95-100; M NORTON, supra note 45, at 251·55 (analyses
of Wollstonecraft's work and its effect).
.., See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 161, 168, 170; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 110-11;
Speth, supra note 69, at 79-80.
66 See Chused, supra note 21, at 1361, 1400; Speth, supra note 69, at 72-79; cf. N. BASCH,
supra note 9, at 136-61; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 10, 74 (women's movement not primarily responsible for New York's 1848 Act). The question of what impact women's rights proponents had on passage of the early Acts warrants more comprehensive treatment. For a
thorough analysis of New York's Act, see Basch and Rabkin, who conclude that the Acts
"gave impetus to the women's movement by providing a focus for presutTrnge demands." P.
RABKIN, supra note 10, at 11; accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 166-99.
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mate for the measures' passage.
As industrial capitalism pushed production out of the
home in the first half of the nineteenth century, emphasis on the wife's special role was intensified, sentimentalized, and transformed into the cult of domesticity
[whereby women] occupied a lofty sphere that was complementary to but clearly separate from the world of men
[and in which] women redefined and expanded their
roles. 89
The "emergence of the modern American family," characterized by
the companionate ideal of marriage, increased responsibility and
autonomy for females in the household, and greater emphasis on
child rearing and the special needs of young children, enabled
wives to expand their authority in the private sphere. 90 Women's
literacy rates increased substantially and their educational opportunities grew.91 Women participated in a number of voluntary,
moral reform, and religious organizations designed to improve society. 92 Thus, "when distressed economic times appeared after 1839,
the moment was right for legislatures to codify a portion of the
equitable separate estates tradition by insulating wives' property
from their spouses' creditors."93
In short, the earliest group of Married Women's Acts did not
affect coverture, much less emancipate wedded females or afford
them equality or important rights, such as the vote or the opportunity to serve as jurors.94 Indeed, nearly all of the legislation was

89
N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 40, 30. Accord M. SALMON, supra note 10, at 191; sources
cited supra note 65.
90
See N. COTT, supra note 51, at 200; C. DEGLER, supra note 65, at 8·9, 28, 111·43;
Zainaldin, supra note 54, at 1084-89.
91
See L. KERBER, supra note 49, at 193-221; M. NORTON, supra note 45, at 256·72;
Chused, supra note 21, at 1416-17. Cf. Minow, supra note 9, at 866-77 (experiences of work·
ing and frontier women).
•• See C. CLINTON, supra note 65, at 166-87; W. O'NEILL, supra note 9, at 18-21. Cf. B.
EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF DOMESTICITY: WOMEN, EVANGELISM, AND TEMPERANCE IN NINE•
TEENTH- CENTURY AMERICA (1981). The 1830s was a period of "extraordinary ferment," char·
acterized by a "generalized reform spirit," during which time women were involved in anti·
slavery activities. W. O'NEILL, supra note 9, at 18-21; accord C. CLINTON, supra note 65, at
166-87; Minow, supra note 9, at 877-84.
93
Chused, supra note 21, at 1361.
.. For historical analyses of the denial of rights in the public sphere, see K. O'DONOVAN,
supra note 65, at 59-158; Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and
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compatible with, and even reinforced, prevailing societal views of
women, marriage, wives, and the family. eG Enactment of the statutes was not particularly controversial, especially in contrast to the
bitter, and even volatile, "century of struggle" over suffrage.e 6
Most of the measures passed easily in all-male legislatures, with
limited lobbying by women,e 7 engendering minimal discussion in
statehouses and little public debate.es
(ii) The Second Wave. The second wave of enactments a:fforded
wives separate estates, thereby commencing the long process of
dismantling coverture and providing independent legal identity.
These Acts were passed over a lengthy period, which started in the
1840s and ended after the Civil War; thus, their adoption overlapped the first wave. Creation of separate estates was the most
important aspect of the second group, although employment of
this mechanism had contradictory implications.ee For example, the

the Role of the Law, ch. 6, in Tm: PoLmcs OF LAW {D. Kairys ed. 1982); Powers, supra note
65, at 70-73, 79-88. Analysts nearly unanimously agree that the Acts were not intended to
afford wives' equality or rights or to affect marriage. See B. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 597;
N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 41; M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 113, 122; P. RABKJN, supra
note 10, at 13; Chused, supra note 21, at 1359-61.
•• See Chused, supra note 21, at 1361, 1423-25; K. Thurman, supra note 82, at 7; cf.
supra notes 65 & 89-93 and accompanying text {discussion of prevailing societul views of
women, marriage, wives, and the family); N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 142-43 (proponents of
Act argued it would improve marriage); P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 89, 154-55 (Acts
strengthened family as economic unit).
96
See P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 10; Powers, supra note 65, at 79 n.111; cf. E. FLEXNRR.
CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: Tm: WOMEN'S RIGHTS MOVEblENT IN THE UNITED STATES 62-102
{1975) {discussing suffrage struggle).
97
See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 156; M. BEARD, supra note 10, at 171-72; M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 117; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 98; Chused, supra note 21, at 1361.
•• See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 136; C. DEGLER, supra note 65, at 333; P. RABKJN, supra
note 10, at 153; K. Thurman, supra note 82, at 50. The above account of passage of the first
wave of Acts necessarily is general. One or a combination of the factors examined above may
have affected passage of specific Acts. Moreover, these explanations are not an exhaustive
catalog. For example, passage may have been part of broader codification and lnw reform
efforts, as manifested specifically in the effort to democratize equity. See N. BASCH, supra
note 9, at 116, 126, 226-27; and P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 10-11, 31-90 {discussing codification and law reform effort); N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 136-61; l\t BLOOMFIELD, supra note
20, at 113 {discussing equity's democratization) .
.. The "early statutes inevitably needed refinement to account for ambiguity, enlarged
goals, or hostile judicial reception." Chused, supra note 21, at 1398 n.202; accord N. BASCH,
supra note 9, at 136-61; M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 20, at 117. Much work remains to be
done on the second wave, but Professors Basch and Chused have done the most. and I rely
here upon them. There is widespread agreement that the judiciary narrowly construed the
Acts. See sources cited in N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 202 n.2; Chused, supra note 21, at 1400
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use of separate estates indicates that wives' property was seen primarily as a family asset or as protection for abandoned or widowed
women and that wives were to have more power to dispose of separate property. Nonetheless, the "very device used to confirm
women's special sphere ... created a wedge in the coverture bastion, and confirmed for women a small degree of independence
from their marriage partners.moo Although women's rights advocates lobbied actively for this legislation, particularly in states such
as New York, and for some of the subsequent measures, 101 even
these "statutes were neither driven by the Women's Movement nor
indicated a commitment to women's rights." 102 This is only one of
"myriad contradictions" reflected in most legislation passed after
the first set of Acts. 103
(iii) The Third Wave. The third series of measures, passed primarily in the 1870s, principally protected wives' earnings from
their husbands, further eroding the unity concept and enhancing
married women's legal personalities. These statutes probably were
premised more on an "ideology lauding the capacity of womei;i to

n.211 (high probability of mixed picture). But cf. Johnston, supra note 5, at 1069 (much
more evidence needed to conclude "general pattern" existed in which judiciary "deliberately
sabotaged legislative attempts to implement broad reforms").
10
° Chused, supra note 21, at 1412.
101
"Only after this initial wave of debtor protection measures appeared did the women's
movement get deeply and successfully involved in substantial reform of coverture law."
Chused, supra note 21, at 1361. Accord Speth, supra note 69, at 72-85. For discussion of the
role of the women's movement in New York, see N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 162-99; P.
RABKIN, supra note 10, at 106-17. Cf. M. BEARD, supra note 10, at 128-33; Speth, supra note
69, at 82-83 (other states).
102
Telephone interview with Richard Chused, Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center (May 3, 1985). Accord Speth, supra note 69, at 83-84.
10
• Chused, supra note 21, at 1412. The most prominent contradiction was mentioned in
supra note 102 and accompanying text. Another contradiction is that separate estates afforded incentives to hide family resources from creditors in the wives' estates. These devel·
opments eventually evoked legislative responses. See Chused, supra note 21, at 1412;
Chused, supra note 69, at 23, 35. Much said above regarding the first wave of Acts applies to
the second wave. For discussion of societal views of women, marriage, wives, and the family
at this time, see E. FI.EXNER, supra note 96, at 78-144; T. HAREVEN & M. VINOVSKIS, FAMILY
AND POPULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1978) [hereinafter T. HAUEVEN]; J.
HIGHAM, FROM BOUNDLESSNESS TO CONSOLIDATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMElllCAN CUL·
TURE (1969); M. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS, THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW
YoRK, 1790-1865, at 145-229 (1981). Cf. supra notes 65 & 89-93 and accompanying text
(views during earlier part of period); N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 162-99; C. CLINTON, supra
note 65, at 40-71; Welter, supra note 65, at 24-41 (views during latter part of period).
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make finer moral judgments," particularly regarding children,104
than on solicitude for working wives' needs. This was evidenced by
decreasing interest in the legislation of women's rights proponents105 and the enhanced vitality of the "cult of domesticity" during the Victorian era.106
After this period in every jurisdiction legislatures continually
amended the enactments. Merger was dismantled gradually with
the alteration of specific indicia of legal identity. Some incidents of
legal personality, like the capacity to litigate, undoubtedly were
necessary to effectuate indicia already granted. 107 Although a number of measures legalized wives' relationships with "anyone,'' few
explicitly provided for much interspousal legal activity. 108 Some of
the legislative initiatives may have been responsive to unpalatable
judicial construction, the lobbying efforts of moral reformers or

104
Chused, supra note 21, at 1424. Much work remains to be done on the third wave of
Acts, but Professor Chused has done the most. See id.; Chused, supra note 69. I substantially rely on his work here.
10
• The earnings legislation might have been responsive to working wives' needs. Jn fact,
Elizabeth Cady Stanton did urge passage on their behalf. See P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at
113. Professor Basch persuasively refutes this idea, however. See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at
164-99. Cf. P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 139-46 (impact on working wives of Earnings Act
judicial construction). E. PLECK, supra note 40, at 49-66 (women's movement of 18-003 exposed domestic abuses and promoted legislation that would add physical cruelty as grounds
for divorce in New York State).
An important reason for the reformers' decreasing interest in the legislation was their
increasing focus on suffrage, an interest attributable partly to work on the Acts. See N.
BASCH, supra note 9, at 207-08; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 156. New York is anomalous in
several ways; its Earnings Act passed in 1860 and was instigated by the women's movement.
See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 162-99; P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 106-17.
106
See Chused, supra note 21, at 1423-24; cf. supra note 65 (discussing cult of domesticity). For discussion of societal views of women, marriage, wives, and the family at this time,
see E. Fi.EXNER, supra note 96, at 115-44; T. liAREVEN, supra note 103; R. WIEBE. THE
SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920, at 1-110 (1967).
07
'
See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 165. States frequently included the capacity to litigate
and additional indicia in their civil procedure codes. See, e.g., the Acts at issue in Peters v.
Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 35, 103 P. 219, 220-21 (1909), overruled, Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376
P.2d 65 (1962); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920); Chused, supra note 69,
at 33 n.116. Much work remains to be done on the Acts passed after the third wave. For
helpful discussion of these Acts, see Johnston, supra note 5, at 1070-89.
10
• See, e.g., 1860 N.Y. Laws ch. 90, 11 2; D.C. Code § 1155 (1901), quoted and construed
in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1910). Cf. 1884 N.Y. Laws ch. 384 (\\ives
could contract as if single but not with husbands). Indeed, much nineteenth century litigation over the Acts involved family creditors who sued one of the spouses, not interspousal
actions. See P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 126, 155; Chused, supra note 69 (impact of family
debtor-creditor problems on Married Women's law in Oregon); Speth, supra note 69, at 79.

382

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:359

women's rights activists, or to a number of other forces. 10° For instance, the practice of employing the separate estate device to hide
family assets from creditors led numerous jurisdictions to adopt
statutes permitting creditors to reach both spouses' property.110
This final group of enactments was so disparate that it may not
even comprise a wave. It, like the second and third, only eroded
unity to the extent that a specific disability of coverture was modified and did not provide significant rights, such as suffrage. Nonetheless, these measures probably were most important to the eventual abolition of immunity.111
This survey of the Married Women's statutes demonstrates the
difficulty of characterizing the reform as a wholesale attack on the
merger concept. The measures did not create independent legal
status or comprehensively emancipate wives, much less restructure
marriage or the family. 112 The nineteenth century amendment process is described best as "evolutionary"; it was primarily commercial and principally involved the gradual extension of separate estates to married women and equalization of property available to
creditors. 113 The considerations above are not dispositive of the
legislation's implications for immunity, because by the concluding
phases of the amendment process, coverture was no longer a legal
reality. Indeed, the addition of each incident of separate legal identity and concomitant removal of an incident of coverture increased
the plausibility of arguing that the measures eroded unity, en10
• See Chused, supra note 21, at 1400, 1424; cf. supra note 99 (discussing judicial con·
struction of Acts).
110
See Chused, supra note 21, at 1412; Chused, supra note 69, at 23, 35. Tho caveats
mentioned in supra note 98 are especially applicable to the final group of Acts. For societal
views of women, marriage, wives, and the family at this time, see the sources cited supra
notes 103 & 106.
111
See infra notes 246-55, 324 & 329 and accompanying text.
112
As late as the 1890s, marital property law could be characterized as a "jumbled patch·
work reflecting no coherent policy or philosophy concerning the status of married women."
Johnston, supra note 5, at 1069; accord N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 38, 224. Cf. Chused
telephone interview, supra note 102 ("radical restructuring of the family was not in the
imagination" of any legislators, who were principally conservative men).
113
Perhaps Professor Chused most accurately captures the amendment process:
[O]ne must hypothesize that shifts in the nation's economy, job map, family
structure, agricultural productivity, banking practices, and trade structures
would be mirrored by piecemeal, one step to the left, one step to the right,
reforms in legal norms, and that changes would reflect generally held percep·
tions about women's appropriate sphere of influence.
Chused, supra note 21, at 1423.
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hanced wives' legal status, or emancipated them and, thus, altered
the notion of tort immunity. Accordingly, as early as the 1860s,
lawyers seized upon the statutes and contended that they provided
for personal injury litigation between husbands and wives. 114 These
suits commenced a process which has continued unabated to the
present.
b. Immunity Case Law. Because legislatures did not specifically
address interspousal tort immunity, judicial opinions have been
determinative. 115 The 125 years of case law-common law development can be divided into four discrete periods.116 Between 1863
and 1913, judges unanimously rejected interspousal personal injury
claims. In 1910 a sharply divided United States Supreme Court
recognized the rule. From 1914 until 1920, jurists in seven states
allowed such actions, and a comparable number denied them. During the ensuing half century, immunity slowly eroded. Finally,
since approximately 1970, the doctrine has been converted to a minority rule. 117
(i) 1863-1913. The twelve state courts asked to permit interspousal tort actions in the half century after 1863 refused to do

,,. The first reported case is Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366 (N.Y. 1863). Cf.
supra note 63 and accompanying text (why first case brought then).
115
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
11
• Numerous difficulties attend any attempt to provide a coherent account of 125 years of
opinions. Many considerations affected specific cases that were issued during such a lengthy
period. Moreover, there are hundreds of opinions. Their chronological examination yielded
insights and undermined numerous preconceptions. The opinions can be classified into surprisingly discrete groups, even though this may be too "structuralist," "instrumentalist.'' or
"evolutionary" for some. See, e.g., Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1017, 1018-24 (1981) [hereinafter Gordon
Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and
the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAw & Soc'v REv. 9
(1975) [hereinafter Gordon II]; Minow, supra note 9. The conclusions herein are intended to
provoke thinking about these cases and the issues they raise. Others are encouraged to assess the opinions and questions, reach their own conclusions, and contribute to ongoing debate. See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1560 n.241. I appreciate the limitations of relying on legal
texts and cases, especially intentional tort cases that reflect "trouble" in the community.
See K LLEWELLYN & E. HoEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 20-63 (1941); Minow, supra note 9, at
825, 850 (explaining case of trouble).
"' For some of the difficulties entailed in ascertaining why the opinions were decided
these ways, see G. WHITE, PATI'ERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGllT 74-95 (1978); Feinman,
The Meaning of Reliance, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1373; Feinman, The Role of Ideas in Legal
History, 78 Mica L. REv. 722 (1980); Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. RE\·. 57
(1984); Gordon I, supra note 116; Gordon II, supra note 116; Minow, supra note 9. Helpful
suggestions for future work can be gleaned from N. BASCH, supra note 9; Chused, supra note
21; Minow, supra note 9.

n;

384

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:359

so. 118 Uniform rejection is not surprising, given the legal status of
wives, the significance of coverture, and the lack of clarity respecting immunity in the Married Women's Acts. 119 Moreover, this result was consistent with courts' perspectives on their responsibilities in handling immunity, prevailing societal images of females,
wedlock, wives, and the family, and other tort law developments. 120
Somewhat less predictable than the results reached are the similar
reasoning processes employed. 121 The cases rejecting interspousal
tort actions articulate every major policy argument subsequently
espoused to justify immunity, and they facilitate understanding of

• An 1882 opinion of a New York intermediate appellate court would have permitted
interspousal tort litigation. See Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33, rev'd, 89 N.Y.
644 (1882). The summary reversal of the case indicates its relative insignificance. Nation·
wide retention of immunity during the ensuing 30 years and the failure of courts to abolish
immunity in reliance on the decision also reflect its insignificance. But the opinion's author
did depend on decisional techniques, statutory interpretation, and policy concepts similar to
those relied upon by many judges who later abrogated immunity. For purposes of con·
tinuity, the decision will be treated with the initial cases abolishing immunity, see infra
notes 246-64 and accompanying text. There also is the 1910 dissenting opinion in Thompson
v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910) (discussed infra notes 205-21 and accompanying text).
The cases retaining immunity were Thompson, 218 U.S. 611; Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32,
38, 103 P. 219, 221, (1909), overruled, Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 691, 376 P.2d 65, 70
(1962); Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106 (1891); Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 296, 44 N.E.
462, 465 (1896); Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182 (1875), overruled, Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d
616 (Iowa 1979); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 309 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. Mac·
Donald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980); Libby v. Berry, 74 Me. 286, 289 (1883); Bandfield v. Band·
field, 117 Mich. 80, 83, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898), overruled, Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39,
187 N.W.2d 236 (1971); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 428, 107 N.W. 1047, 1048 (1906),
overruled, Poepping v. Lindeman, 268 Minn. 30, 127 N.W.2d 512 (1964), and overruled,
Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44
Barb. 366, 368-70 (N.Y. 1863); Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N.Y. 1865); Schultz, 34
N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 26; Abbe v. Abbe, 22 A.D. 483, 484, 48 N.Y.S. 25 (1897); Nickerson v.
Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281, 283 (1886), overruled, Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.
1978); Sykes v. Speer, 112 S.W. 422, 424-25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), modified sub nom. Speer
& Goodnight v. Sykes, 102 Tex. 451, 119 S.W. 86 (1909); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash.
496, 501, 118 P. 629, 631 (1911), overruled, Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771
(1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). Cf. Deeds v.
Strode, 6 Idaho 317, 55 P. 656 (1898) (dictum); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 391,
77 S.W. 664, 668 (1903) (dictum), overruled, Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 759 (Tenn.
1983).
11
• See supra notes 66-111 and accompanying text.
120
See infra notes 159-89 and accompanying text (considerations regarding torts, judicial
views, and societal images). The societal images also are mentioned, see supra notes 103 &
106, and articulated by judges in opinions recognizing immunity. See, e.g., infra notes 141·
56 and accompanying text.
121
The reasoning processes are remarkably similar, although not identical.
11
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the doctrine's survival into the late twentieth century.122 Accordingly, these cases merit comprehensive examination.
The starting point for the courts was the common law. Most
judges simply announced, with little explanation and even with approval of plaintiff's counsel,123 the existence of a substantive common-law rule of interspousal tort immunity, although there technically was no rule as such.12" These judges apparently were taking
the common-law fiction of marital merger, essentially as formulated by Blackstone and applied in America, and transforming it
into a substantive tort rule. 125 Some courts, however, were more
explicit about their reasoning. They began with the unity maxim
and explained that at common law wives: (1) had no substantive
civil causes of action against anyone, including their husbands; (2)
were under a procedural disability, requiring that husbands file
tort suits on their behalf; or (3) were not entitled to damages recovered because any such award would belong to their husbands.126
As each court concluded that there was a common-law rule of
tort immunity, each proclaimed that the rule could be modified

122
Indeed, the public policies judges espoused during this period were adopted by jurists
deciding cases much later; were the precursors of the principal policy arguments for immunity's retention; and eventually evolved into a standard litany recited by courts whenever
they rejected requests to permit interspousal tort actions. The cases also afford insights into
nineteenth century judicial decisionmaking and societal views of women, llllllTiage, wives,
and the family that have implications beyond the confines of tort immunity. See, e.g., infra
notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
123
Counsel who pursued the first reported case conceded that "by the rules or the common law husband and wife could not sue each other in a civil action." Longendyke v.
Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 367 (N.Y. 1863).
"' "[T]ort actions between husband and wife were unknown at common lnw." Haglund,
supra note 24, at 704. One reason for this was that "torts was not considered a discrete
branch of law until the late nineteenth century." G. WHITE, TORT LAw IN Aw:luCA 1 (1979).
Accord W. PROSSER & W.P. KEEToN, supra note 2, § 1.
120
See, e.g., Main v. Main, 46 IlL App. 106, 107 (1891); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wnsh.
496, 498, 118 P. 629, 629 (1911), overruled, Freehe v. Freehe, 81Wash.2d183, 500 P.2d 771
(1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). For n discussion
of Blackstone's articulation of the merger fiction and of his influence in America, see supra
notes 20-23 and accompanying text. Cf. Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 522-23, 105 S.E.
206, 210 (1920); supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (alternative origins or merger
fiction). One judge simply seemed to presume that a substantive tort rule existed. See Bnndfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 83, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898), overruled, Hosko v. Hosko, 385
Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971).
12
• See, e.g., Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 288-91, 44 N.E. 462, 463·64 (1896);
Longendyke, 44 Barb. at 368-69; Schultz, 65 Wash. at 498, 118 P. at 629.
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only by statute. 127 Thus the merger concept, which remained, after
all, a fiction, was converted into a rule of common law. This pronouncement had two effects. First, it invested the transformed
unity construct with solidity and validity. 128 Second, it foreclosed
consideration of the interspousal issue as a common-law policy
question amenable to judicial treatment independent of legislative
action. 129 Indeed, it is difficult today to appreciate the almost mystical authority that the merger notion exerted over jurists during
this period. Unity was a "metaphor of enormous power" and resilience that exercised "linguistic hegemony."130 The fiction was effectively the measure of all things legal between husbands and wives.
Once judges had chosen to treat the merger maxim as a common-law rule that could be altered only by legislation, the immunity issue became essentially a question of statutory interpretation-that is, of ascertaining whether the Married Women's Acts
permitted interspousal tort claims. In construing the statutes, most
courts followed several steps and employed varying techniques
purportedly designed to determine the intent of legislatures in
adopting the enactments.
The initial step was the perfunctory examination of the relevant
statutory language to discern whether it expressly prescribed tort

127
See, e.g., Henneger, 145 Ind. at 293-94, 44 N.E. at 464; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304,
307 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980); Freethy v.
Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 641-42 (N.Y. 1865).
12
• See infra note 130 and accompanying text (solidity and validity); supra notes 20·27;
infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (possible reasons therefor).
12
• Although jurists did rely on policy concepts when construing the Married Women's
Acts, see, e.g., infra notes 143-56 and accompanying text, treating tort immunity solely as a
common law policy question may have been incompatible with judges' views of their roles,
see infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. These ideas conflict with the widely accepted
view that many judges worked in the "Grand Style" and were amenable to modifying the
common law between 1800 and 1850. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DE·
CIDING APPEALS 35-38 (1960); M. HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 26-30; R. POUND, Tm: FORMA·
TtVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938); infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. Cf. Abbott, 67
Me. at 307 (allusion to law's growth by adapting itself to present societal conditions).
130
I use hegemony in the sense that Antonio Gramsci did, see, e.g., A. GRAMSCI, SELEC·
TIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (1971), as described in
BOGGS, GRAMSCI's MARXISM
39-40 (1976), and as Professor Basch does, see N. BASCH, supra note 9. Cf. E. GENOVESE,
supra note 29, at 25 ("hegemonic function of the law"). Professor Basch persuasively shows
the enormous power and resilience of the merger fiction which served the "legal needs of
three shifting social structures," and "survived its feudal origins and early modern connec·
tions," "the dislocations of colonization and revolution," and "the legislative assaults of the
nineteenth century." N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 26-27, 38-69.

c.
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suits between spouses. No Act was found to so provide. 131 Although
a few courts acknowledged that particular statutes' wording might
be sufficiently comprehensive to encompass such litigation, each
felt obligated to ensure that this reading comported with the intent and spirit of its legislature. The focus of analysis for all of the
courts, therefore, ostensibly shifted from the language of the statutes almost exclusively to the legislative intent and purposes which
were believed to underlie adoption. 132 When ascertaining legislative
intent, the courts did not consult secondary legislative materials,
such as committee reports or floor debates. 133 Instead, they employed abstract canons of statutory construction and made choices
premised upon their ideas of public policy.
The overarching principle of statutory interpretation, variously
formulated, was the "derogation" canon: courts strictly construed
legislation in derogation of the common law. 134 For example, some
courts declared that when an enactment was phrased in general
language and any doubt existed, it should be interpreted in accordance with the common law because the legislature was presumed

m See, e.g., Main v. Main, 46 IlL App. 106, 109 (1891); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich.
80, 82, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898), overruled, Rosko v. Rosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236
(1971); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 498-99, 118 P. 629, 629-30 (1911), overruled,
Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100
Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984).
132
This shift in analytical focus constituted an implicit rejection or the "pluin meaning"
concept, application of which would have obviated the need to consider legislative intenL
See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 621-24 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The plain
meaning concept was familiar to nineteenth century jurists. See United States v. Fisher, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 399 (1805); T. SEDGWICK. A TREATISE ON THE RULES WmcH Go\'ERN Tl!E
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 309-12 (1857). Cf.
2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCT10N § 46.01 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973);
Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939) (discussing concept).
133
None of the opinions listed at supra note 118 mentions secondary sources. Writers
have identified this phenomenon in broader contexts. See, e.g., J. HURST, TUE GROWTII OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAw MAKERs 186-88 (1950) (tracing judicial use or legislation) (hereinafter HuRST I]; J. JOHNSON, supra note 77, at 78-79 (first third or twentieth century v.itnessed more pronounced use of legislative history). Courts apparently did not attempt to
consult legislative materials even with suits instituted relatively soon after enactmenL See,
e.g, Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N.Y. 1865). But cf. supra note 77 and accompanying
text (few states compiled legislative history and when available it probably was not illuminating); infra note 167 (questioning propriety of consulting secondary sources).
1
" ' See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 36, 103 P. 219, 221 (1909), or:erruled, Self v.
Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); Bandfield, 117 Mich. at 82, 75 N.W. at 288;
Freethy, 42 Barb. at 642-43, 645. Cf. infra note 167 (discussing derogation canon).
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to have changed the common law only to the extent that the statute expressly stated.135 A few judges articulated the canon differently. They warned that courts must remember the law prior to
passage of new legislation and the modification intended and assume that legislators were cognizant of the longstanding common
law and legislated with it in mind. 136 Regardless of how courts formulated the derogation canon, they applied it with exacting specificity, invariably yielding the same result: legislatures intended
only those modifications of the common law explicitly enumerated
in the terms of the statutes. For instance, a statute providing that
"any married woman may bring and maintain an action in her own
name, for damages, against any person . . . for any injury to her
person or character, the same as if she were sole"137 was deemed
insufficient. Courts applying the derogation canon determined that
the enactments did not lift disabilities imposed upon wives at common law,138 sever merged legal identity,139 or expand wives' legal
personalities140 any more than was expressly provided.
The second principal way that judges discerned "legislative intent" was to rely upon public policy reasons why legislators could
not have intended to prescribe interspousal tort claims. 141 The articulation of these policies was subtle and complex. Courts seemed
to be saying that legislatures could not have intended certain undesirable effects, primarily relating to marriage and the family,
... See, e.g., Bandfield, 117 Mich. at 82, 75 N.W. at 288; Freethy, 42 Barb. at 642·45.
136
See, e.g., Bandfield, 117 Mich. at 82, 75 N.W. at 288; Freethy, 42 Barb. at 642-45. But
cf. Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 30 (holding Act's purpose to invade and dispel
common law, and Act not to be construed with reference to common law at time of passage),
rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882).
m Freethy, 42 Barb. at 642 (construing New York Married Women's Act). The court
would have required explicit inclusion of the term "husband" before allowing suit, see id. at
644-45, even though when the state assembly wanted to exclude husbands from the purview
of Married Women's Acts, it nearly always provided so expressly. See Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup.
Ct. at 32-33.
1
•• See, e.g., Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 428, 107 N.W. 1047, 1048 (1906); Freethy, 42
Barb. at 645. But see Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 30.
uo See, e.g., Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 293, 44 N.E. 462, 464 (1896); Longendyke
v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 369 (N.Y. 1863). But see Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 30.
140
See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 35·36, 103 P. 219, 220-21 (1909), overruled, Self
v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106, 108 (1891);
Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 83, 75 N.W. 287 288 (1898), overruled, Hosko v.
Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 197 N.W.2d 236 (1971). But see Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 30.
141
Nearly every court that recognized or retained immunity employed this method and
relied upon similar policy reasons.
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which judges thought would necessarily result from tort suits between husbands and wives. Thus, courts inverted the technical
meaning of legislative intent by consulting their post-enactment
concerns regarding the statutes' potential adverse impacts, rather
than the contemporaneous purposes of legislators who passed the
statutes. 142
Courts espoused many policy reasons for finding that the statutes did not authorize interspousal tort suits; most of these policies
pertained much more to marriage and the family than to substantive tort law. 143 The overarching factor was fear that allowing personal injury claims would create, or exacerbate preexisting, marital
disharmony. 144 Because it was clear state policy to protect wedlock
and the family, legislatures could never have "intended to permit
such actions. " 145
One important way in which these suits were thought to disrupt
connubial peace was by exposing delicate matters to public scrutiny.146 Abolition of immunity also was believed to threaten marital
141
Cf. T. SEDGWICK, supra note 132, at 309, 231 (rejecting judicial consideration of effects
when legislation clear but recognizing such practice when legislation ambiguous). For a discussion of what legislators who passed the Acts might have "intended" for tort immunity,
see supra notes 66-114 and accompanying text.
143
Indeed, the cases as a whole leave the impression that tort immunity was more a mat·
ter of family law than of tort law.
,.. The marital harmony concept, which was articulated first, has been enunciated most
consistently and still has much vitality. See infra notes 417-54 and accompanying text. Most
of the policy reasons that judges espoused are versions of this rationale. See, e.g., infra notes
518 & 539 and accompanying text.
14 • See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 35, 103 P. 219, 220 (1909), overruled, Self v.
Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 368-69
(N.Y. 1863). But cf. Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33, reu'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882)
(interspousal tort actions could preserve or promote harmony).
"" Because "private matters of the whole period of married existence might be exposed
by suits," courts found it preferable "to draw the curtain and shut out the public gaze."
Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307-08 (1877), overruled, :MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d
71 (Me. 1980). This privacy component of the marital harmony rationale relates to broader
themes in nineteenth century judicial decisionmaking that "privatized" and "de-legalized"
the family. See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1501-07; infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
Central to these ideas is a world "split" into a legalized public sphere inhabited by men and
a private sphere without law to which women were relegated. See K O'DONOVAN, supra note
65, at 59-158; Powers, supra note 65, at 70-73, 79·88; Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and
Patriarchy, ch. 15, in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Taub & Schneider, supra
note 94; cf. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL IiARAssMENT OF WORKING Wor.IEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 83-90 (1979); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 656-58 (1983). But cf. Teitelbaum, Family His·
tory and Family Law, 1985 Wts. L. REv. 1135, 1165 (danger of split sphere appro:ich as
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tranquility by allowing spouses to invoke the tort litigation process
for the resolution of minor conjugal differences, such as petty domestic quarrels. 147 Moreover, judges reasoned that retention of immunity could even promote marital harmony because it required
spouses to resolve their difficulties, essentially by forgiving and
forgetting. 148
Numerous courts also evinced concern about the problems entailed in distinguishing behavior that would be considered tortious
between strangers from similar conduct between spouses which
would not be actionable. 149 A number of judges worried about burdens imposed upon the judicial system by excessive and frivolous
or trivial claims, and a few jurists expressly mentioned the possibility of multiple suits upon divorce. 150
Courts also rejected interspousal tort claims because as a matter
of policy they believed that legislators could not have "intended"
such claims. The judges premised this conclusion on the legislatures' provision of adequate remedies for spouses for tortious behavior, primarily criminal and divorce actions. 161 Some courts, apparently alluding to the threat of duplicate claims upon marital
dissolution, specifically observed that divorce afforded the advantage of resolving all interspousal disputes in a single proceeding. 102
analytical tool).
"' Courts evinced concern about interspousal litigation over "every real and fancied
wrong." Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 82-83, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898), overruled,
Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, N.W.2d 236 (1971). Accord Longendyke, 44 Barb. nt 369.
This idea is a forerunner of the "floodgates" policy argument. See infra notes 149-50 & 52141 and accompanying text.
148
See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDon·
ald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980). Accord Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 645 (N.Y. 1865). For
helpful discussion of the "forgiving and forgetting" rationale and related notions of altruism, sharing, and sacrifice within the family, see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1725-37 (1976); Olsen, supra note 65, at 1505,
1520-24; Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 623-24 (1983).
149
See, e.g., Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 33, 34 (Davis, P.J., dissenting), reu'd, 89
N.Y. 644 (1882).
0
'"
See, e.g., Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106, 108-09 (1891); Abbott, 67 Me. at 307-08;
Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 501, 118 P. 629, 630-31 (1911), overruled, Freehe v.
Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972), and overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d
729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). This idea illustrates the overlapping nature of the policy argu·
ments because it implicates the marital harmony, "floodgates," and "alternative remedies"
arguments. See supra note 147 and infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
'"' See Main, 46 Ill. App. at 108; see infra notes 542-63 and accompanying text.
m See, e.g., Main, 46 Ill. App. at 108; Abbott, 61 Me. at 307-08; Schultz, 65 Wash. at 501,
118 P. at 630-31.
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Judges articulated several additional public policies. They declared that wives should not be allowed to sue their husbands for
personal injuries because "marriage acts as a perpetually operating
discharge of all wrongs between man and wife.m 113 Courts also expressed concern that such litigation would provide a new means for
unfairly raiding estates 111' and could jeopardize testamentary dispositions that otherwise might have been made.m Moreover,
judges espoused a juridical equality idea, observing that husbands
never had been permitted to file personal injury claims against
wives. 156
In short, courts treated the interspousal issue principally as a
question of statutory interpretation by discerning legislative intent
through application of certain abstract canons and public policies.
Judges could have made different choices, however. Instead of relying upon the derogation canon, they could have used its complement: remedial measures are to be construed liberally. Similarly,
courts might have found that permitting interspousal tort litigation could deter the intentional infliction of injury, thereby promoting marital harmony. 1117 Moreover, judges might have eschewed
reliance on the canons and public policy and consulted legislative

103
Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877), overruled, M.acDonnld v. MacDonald, 412
A.2d 71 (Me. 1980), cited in Peters v. Peters, 156 Cnl. 32, 36, 103 P. 219, 221 (1909), ouerruled, Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962). But cf. Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 26, 33 (holding husband's intentional tort violated marit.al contract and responsibilities), rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882). Perhaps courts recognizing immunity were suggesting that
marriage is a contract, albeit not subject to the rules generally governing such agreements.
See text accompanying supra note 16.
1
$4 See, e.g., Abbott, 67 Me. at 308; Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 369 (N.Y.
1863). The concerns appear to be a precursor of the fraud and collusion policy contention,
discussed infra notes 457-503 and accompanying text. See Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316,
317 (Tex. 1987).
105
Longendyke, 44 Barb. at 369.
106
See, e.g., Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 428, 107 N.W. 1047, 1048 (1906), overruled,
Poepping v. Lindeman, 268 Minn. 30, 127 N.W.2d 512 (1964), and ouerruled, Beaudette v.
Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 644 (N.Y.
1865); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 500, 118 P. 629, 630 (1911), overruled, Freehe
v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d
729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). For .a helpful discussion of the juridicnl equality idea, see Olsen,
supra note 65, at 1505, 1512, 1516-20. Of the cases listed at supra note 118, Peters v. Peters,
156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909), is the only one brought by .a husband intentionnlly injured by
his wife.
107
See Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33 (contemporaneous judicinl expression),
rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882); infra note 445 and accompanying text (modem expression).
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history. uss
There are a number of explanations for the courts' treatment of
immunity. The most significant derive from broader currents in judicial decisionmaking after 1850, particularly jurists' views of appropriate roles for courts to play, especially vis-a-vis legislatures.
Judges' perspectives on their functions changed dramatically in
the middle of the nineteenth century. The first half of the century
was a time of great legal innovation. Jurists deciding cases in the
"Grand Stylemise were willing to use the common law as an instrument of social policy and came to see themselves as lawmakers
with primary responsibility for shaping private law doctrine. 100
In contrast, the second half of the century was a period of consolidation, when "precedents were regarded as settled, rules as formulated, and principles as defined," 161 characterized by formalistic
opinion writing. Courts typically were reluctant to act unless compelled by precedent or empowered by statute. 162 Professing to observe a strict separation of powers, and categorizing governmental
authority according to function, each branch having hegemony in
its respective sphere, judges announced that they were merely to

••• Judges may not have relied on legislative history, however, because it was usually un·
available or unilluminating or because such reliance was considered improper. See supra
notes 77 & 133 and accompanying text; infra note 167. Cf. infra notes 159-66 and accompa·
nying text (explanations why judges relied on canons and public policy).
Of course, judges also might have read the Acts' language more broadly. But even courts
treating Acts passed nearer the end of the amendment process, when coverture had been
substantially eroded, read them narrowly so as to Gnd that wives could only sue third par·
ties. See, e.g., Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909).
••• K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 36-38. Accord M. HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 26-30;
HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-88; J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN TllE
NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956) [hereinafter HURST II]. Full treatment of these
ideas is beyond the scope of this Article and must await much more research, but their
contours can be sketched, and plausible accounts afforded, by relying principally on the
sources above.
0
•• See M. HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 26-30; HURST II, supra note 159; K. LLEWELLYN,
supra note 129, at 36-37. Cf. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400
(1950) (statutes construed freely to implement purposes from 1820 to 1850). Accord Hu11sT
I, supra note 133, at 186-89.
••• J. REID, CHIEF JUSTICE: THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES DoE 299 (1967). Accord M.
HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 253-66. Cf. HURST II, supra note 159; K. LLEWELLYN, supra note
129, at 35-41; R SUMMERS, lNSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982) (discuss·
ing formalism).
••• See J. REID, supra note 161, at 299; G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 113·
14 (1976).
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find, declare or interpret, but not to make, law. "Policy," it was
said, "is for the legislature, not for the courts, and so is change
even in pure common law." 163 Judges exhibited a preference approaching reverence for the common law, much of which their
predecessors had created during the preceding half century. Correspondingly, courts evinced less regard for legislative law. They
viewed statutes as alien intruders upon the well-ordered commonlaw system. 164 Judges also considered legislatures as competitors
for governmental authority; as populist, political, and potentially
redistributional; or as lacking the requisite competence to draft adequate measures. 165
Thus, courts displayed significantly increased willingness to
scrutinize, read restrictively, and even invalidate enactments like
the Married Women's Acts. 166 Judges regularly announced that
policy was for legislatures, not courts. They ascertained legislative
intent almost entirely by employing techniques and consulting
materials unrelated to the Acts or the legislative process. 167 They
accorded cursory consideration to statutory phraseology, unless
blindingly clear. Jurists also applied abstract rules of construction,
particularly the derogation canon, while they ascertained legislaK LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 38. Accord HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-89.
See K LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 39; HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-89; J.
HURST, DEALING WrrH STATUTES 41-42 (1982) [hereinafter HuRST Ill]; Stone, The Common
Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 12-15 (1936). Cf. R COSGROVE, OUR W\ THE
COMMON LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY, 1870-1930, at 1-2 (1988) (AngloAmerican community of scholars dedicated to celebration or common law dated from 1870
and reached zenith in years before World Warn.
1
•• See M. HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 253-66; HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-89; K
LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 38-40; HURST III, supra note 164, at 42.
168
"[I]n the late nineteenth century, judges were not inclined to look favorably on legislation which, like the Married Women's Property Acts, changed doctrine which judges had
made the law of the land." HURST I, supra note 133, at 186. Accord K Lu:wELLYN, supra
note 129, at 38; cf. Llewellyn, supra note 160, at 400 (statutes limited or eviscerated by
wooden and literal reading and insistence on precise language).
167
Indeed, as late as 1900, the United States Supreme Court, which had greater access to
such material than state judges, declared that congressionnl debates were "not appropriate
sources of information from which to discover the meaning or the language or a statute
passed by that body." United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318
(1897). Cf. HURST I, supra note 133, at 187; J. JOHNSON, supra note 77, at 78-80 (Supreme
Court relied consistently on such materials only in twentieth century); Thomir.>0n v.
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618, 621 (1910) (majority and dissenting opinions in tort immunity
case eschew reliance on materials). See generally T. SEDGWICK, supra note 132, at 241-47
(contemporaneous treatise stating that legislative intent was to be gleaned only from statutory words).
163
104

0
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tive intent by considering possible consequences of specific
interpretations. 168
An additional theme in nineteenth century judicial decisionmaking was the courts' reluctance to intervene in the private family. 100
Judges hesitated to interfere with familial interactions, principally
because domestic life was viewed as sacred, delicate, altruistic, and
certainly not for public scrutiny.170 This reticence was manifested
in jurists' refusal to criminalize interspousal activity which would
have been illegal between strangers or to treat as legally cognizable
disputes among family members involving domestic relations. 171
Most telling, however, was the courts' reluctance to legalize relations between husbands and wives in property and contract, although the Married Women's Acts provided much more explicitly
for such interspousal interaction. 172
Two propositions follow if legislators were seen as "lawmakers"
and judges as "law interpreters." First, the common law could only
be changed by statute, because judicial alteration would be lawmaking. Second, courts read statutes modifying the common law
narrowly and with demanding specificity. Accordingly, predicating
interspousal tort litigation on liberal construction of broad enactments would require courts to add words to legislation and, thus,
See HURST Ill, supra note 164, at 42; HURST I, supra note 133, at 186 (application of
derogation canon). The canon's application is revealing. As with most tenets of statutory
construction, an equally persuasive counter-rule could have been invoked to yield tho oppo·
site conclusion as to legislative intent. One is that remedial legislation is to be interpreted
liberally. For the modern exposition of this, see Llewellyn, supra note 160. See also T.
SEDGWICK, supra note 132, at 231, 309 (consideration of effects proper when legislation am·
biguous but not when clear). Several writers have contended that the judicial treatment of
statutes reviewed often was obstructive and narrowed the legislation's intended effects. See
HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-88; K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 38·39.
1
•• Courts were also said to have "privatized" or "delegalized" the family. For a compro·
hensive discussion of these phenomena, see Olsen, supra note 65, at 1504-07. See also C.
MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 83-90; Taub & Schneider, supra note 94; MacKinnon, supra
note 146; Polan, supra note 146; Powers, supra note 65, at 70-88. Cf. R. UNGER, LAW IN
MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 144 (1976) (familial relationships
governed by "law of the jungle" reflected in state noninterference with "exploitation of
power advantages within the family").
17
° For a comprehensive analysis, see Olsen, supra note 65, at 1504-07.
111
For a tort immunity case articulating these views of the family, see Abbott v. Abbott,
67 Me. 304, 306-09 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980).
112
The Acts, discussed supra notes 66-114 and accompanying text, expressly legalized
relations in contract and property between husbands and wives during the nineteenth con·
tury but only legalized tort actions in the twentieth century. See supra note 75. Cf. N.
BASCH, supra note 9, at 200-23 (judicial reluctance to legalize husband-wife relations).
168
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to make law. 173
An additional explanation for the courts' treatment of immunity
is the idea of "judicial de-radicalization,m7 " meaning that courts
consciously undermined clear efforts of legislatures to prescribe interspousal tort suits. 176 The de-radicalization concept cannot be
sustained, however, given the imprecise language and purposes of
the Married Women's Acts, as well as the difficulty of securing reliable evidence pertaining to .the passage and judicial treatment of
the Acts. 176
Other important reasons for the courts' resolution of the interspousal immunity issue pertain to prevailing societal images of females, wedlock, wives, and the family. These images-of a world
split into a superior, public, legalized sphere occupied by males
and an inferior, private realm without law to which women were
relegated; of females as weak, inferior beings who needed men's
protection; of marriage and the family as private, altruistic and sacred-often were articulated expressly in the cases. 177 Most signifiIf judges construing statutes generally considered it improper to consult legislati\'e his·
tory but appropriate to discern legislative intent by applying canons and public policy, it
should not be surprising that these principles were employed when courts analyzed the Married Women's Acts. Moreover, if jurists were reluctant to recognize interspousal interactions
in property and contract, clearly provided for in statutes, they would ha\'e been e\'en less
willing to permit tort claims. Although courts currently treat tort immunity almost exclu·
sively as a common-law policy issue, such treatment might ha\'e appeared e\'en more inappropriate to late nineteenth century judges. But cf. text accompanying supra notes 159-60
(judges from 1800 to 1850 viewed themselves as "policymakers").
174
See Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 270-80 (1978) (explanation of idea).
Cf. P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 123; Johnston, supra note 5, at 1069 (context of judicial
treatment of Acts).
175
See, e.g., Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 28, 30, 33, reu'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882).
Cf. Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 524, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920); N. BASCH, supra note 9,
at 202-03, 206-07 (later allegations of judicial obstructionism).
176
See P. RABKIN, supra note 10, at 123; Chused, supra note 21, at 1400 n.2ll; Johnston,
supra note 5, at 1069. For a discussion of the Acts' language and purposes and evidence
regarding their enactment, see supra notes 66-114 and accompanying text. There is widespread agreement, however, that courts narrowly read the Acts. See supra note 99.
m See cases cited supra notes 145-56. See also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 5S2.
589 (1858) (wife's identity merged into husband's); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring} (discussing propriety of wife remaining in pri\'ate
sphere; impropriety of wife having occupation distinct from husband in public sphere);
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1888) (holding marriage more than mere contract;
not subject to normal contractual rules, thereby enabling husband to a\'oid obligations to
abandoned wife); Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485 (1904) (wife as husband's property);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) ("woman has always been dependent upon
173
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cant, however, probably was the merger fiction, especially insofar
as it conveniently captured those images and thereby essentially
embodied the underlying social relations that governed the nineteenth century patriarchal family. 178 Indeed, when jurists observed
existing society, it may well have been inconceivable to them that
legislatures could have intended to intrude upon a husband's control over his wife's body, the most delicate area of the sacrosanct
institution of marriage. 179
The judiciary was an all male elite, few of whom were sympathetic to alterations of the status quo, especially the potential subversion of traditional gender roles that interspousal tort litigation
might have represented. 180 Nevertheless, most judges probably

man"). Cf. Polan, supra note 146; Powers, supra note 65, at 72-73; Taub & Schneider, supra
note 94 (discussions of Supreme Court cases). Cf. Minow, supra note 9, at 840-51; Olsen,
From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518, 1523-34 (1986) (recent analysis of Bradwell caution·
ing against overemphasizing importance). For discussion of societal views of women, marriage, wives, and the family at the beginning of this period, see supra notes 65, 89-92, 103,
106 & 109 and accompanying text. These views of marriage and the family as private and of
the separate spheres probably reached their apogee in the Victorian era. By approximately
1890, however, the images were beginning to change. After 1890 more single and married
women attended college and entered the workforce; social and economic changes drew together the private, family sphere and the legal, public sphere; and most entities within the
emerging middle class experienced a new self-consciousness. See generally E. FLEXNEll,
supra note 96, at 182-247; S. EISENSTEIN, GIVE Us BREAD BuT GIVE Us RosES: WORKING
WOMEN'S CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890 TO THE FIRST WORLD WAii (1983); A
KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 5-6 (1965); R. SEN·
NE'IT, FAMILIES AGAINST THE CITY: MIDDLE CLASS HOMES OF INDUSTRIAL CHICAGO, 1872-1890
(1970); R WIEBE, supra note 106, at 111-32. Cf. E. PLECK, supra note 40, at 69-120 (three
reform efforts against domestic violence defining it as crime requiring stern punishment
reached apex in last third of nineteenth century); Minow, supra note 9, at 874-83 (women
factory and volunteer workers created ethic of caring and new roles but not individual rights
within family).
178
See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 27, 38-41, 68-89, 200-03, 224-32 (merger fiction); Olsen,
supra note 65, at 1504-07; Unger, supra note 148, at 623-24 (nineteenth century family). For
discussion of the correlation between legal doctrine and underlying social relations, see C.
MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 83-90; Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 829 (1983).
178
The specter of wives invoking the tort litigation process and hauling their husbands
before public tribunals to divulge the intimacies of their lives, thereby striking at the es·
sence of marriage, all to the detriment of individual families and the society, must have
been unimaginable to most judges. Even if judges could have overcome their incredulity,
they probably would have found the effects of interspousal tort litigation more deleterious
than beneficial.
180
See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 208, 225 (pervasive maleness of legal system at that
time). Cf. Polan, supra note 146, at 301 (same today).
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were not attempting consciously to suppress women but believed
in a subtler, more paternalistic way that denying wives suits
against their husbands was best for the individual women and
society. 181
Developments in tort law are less important to resolution of the
early immunity cases than are the factors discussed above because
torts had only begun to emerge as a discrete field of jurisprudence
and because the immunity opinions rarely mentioned tort principles.182 Nonetheless, insofar as a field which can be denominated
torts is discernable, much in the area comported with judicial
treatment of immunity.
Torts "was essentially a common law subject, one whose rules
and doctrines had been articulated and developed by judges and
academicians [so that] legal problems in Torts were 'solved' primarily by the application of common-law principles . . . rather
than through legislation. m 93 The prevailing tenor of tort jurisprudence, which could be characterized fairly as one of constricted liability, was evidenced by the rise and consolidation of the negligence concept. During this period, jurists formulated modern
negligence and expanded the scope of its coverage. Strict liability
and intent faded in significance, while nuisance essentially disappeared.184 Correspondingly, courts shifted the burden of proof from

181
For example, see the paternalistic public policies enunciated for recognizing immunity
in the cases cited supra notes 145-56. Some have suggested that courts' treatment of immunity was an exercise in male chauvinism, whereby judges manipulated available legal mechanisms to perpetuate the subjugation of wives. See, e.g., Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516,
523-24, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920); see also L. KANOWITZ, supra note 5, at 40; Warren, Husband's Right to Wife's Services, 38 HARv. L. REv. 421, 423 (1925). But this view is "reductive if not somewhat ahistorical" and ignores other realities, such as "why male lesfulators
wanted to change the law in the first place." See N. BASCH, supra note 9, at 225-26.
18
' See G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 3-62 (discussing coalescence of tort law). There is
widespread agreement about the general ideas in this account, but controversy and revision
have attended recent analyses of numerous specifics discussed. A reliable account can be
afforded by relying principally upon l\.1. HORWITZ, supra note 43; G. WHITE, supra note 124,
at 3-62; and Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981).
183
G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 60. This account of tort law dovetails with the judges'
view of their roles vis-a-vis legislatures. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying texL
"[l)n the late nineteenth century, judges were not inclined to look favorably on lesfulation
which, like the Married Women's Property Act, changed doctrine which judges had made
the law of the land." HuRST I, supra note 133, at 186.
,.. See G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 61. For history of the negligence idea, see ~1. HOR·
wrrz, supra note 43, at 85-99; W. PROSSER & W.P. 'KEEroN, supra note 2, § 28, at 161; G.
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the defendant to show that he or she exercised extraordinary care
to the plaintiff to prove that defendant failed to exercise ordinary
care. m Judges also recognized, or emphasized, the "unholy trinity"
of defenses: contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the
fellow-servant doctrine. 188 Moreover, judicial treatment of the remaining immunities paralleled that of interspousal immunity. In
this period, parent-child immunity was created, and no jurisdiction
allowed such intrafamily litigation;187 charitable immunity was recognized for the first time and by the overwhelming majority of
courts asked to permit claims against charities;188 and the United
States and all state governments rarely consented to be sued. 189

WHITE, supra note 124, at 3-19. For discussions of the tenor of tort law, characterizing it as
one of constricted liability, see M HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 98-99; W. PROSSER & W.P.
KEETON, supra note 2, § 80, at 571-72; § 65, at 451-62; § 68, at 480-98; G. WHITE, supra note
124, at 61-62. But cf. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 264 n.37, 417-27; Schwartz, supra note
182, at 1720 (nineteenth century torts system less favorable to industry and more favorable
to victims than had been thought).
19
• See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 298 (1850); but cf. M. HORWITZ, supra
note 43, at 89-91 (Brown given exaggerated significance).
186
Chief Justice Shaw has been credited with advancing American recognition of contributory negligence in Brown, 60 Mass. at 292 n.181, see Schwartz, supra note 182, at 1757-67,
and the fellow-servant and assumption of risk doctrines in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester
Ry., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 57 (1842). See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 263-64; M. HOR·
WITZ, supra note 43, at 209-10; W. PROSSER & W:P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 80, at 571-72
(fellow-servant doctrine). See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 263; M. HORWITZ, supra note
43, at 210 (assumption of risk). Cf. L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH ANO C111EF
JUSTICE SHAW (1957) (Shaw's biography). For discussion of the history of the "unholy trinity" see L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 263-64; W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, §
80, at 571-72; § 65, at 451-62; § 68, at 480-98. Cf. M. HORWITZ, supra note 43, at 95-96;
Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946) (history
of contributory negligence); Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 50, 51-58 (1967) (history of fellow-servant rule); G.
WHITE, supra note 124, at 41-45 (history of assumption of risk). These developments are
important examples of tort liability's constricted tone, see supra note 184, and of how courts
created an interrelated doctrinal scheme, see G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 61. Finally, it
should be noted that before 1900 the "primary function of tort liability had been seen as
one of punishing or deterring blameworthy civil conduct," not compensating injured persons. G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 62.
187
See Hollister, supra note 11, at 494; cf. F. HARPER, supra note 27, § 8-11, at 573; W.
PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 122, at 904-07 (discussing history of parent-child
immunity).
188
See F. HARPER, supra note 27, § 29.16, at 756-63; W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra
note 2, § 133, at 1069-70.
••• See F. HARPER, supra note 27, § 29.1-29.4, at 596-618; W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON,
supra note 2, § 131, at 1032-56.
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(ii) 1910: Thompson v. Thompson. 100 Every court requested to

allow interspousal personal injury actions between 1863 and 1913
refused. By the end of this period, however, certain considerations
relevant to tort immunity had changed. For example, most legislatures substantially amended their Married Women's Acts, significantly eroding coverture. Nevertheless, it was a transitional period:
even as voters in California and Washington approved female suffrage, the supreme courts of each jurisdiction simultaneously rejected interspousal tort litigation.191 It should not have been surprising, therefore, that in 1910, when a four-Justice majority of the
United States Supreme Court recognized immunity in the District
of Columbia, Justices Harlan, Holmes, and Hughes would join in a
strong dissent. 192 The opinions in Thompson represented the "moment" of legal change for the longstanding immunity concept. 193
The majority determination constituted immunity's zenith; the
idea previously had been acknowledged or reaffirmed in twelve
states. The dissenting decision was the first substantive break with
immunity, marking the commencement of its erosion, a process
that continued throughout the twentieth century. m
Justice Day's majority opinion reiterated most of the rationales
for rejecting interspousal tort claims articulated in prior case law.
After announcing the common-law existence of a substantive rule
of tort immunity,1915 the jurist analyzed the District of Columbia
Married Women's Act which arguably prescribed interspousal tort
suits as clearly as any contemporaneous measure. He stated that
"interpretation of the law [is] the only function of the courts";
policymaking was for Congress; and the Court should construe the
218 U.S. 611 (1910).
See E. Fl.EXNER, supra note 96, at 263-66 (California and Washington suffrage approval); Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 37-38, 103 P. 219, 221 (1909), ouerruled, Selfv. Self, 5S
Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wosh. 496, 501, 118 P. 629, 631
(1911), overruled, Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972), and ouerruled,
Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984) (both states rejecting tort
litigation).
192
Thompson, 218 U.S. at 619-24.
193
I use the idea here to mean the point of dramatic change in a doctrinnl legal concept.
For other definitions, see A WATSON, SOURCES OF LAw, LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGum' 93-131
(1984); Feinman, supra note 178.
194
Of course, there is in Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33, reu'd, 89 N.Y. 644
(1882), discussed supra note 118, in which an intermediate appellnte court would have permitted interspousal suits, but it was summarily reversed.
190
Thompson, 218 U.S. at 614-15.
100
191
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enactment "with a view to effectuate the legislative purpose. " 190
Justice Day observed that "such radical and far-reaching changes"
in the common law's "policy of centuries" as the abolition of immunity "should only be wrought by language so clear and plain as
to be unmistakable evidence of the legislative intention. m97 He
then briefly considered the statutory terminology which empowered married women to sue anyone separately "for torts committed
against them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried.m 9 s The
Court found that the statute was meant "to allow the wife, in her
own name, to maintain actions of tort, which, at common law,
must be brought in the joint names of herself and her husband. " 199
Justice Day next purported to interpret the measure and examine the legislative intent underlying the enactment but failed to
consult any relevant legislative materials. 200 Instead, he "strictly
construed" the Act, invoking several propositions closely related to
the derogation canon. 201 Justice Day also appealed to public policy.
He enumerated several "possible evils" of interspousal tort litigation that he thought Congress could not have "intended"-connubial disharmony, exposure of conjugal differences
to public scrutiny, and frivolous and trivial litigation-while explicitly acknowledging the impropriety of considering such potential effects. 202
The jurist found that provision of "adequate grounds for relief
under the statutes of divorce and alimony" also evidenced congressional intent not to prescribe these suits.203 Justice Day concluded
by asserting that Congress could not have intended "to revolutionize the law governing the relation of husband and wife as between
196

Id. at 618 (first two propositions); id. at 615 (third proposition).
Id. at 618.
198
Id. at 615-16.
199
Id. at 617.
200
Justice Day mentioned no secondary sources, such as committee reports, although tho
Act had passed in 1901. See id. at 615-19.
201
A helpful example is the proposition in the text accompanying supra note 197.
202
"The possible evils of such legislation might well make the lawmaking power hesitate
to enact it." Id. at 618 (Harlan J., dissenting). See also id. at 617-18 (enumeration of evils).
Justice Day acknowledged the impropriety of considering these evils by stating that "inter·
pretation of the Jaw is the only function of the courts," and that "[w]hether the exorcise of
such jurisdiction would be promotive of the public welfare and domestic harmony" is a
question properly "addressed to the legislative, not the judicial branch of the Government."
Id. at 618.
20
• Id. at 617, 619.
197
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themselves."204 In short, the majority opinion epitomized the reasoning processes of courts that had previously addressed
immunity.
Justice Harlan, in dissent, used similar and equally cryptic
methods to reach the contrary result. He agreed that a judge's
"duty is only to declare what the law is," proclaiming that responsibility for the "mere policy, expediency, or justice of legislation"
must remain "with the legislative department, so long as it keeps
within constitutional limits."2011 Justice Harlan, however, accused
the majority of making law and of discerning congressional intent
by improperly considering possible impacts of the enactment. The
jurist remarked that, if the statute's phraseology led to undesirable
public policy results, it was outside the Court's province "to ward
off the dangers feared or the evils threatened by a judicial construction that [would] defeat the plainly-expressed will of the legislative department."206 He declared "mere construction" unnecessary when the language was clear, thus vitiating the need to
examine congressional intent or secondary legislative materials.207
Justice Harlan scrutinized the Act's text and listed the indicia of
legal status afforded married women, especially their capacity to
sue in tort. He observed that "Congress, by these statutory provisions [destroys] the unity of the marriage association as it had previously existed [, making] a radical change in the relations of man
and wife as those relations were at common law in this District,"
and concluded that Congress had prescribed interspousal tort
litigation.208
Why was Thompson decided in this manner? The explanations
discussed above for previous recognition and reaffirmation of tort
immunity appear applicable to the majority determination, as Justice Day's reasoning process attests.209 The most important factors
Id. at 619.
Id. at 621 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
206
Id. at 621; see generally id. at 621-24 (accusations).
207
Id. at 621; cf. supra note 132 ("plain meaning" concept might allow court to consider
only words of Act); text accompanying supra note 200 (Thompson majority consulted no
secondary sources).
0
• • See id. at 621-23; id. at 622 (quotation); id. at 623 (conclusion). Thus, the authors or
the majority and dissenting opinions employed similar, equally cryptic approaches to reach
opposite results. The majority's conclusions as to what Congress intended are only marginally less defensible than the dissent's.
20
• See supra notes 159-89 and accompanying text (explanation of uniform tort immunity
204

20

•
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pertain to broad trends in nineteenth century judicial decisionmaking, especially jurists' perspectives on their functions when
treating legislation.210 Many judges continued to hold those views
in 1910, as may have the four jurists who comprised the majority.
Each has been characterized as a traditionalist; each analyzed
closely and read narrowly social reform measures. 211
The dissenting opinion is more difficult to explain, however, because it abruptly departed from prior judicial treatment of immunity. The most significant explanations implicate judicial decisionmaking, especially courts' roles in handling social welfare
legislation. The three Justices generally deferred to public policy
choices of legislatures and acquiesced in their reform efforts, refusing to read restrictively social welfare measures. They also construed generously enactments, even searching for and implementing purposes not expressed clearly, so as to effectuate affirmatively
the statutes' reformist goals.
For example, Justice Harlan was a staunch proponent of separation of powers, and the "uncompromising faith that the legislature,
not the judiciary, should administer political affairs infused all

treatment). Compare the similar reasoning processes of courts recognizing immunity, supra
notes 124-58 and accompanying text, and of Justice Day, supra notes 195-204 and accompn·
nying text.
1
• • See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text (judges' views of their role in interpret·
ing legislation). For many judges the common law remained a "brooding omnipresence." Sec
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Cf. supra
note 164 (scholars dedicated to common law's celebration reached zenith in years before
World War I).
•n L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789·
1969 (1969) (five volumes), provides helpful biographical analyses of each justice. See id. at
1773-89 (Day); id. at 1847-63 (Lurton); id. at 1719-36 (McKenna); id. at 1633-57 (White);
see also R. HIGHSAW, EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE: DEFENDER OF THE CONSERVATIVE FAITH
(1981) (biography); M. MCDEVITT, JOSEPH McKENNA: AssocIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES (1946) (biography); J. SEMOSCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RE·
SPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920 (1978) (additional analysis of justices). Tho nine·
teenth century theme of judicial nonintervention in the private family, see supra notes 169·
72 and accompanying text, and the earlier visions of women, marriage, wives, and the fam·
ily, supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text, seem somewhat less important to the
Thompson majority. But patriarchical pronouncements are present in Thompson and in
other contemporaneous opinions the four justices joined. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (holding constitutional Oregon statute limiting hours women could work);
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904) (holding that assault to wife was injury to husband's
property) (superseded by statute as stated in In re Quezada, 718 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied sub nom. Kelt v. Quezada, 467 U.S. 1217 (1984)).
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other areas of his legal thinking." 212 Correspondingly, Justice
Holmes "advocated 'purposive' or 'goal-oriented' interpretation" of
statutes.213 Significantly, when legislation did not provide for a
particular contingency, Justice Holmes looked beyond the measure's express language to ascertain and implement purposes not
mentioned explicitly, declaring the failure to do so a dereliction of
judicial duty:
A statute may indicate . . . a change in the policy of the
law, although it expresses that change only in the specific
cases most likely to occur to the mind. The Legislature
has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall
be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly,
that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major
premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute ... may

212
G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 130-31. He also believed that national and state governments possessed broad powers, often viewing expansively the regulatory authority delegated
to administrative agencies. Justice Harlan thought ns well that the federal government
should protect the rights of disadvantaged minorities, particularly blacks. These ideas were
captured best in stinging dissents, which accused the majority of amending constitutions
and statutes through judicial "legislation" or "construction." See, e.g., Civil Rights Cnses,
109 U.S. 3, 26-62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that "courts best discharge their duty by executing the will of the lawmaking power, constitutionally expressed, leaving the results of legislation to be dealt with by the people through their representatives"). Accord G. WHIT&,
supra note 162, at 130-31, 138-45. Indeed, the accusations were similar to those in the
Thompson dissent. In short, his opinion seems premised principnlly on solicitude for integrity of the branches of government. See 2 L. F'RmDMAN & F. lsRAEL, supra note 211, at 1285.
I rely substantially here on G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 128-35; 2 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL,
supra note 211, at 1281-95; and J. SEMONCHE, supra note 211, at 3-276.
213
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 417 (1899), cited in R.
Su111MERS, supra note 161, at 154. Justice Holmes had been a member of the Supreme Court
since 1902 after sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Court for twenty years. Although
more has been written about Holmes than any other Justice, his jurisprudence defies easy
description. See White, Looking at Holmes in the Mirror, 4 LAw & HIST. REv. 439 (19SS)
(recent compilation and analysis). Nonetheless, the jurist consistently opposed invalidation
of social welfare enactments, "finding strength in his Marshnllinn conception of a Constitution, his skepticism, and the liberation from parochialism wrought by a grandly synoptic
view of legal history." 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. lsRAEL, supra note 211, at 1759. Justice Holmes
respected the wishes of the people as expressed through their elected representatives and
was unwilling to read narrowly reform measures, regardless of his feelings ns to the ad\i..<>n·
bility of the specific legislative activity and in the belief that law must reflect existing community values. See id. See also G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 150-77, 425-26; White, The
Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHL L. REv. 51 (1971). Cf. H. POHLMAN. JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL Hou.ms AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1984) (ongoing debate over
Holmes).
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not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are
driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we
shall go on as before. 214
Justice Hughes shared the perspectives of Justices Harlan and
Holmes on numerous considerations relevant to Thompson. 21 n
Hughes was receptive to legislative reform endeavors, refusing to
read restrictively social welfare measures; 218 he viewed broadly governmental authority, often construing expansively agency regulatory power;217 and he supported civil liberties. 218
Thus, one plausible explanation for the dissenters' treatment of
interspousal tort immunity is deference to the legislature. Justice
Harlan believed that "courts best discharge their duty by executing the will of the lawmaking power, constitutionally expressed,
leaving the results of legislation to be dealt with by the people
through their representatives. " 219 It seems logical in Thompson for
the Justice (1) to have implemented that will by reading receptively the substantially amended Act and by finding its terminology sufficient to permit interspousal tort litigation, and (2) to have
castigated the majority for frustrating Congress' clearly enunciated

"" Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908). For helpful discussion of
Holmes' use of this technique, see Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their
Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 558 (1982); cf. Landis, Statutes
and the Sources of Law, 2 HARV. J. LEGIS. 7, 15-17 (1965) (technique's application to Married Women's Acts); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908)
(contemporaneous advocacy of technique's use). Justice Holmes has also been characterized
as relatively indifferent to the rights of minorities. Thus, his vote in Thompson appears to
be based primarily on general willingness to acquiesce in, and even effectuate, the will of the
populace as articulated in legislation.
210
Like Harlan, Hughes was a former governor, joining the Court at the end of two terms
as New York's chief executive. His gubernatorial record was distinctly "progressive." For
thorough accounts of Hughes, see D. DANELSKI & J. Tut.CHIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NO'l'Es
OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1973); L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 211, at 1893-1915;
M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1951); and G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 200-29.
••• See Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1967).
211
See 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 211, at 1899; M. PUSEY, supra note 215, nt
215-16; J. SEMONCHE, supra note 211, at 321.
••• See 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 211, at 1906; Pusey, Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, in MR. JUSTICE 166-69 (A. Dunham & P. Kurland eds. 1956); Freund, supra note
216, at 41-42.
••• Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552, 558-59 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Accord
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 621 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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will and considering the measure's potential impacts.220

More limited explanations pertaining to trends in early twentieth century judicial decisionmaking also can be proffered. Some
courts evidenced less reluctance to intervene in, legalize, and deprivatize the family. Jurists recognized more areas of potential
criminal and civil liability, legalizing, for instance, much interspousal interaction in property and contract. 221
The dissenters' views about women may explain their decision.
Justices Harlan and Hughes generally were sympathetic to disadvantaged minorities, although it is unclear whether this concern included women. 222 Justice Holmes was familiar with the history of
wives' legal status,223 but his judicial opinions evinced ambivalence
toward women's rights. For example, in 1923 Justice Holmes simultaneously upheld statutory protection for female workers and
opined that it would take "more than the Nineteenth Amendment
to convince me that there are no differences between men and
women. "224
Although the three jurists probably appreciated the underlying
realities of wife battering, they may have believed it improper to
intervene in marriages on behalf of one spouse, absent legislative
prescription, or to accord wives all the individual rights of males

220

Similarly, if Justice Holmes thought that judges were obligated to effectuate the people's wishes as expressed in legislation, even when particular situations were not provided
for specifically, the jurist might have dissented, because he viewed the statutory conferral of
particular indicia of legal personhood as an expression of congressional intent to alter relations between husbands and wives or to effect a change in wedded females' legal status and,
thus, sufficient to allow interspousal tort suits. Moreover, the language of the act at issue in
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1910), came as close to permitting interspousal tort suits as any contemporaneous act. Justices Harlan and Holmes had evinced
willingness to acquiesce in legislative reform efforts in many contexts. A famous example
was Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65, 74 (1905) (Harlan, Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
221
Two courts that retained interspousal tort immunity recognized interspousal suits over
. property. See Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 36, 103 P. 219, 221 (1909), overruled, Self v. Self,
58 Cal. 2d 683, 691, 376 P.2d 65, 70 (1962); Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 294, 44 N.E.
462, 464 (1896).
222
See supra notes 212 & 215 (Harlan's and Hughes' concern for minorities).
= See Holmes, Agency, 4 HARv. L. REv. 345, 352-53 (1891) (writing on history of v.ives'
legal status illustrates familiarity).
224
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 569-70 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes' refusal to invalidate women's "protective legislation" in Adkins, and in Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), seems premised more on deference to legislative reform than
concern for women's rights.
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and single women. 2211 Instead, they may have seen females as vulnerable beings who might need the protection of special legislation. 226 These viewpoints may be reflected in their acquiescence in
patriarchal Supreme Court pronouncements but are captured best
in Muller v. Oregon,227 agreed to by Justices Harlan and Holmes in
1908, and adopted in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 228 by Justice
Hughes three decades later:
[W]oman's physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the
struggle for subsistence ... [so] that her physical well
being becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race . . . .
[T]here is that in her disposition and habits of life which
will operate against a full assertion of [contractual]
rights. She will still be where some legislation to protect
her seems necessary to secure a real equality of right.
Hence she was "properly placed in a class by herself and
legislation designed for her protection may be sustained
even when like legislation is not necessary for men and
could not be sustained. " 229
Other general currents in judicial decisionmaking at this time
are less applicable to the dissent. Around 1880 legislatures had assumed responsibility for general policymaking, so that after the
turn of the century courts read measures more positively and

••• Nonetheless, the jurists might have been amenable to helping the injured wife by pro·
viding civil recourse. For discussion of judicial intervention in marriages, see supra notes
169-72 and accompanying text; infra notes 282-85 and accompanying text; cf. infra note 412
and accompanying text (discussion of wives as rights-holders); Minow, supra note 9 (criticizing traditional family law view of wives as rights holders).
••• See Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal
Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 653-65
(1981) (discussing special treatment legislation).
227
208 U.S. 412 (1908). The Supreme Court made other patriarchal pronouncements in
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485 (1904) (holding that assault to wife was injury to hus·
band's property) (superseded by statute as stated in In re Quezada, 718 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied sub nom. Kelt v. Quezada, 467 U.S. 1217 (1984)), in which Harlan joined,
and MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915) (domestic and international policy give
dominance to husband), in which Holmes joined.
••• 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
••• Id. at 394-95. Of course, the Justices may not have considered the pronouncements
patriarchal and what they agreed to in an opinion may not actually reflect their views.

1989]

INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY

407

pragmatically, by, for instance, relying less on abstract canons of
statutory construction.230 Moreover, after 1900 some judges and academicians increasingly criticized mechanical or formalistic judicial
decisionmaking perceived as antidemocratic or as hindering legislative reform efforts.231 Accordingly, the critics offered numerous
prescriptions. For example, courts were admonished to defer to
legislative policymaking.232 But these developments probably had
minimal impact on the Supreme Court dissenters; in fact, the Justices may well have influenced or even anticipated the developments. Although Justice Harlan has been characterized as the
quintessential transitional jurist between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, little probably could have influenced him to modify
his long held views regarding statutory construction and the
branches of government.233 Moreover, Justice Harlan's opinion in
Thompson was as formalistic as the majority determination. 234
Similarly, Justice Holmes, in "magisterial detachment," had firmly
held convictions respecting the judiciary's obligation to implement
the sovereign's will as expressed through legislation.2311
Additional, less significant, reasons for the dissent pertain to
contemporary societal visions of women, wedlock, wives and the
family. These images had changed by 1910: marriage was seen as
less irrevocable and wives as more independent of their spouses.236

See HURST I, supra note 133, at 186-88; HURST m, supra note 164, at 41-42.
Roscoe Pound, in articles, such as Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 6-05
(1908), was an important proponent of these views. For helpful discussion of these developments, see G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 116-19; White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to
Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L.
REv. 999, 1000-12 (1972).
= See G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 145-46; G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 116-19; White,
supra note 231, at 1000-12 (discussing prescriptions and judicial deference); cf. H. BLACR.
HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCl'ION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAws xii, at 710 (2d ed. 1911)
(contemporaneous reference source including prescriptions); Pound, supra note 214 (contemporaneous advocacy of applying statutes in way Thompson dissent may ha\•e).
= "With the end of Harlan's tenure, American appellate judging entered the twentieth
century." G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 146. Indeed, Harlan was one of the first judges to use
"modem" statutory interpretation techniques.
""' Compare the dissenting and majority opinions in Thompson, 218 U.S. 611. Cf. K
LLEWELLYN, supra note 129, at 40-41 (temporal, geographical variability in opinion \\Titing);
supra note 166 (formalism discussion).
= Indeed, Holmes apparently affected these developments with contributions such as his
dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905), and advocacy of "goal oriented"
statutory interpretation, see supra notes 213-14.
236
See S. EISENSTEIN, supra note 177, at 13, 19 (eight times as many women worked in
230
231
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The modified visions may have been held by the three dissenters,
as evidenced in Justice Harlan's proclamation that Congress had
radically altered the common-law relation of husband and wife. Indeed, when the dissenters considered contemporary social conditions, it might have seemed plausible to them that the legislative
branch intended to end coverture. 237
The factors discussed above seem to have more importance for
the Thompson dissent than tort jurisprudence. Indeed, the dissenting opinion does not explicitly mention tort law.238 Developments in the field, which had coalesced by 1910, yield a mixed picture. Substantive tort doctrine differed minimally from that of the
nineteenth century,239 and most of the change originated in the
legislature and not in the judiciary. For example, the New York
Assembly initially created a cause of action for violation of the
right of privacy in 1903 but only after the state's highest court had
refused to do so the preceding year. 240 New York also adopted the
nation's first state-level workers' compensation scheme in 1910,241
in part to ameliorate the harsh effects of the judicially created "unholy trinity" of defenses. 242 Accordingly, the dissent appears less
explicable in terms of tort law.
In summary, Thompson was a watershed for interspousal tort
immunity. The majority opinion marks the rule's apogee, 243 while

1910 as 1890, but marriage was still seen as duty); w. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA x (1967) (1880-1920 time of decisive change in public attitudes on divorce and 19001915 crucial because thereafter nothing could control the rising divorce rate); R. SENNETT,
supra note 177, at 208-13 (decline in father's home authority); R. WIEBE, supra note 106, at
ch. 5 (all within new middle class, including women, experienced growth of self.
consciousness).
237
See supra notes 219-20 & 225-29 and accompanying text (deference to legislature more
important than women's rights).
3
• • See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 621 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"" See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text (describing tenor of constricted
liability).
0
"
Act of April 6, 1903, ch. 132, § 2, 1903 N.Y. Laws; Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 545, 64 N.E. 442, 443 (1902).
41
•
Act of July 18, 1911, ch. 674, 1910 N.Y. Laws. This legislation was enacted at then
Governor Hughes' instigation. However, this initiative was only marginally more responsive
to workers' needs than those of employers. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 587-88. Moreover,
the court of appeals declared the New York statute unconstitutional. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 317, 94 N.E. 431, 448 (1911).
242
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 587-88.
243
Prior to Thompson, 12 jurisdictions had recognized tort immunity, but no jurisdiction
had permitted interspousal tort litigation. The Thompson majority probably afforded im-
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the dissenting opinion presaged the abrupt, substantial departure
from prior precedent.244
(iii) 1914-1920. From 1914 until 1920, courts in seven jurisdictions recognized interspousal tort claims, while courts in a comparable number of states refused to do so.24 is Courts that permitted
the claims reached that result in one of three ways.
First, every court that allowed interspousal litigation relied substantially upon the Married Women's Acts, which had been
amended significantly but did not explicitly prescribe tort claims
between spouses. The jurists viewed the measures in numerous
ways, and most subscribed to multiple perspectives. Several judges
depended primarily upon the text of the Acts which was considered adequate to permit the lawsuits.246 Courts also analogized
from statutory causes of action afforded wives against their husbands in contract or property or against third parties in those areas and torts. 247 Moreover, judges found that the Married Women's
Acts (1) restored the legal status that married women had enjoyed
prior to wedlock;2 ' 6 (2) ended spouses' merged identity;249 (3) re-

munity vitality it might not otherwise have had. See infra note 245 (many courts finding
immunity later rely upon Thompson).
"" Justice Harlan's opinion may have anticipated the departure, but the courts that initially abolished immunity relied minimally on the Thompson dissent.
... Cases recognizing interspousal tort suits were Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 44, 77
So. 335, 338 (1917); Fit2patrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 177, 186 S.W. 832, 836 (1916);
Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 49, 89 A. 889, 892 (1914); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 5, 95
A. 657, 657 (1915); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 524, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920); Fiedler v.
Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 129-30, 140 P. 1022, 1025 (1914) (styled as Fiedeer v. Fiedeer in 140 P.
1022); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 47, 102 S.E. 787, 788 (1920).
Cases rejecting interspousal tort suits were Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 639, 92
S.E. 25, 27 (1917); Dishon v. Dishon, 187 Ky. 497, 501, 219 S.W. 794, 796, (1920), overruled,
Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 484, 484 (Ky. 1903); Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 391, 177
N.W. 624, 625 (1920), overruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373, 173 N.W.2d 416,
420 (1969); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 208, 177 S.W. 382, 384 (1915), overruled, Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Mo. 1986); Butterfield v. Butterfield, 195 Mo. App.
37, 38, 187 S.W. 295, 295 (1916); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 64, 179 S.W. 628,
629 (1915); Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 175, 96 S.E. 315, 321 (1918), overruled, Surratt v.
Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971).
"'" See, e.g., Gilman, 78 N.H. at 47, 95 A. at 657; Prosser, 114 S.C. at 47, 102 S.E. at 788•
... See, e.g., Brown, 88 Conn. at 46-47, 89 A. at 891; Crowell, 180 N.C. at 521, 105 S.E. at
209.
"'" See, e.g., Johnson, 201 Ala. at 43, 77 So. at 337; Brown, 88 Conn. at 47, 89 A. at 891;
Schult2 v. Schult2, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 27, rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882).
"'" See, e.g., Fit2patrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S.W. 832 (1916); Brown, 88 Conn. at
46, 89 A. at 891; Crowell, 180 N.C. at 522, 105 S.E. at 209-10.
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moved wives' common-law disabilities;250 (4) invested married females with indicia of independent legal status;251 (5) made married
women equal to their husbands; 252 or (6) were meant to be remedial, and, therefore, to be interpreted liberally. 253 These determinations alone, or in various combinations, supported conclusions that
wives could sue their husbands for personal injuries.
A second way that judges justified allowing interspousal tort actions was by rejecting earlier judicial treatment of immunity.
These courts rhetorically criticized prior analyses of the Married
Women's Acts. Several jurists even ascribed the retention of the
doctrine to statutory readings so restrictive that they "interpret[ ed] away" corrective legislation clearly meant to free wives
from common-law disabilities. 254 Moreover, judges expressly refuted the policy contentions traditionally articulated for immunity.
They found that tort claims would not be pursued in marriages
when any conjugal harmony remained. 255 Instead, courts proclaimed that such suits could serve connubial peace and public policy equally well as permitting married women "to go into the criminal courts and send [their husbands] to the penitentiary or into a
divorce court and publish their entire married [lives] to the
world." 256 The courts also stated that the "alternative remedies" of
criminal prosecution and marital dissolution provided little actual

••• See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 124 Ark. at 167, 186 S.W. at 835; Gilman, 78 N.H. at 4, 95 A. at
657; cf. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 30, 33 (Act's purpose to invade and dispel the common
law).
2 1
•
See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 124 Ark. at 167, 188 S.W. at 833; Brown, 88 Conn. at 44-45, 89
A. at 890.
••• See, e.g., Brown, 88 Conn. at 44-45, 89 A. at 890; Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A.
657 (1915); cf. Fitzpatrick, 124 Ark. at 167, 186 S.W. at 836 (Act could accord wife more
rights than husband).
••• See, e.g., Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 128, 140 P. 1022, 1024 (1914); Prosser v.
Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 47, 102 S.E. 787, 788 (1920). A few courts looked beyond the Acts'
express terms, ascertained that the measures effected a change in wives' legal status, and
reasoned therefrom that disabilities not eliminated explicitly or indicia of legal personality
not prescribed specifically by the Acts also should be removed or granted. See, e.g., Brown,
88 Conn. at 45, 89 A. at 890-91; Fitzpatrick, 124 Ark. at 167, 186 S.W. at 835-36.
204
See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, 124 Ark. at 167, 186 S.W. at 834; Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C.
516, 524, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920); Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 126, 140 P. at 1023.
••• See, e.g., Brown, 88 Conn. at 48, 89 A. at 891-92; Crowell, 180 N.C. at 525, 105 S.E. at
211 (Allen, J., concurring).
••• Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 130, 140 P. at 1025. Accord Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 44, 77
So. 335, 338 (1917); cf. Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33 (permitting tort actions
would promote harmony), rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882).
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redress to injured wives 257 and that the threat of frivolous or trivial
interspousal litigation was insignificant. 258
A third way that courts supported their determinations was with
affirmative public policy arguments. The courts asserted that provision for tort suits could afford married women compensatory relief,259 prevent breaches of the peace,260 or punish or deter intentionally inflicted interspousal harm. 261 Several judges observed that
an important purpose of courts, often enshrined in state constitutions and statutes, was to be open to all, regardless of marital status, to remedy wrongs. 262 A few jurists recognized wives' individual
rights. 263 The Married Women's Acts were the principal focus of
these judges, however, and none treated the immunity issue purely
as a common-law policy question. 264
A number of interrelated reasons underlie this dramatic departure from prior precedent. Considerations pertaining to judicial
decisionmaking, especially to courts' perspectives on their responsibilities, appear predominant. Although numerous judges in the
two decades after 1900 perceived their roles as late nineteenth century jurists did, an increasing number viewed their functions differently. Legislatures clearly had gained primary responsibility for
policymaking, and "statute law had increased in reach and density," becoming the major element of legal growth. Legislation,
particularly the Married Women's Acts, exhibited "sustained lines
of policy" as substantial as case precedent.26G From the turn of the

"'' See, e.g., Johnson, 201 Ala. at 44, 77 So. at 338; Crowell, 180 N.C. at 522, 105 S.E. at
209; Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 130, 140 P. at 1025.
258
See Brown, 88 Conn. at 48, 89 A. at 891-92. In response to the fraud rationale for
prohibiting interspousal suits, discussed supra note 155 and accompanying text. one court
concluded that the "divorce courts open the same avenues in order to recover undeserved
alimony." Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 130, 140 P. at 1025.
••• See, e.g., Johnson, 201 Ala. at 44, 77 So. at 338; Crowell, 180 N.C. at 523, 105 S.E. at
210; Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 129-30, 140 P. at 1025.
••• See Brown, 88 Conn. at 49, 89 A. at 892; Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. CL at 28-29, 33.
••• See Crowell, 180 N.C. at 524, 105 S.E. at 210; Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. CL at 33; Fiedler,
42 Okla. at 129-30, 140 P. at 1025.
••• See Brown, 88 Conn. at 49, 89 A. at 892; Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 127, 140 P. at 1024.
••• Crowell, 180 N.C. at 516, 105 S.E. at 210. Accord Fiedler, 42 Okla. at 129, 140 P. at
1024-25; cf. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 33 (permitting interspousal tort litigation would
enlarge wives' rights).
204
See infra notes 351 & 363-64 and accompanying text (discussions of treatment ns a
common-law policy question).
265
HURST III, supra note 164, at 42. Accord HURST I, supra note 133, at 187-88.
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century until 1920, Congress and state legislatures passed many reform measures premised on the belief that government had an affirmative obligation to rectify newly appreciated social and economic inequities.266 Correspondingly, courts' policymaking
responsibilities diminished. The influence exerted by the common
law, reflected specifically in doctrinal development and in the
merger fiction, waned. Thus, judges more readily accepted statutory law, such as the Married Women's Acts, as part of the general
corpus of the law and considered it less of an intrusion upon the
symmetrical common-law system. In short, courts' "creative opportunity had become the subordinate, but essential, task of imaginative, firm implementation of legislative policy."267
Moreover, certain judges and scholars explicitly urged courts to
adopt new perspectives on their roles, especially vis-a-vis legislatures. These advocates thought that the law should be responsive
to changing human conditions, premised on philosophy and the
new social sciences, and fairly applied to afford social justice in
particular cases.268 They generally favored contemporary reform
measures and lauded improvements in the legislative process.200
These proponents also criticized aspects of existing judicial
thinking and the substantive determinations that it yielded. They
rejected static principles and mechanical legal reasoning, especially
as manifested in formalistic judicial construction of legislative reform measures. 270 The jurists and academicians challenged the proposition that courts merely declared or interpreted law, by exposing them as lawmakers and their decisionmaking as a "highly
politicized and idiosyncratic process."271 Jurists who retained the
••• See HURST III, supra note 164, at 42; Pound, supra note 214, at 384 (legislative im·
provements); G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 69-70, 105; L. GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN
LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 59-81 (1988) (Progressive era trans·
formation of child protection in families); s. Woon, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PRO·
GRESSIVE ERA: CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW 1-46 (1968) (passage of reform measures).
1
••
HURST I, supra note 133, at 187. Accord G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 116·19; G.
WHITE, supra note 162, at 154-56.
••• See Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV.
591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912) (pts. 1 & 3); see also G. WHITE, supra note 124, at
69-71; G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 154-56; White, supra note 231, at 999-1012 (secondary
treatment).
••• See G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 71, 118. See also Bingham, What is the Law? 11
MICH. L. REV. 1, 109 (1912) (pts. 1 & 2); Pound, supra note 214, at 384.
10
•
See, e.g., Pound, supra note 214, at 384-88; Pound, supra note 231.
271
G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 154.
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common law in the face of remedial legislation or who restrictively
interpreted such measures were accused of impeding progress by
improperly substituting their own value choices for those of the
people.272 These observers described the ideal judge as an "architect of social policy," who appreciated the social context of decisionmaking.273 Such a jurist understood the necessity for positive
governmental activity to alleviate societal unfairness and for courts
to engage in those efforts only by effectuating the policymaking
authority of the legislature or remedying the judiciary's prior unresponsiveness.274 When treating statutes, courts were admonished to
read them broadly; to be attuned to such practicalities of legislative drafting as the difficulty of providing expressly for all contingencies; to implement rigorously the legislature's will where articulated explicitly; and to effectuate it even when less clearly
enunciated.275 Indeed, in 1910, Roscoe Pound boldly proposed that
judges handle legislation in the following manner:
[Courts] might receive it fully into the body of the law as
affording not only a rule to be applied but a principle
from which to reason, and hold it, as a later and more
direct expression of the same general will, of superior authority to judge-made rules on the same subject; and so
reason from it by analogy in preference to them. 276
In short, jurists were enjoined to exercise self-restraint and to defer to the legislature.277
These considerations underlie contemporary judicial treatment
of statutes, as manifested in courts' increased willingness to read
expansively the Married Women's Acts in numerous contexts, even
effectuating the legislative will expressed therein, although not
stated clearly.278 Judges became less antagonistic and literal and
= See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905); Pound, supra note 214. Accord
G.

WHITE, supra note 162, at 155.
• G. WHITE, supra note 124, at

118. Accord Bingham, supra note 269, at 119-21.
See Pound, supra note 268 (positive government action); G. White, supra note 124, at
71, 118 (all ideas in text).
27
• For the clearest contemporaneous statement of these ideas, see Pound, supra note 214,
at 385-86. Accord HuRST III, supra note 164, at 41-45; G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 155-56.
276
Pound, supra note 214, at 385.
277
See G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 155; Pound, supra note 214, at 385-86•
..,. See Landis, supra note 214, at 16-17; HURST III, supra note 164, at 41-45; HURST I,
supra note 133, at 186-88.
27

274
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more flexible and pragmatic.279 They accorded greater weight to
the legislative process, particularly as a policymaking endeavor,
while evincing appreciation for the realities of drafting. They recognized that statutes generally resulted from an ongoing process. 280
Courts also read generously the text of Married Women's statutes,
finding imprecise phraseology sufficient to cover specific, uncontemplated contingencies like interspousal tort litigation. When
judges concluded that the text alone was insufficient, they attempted to ascertain legislative intent. Courts typically employed
methods and considered information related to the Acts or the legislative process, such as legislative history. 281 Correspondingly,
courts abandoned reliance on the canons of statutory construction.
Indeed, the only frequently invoked canon-that measures in derogation of the common law were to be interpreted liberally to implement their remedial purposes-often was based upon a statute. 282
Jurists also gleaned applicable expressions of public policy from
legislative activity in a particular area or related fields; from the
passage of a succession of enactments; or from statutes by treating
them like common-law precedents.283
Several other factors may explain these changes in judicial decisionmaking. First, numerous jurists were less reluctant to intervene
in the family, particularly when the legislature had somehow addressed the issue before the court. 284 This phenomenon was reflected in the legalization of widened spheres of interspousal interaction and in rising divorce rates. The opinions also may be
attributable to changing perspectives on judges' roles broader than
those discussed above. 285 For example, some jurists believed that
law should be used affirmatively to aid disadvantaged members of
society and that fair resolution of specific cases required an appreciation of the moral dimensions and the social realities underlying
279

See HURST III, supra note 164, at 42-45; HURST I, supra note 133, at 187.
See HURST III, supra note 164, at 40-46.
281
See id. at 42; HURST I, supra note 133, at 188, J. JOHNSON, supra note 77, at 75·82.
282
See HURST I, supra note 133, at 188 (abstract canons abandoned); Fiedler v. Fiedler,
42 Okla. 124, 128, 140 P. 1022, 1024 (1914) (tort immunity's abolition premised on statute
requiring liberal interpretation of remedial Act).
283
See HURST III, supra note 164, at 44-45; supra note 213 and accompanying text (con·
temporaneous example of Holmes' precedential treatment of statute).
284
See supra notes 247-53 and accompanying text for Acts in cases that legalized inter·
spousal tort activity.
288
See supra notes 265-83 and accompanying text.
280
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them. Therefore, some courts might have permitted interspousal
tort claims because they wanted to intervene on behalf of the
weaker party, help the injured female by affording a civil remedy,
or punish and deter the social evil of wife battering, regardless of
whether the judges thought that the legislators actually had contemplated these precise consequences.288 Thus, although a few jurists may have considered it appropriate for courts to intervene in
the family when necessary, even those who did not might have appreciated that there would be little detrimental interference in a
marriage already disrupted by intentionally inflicted harm. 287
Other significant reasons why courts permitted interspousal tort
actions pertain to contemporary societal visions of women, marriage, wives, and the family. The images had substantially changed
since immunity first was recognized and even since Thompson was
decided. 288 During the late nineteenth century a new middle class
emerged. Between 1895 and 1915, many groups within the class experienced "formative growth toward self-consciousness."289 ConseSee, for example, the cases recognizing interspousal tort suits, discussed supra notes
259 & 261 and accompanying text. Cf. G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 69·71 (judges were
admonished to help weaker members of society, appreciate social realities, nnd do justice in
specific cases).
281
The courts that abolished immunity in Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 523, 105 S.E.
206, 210 (1920), and Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 126, 140 P. 1022, 1024 (1914), evinced
some willingness to permit state intervention in the family. See the other cases recognizing
interspousal tort suit, discussed supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text (second proposition in text). This account offers plausible reasons for courts' abolition of tort immunity. If
jurists in states where such actions were allowed had read expansively the l\iarried Women's
statutes and legalized interspousal relations in numerous other contexts, it made sense to
handle immunity similarly. Indeed, the writers of several opinions asked why a wife who was
able to sue her husband for a broken promise could not also sue him for a broken arm.
Moreover, if certain judges believed that they were obligated to effectuate the legislative "'ill
or to resolve equitably disputes, the jurists may have discharged these duties by abrogating
immunity. See Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C.
516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920).
288
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). See supra notes 190-204 nnd accompanying text.
289
R WIEBE, supra note 106, at 112. Accord W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 15-42; W. C11AFE.
THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-1970,
at 3-22 (1972); W. O'NEILL, EvERYONE WAS BRAVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF FEMINISM JN
AMERICA (1969). For other helpful data, see generally sources on suffrage, e.g. E. Fu:.XNER.
supra note 96, and sources on the "Progressive Era," such as R HOFSTADTER. THE AGE OF
REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R 131-212 (1960); H. MAY, THE END OF Ai.l&IUCAN INNOCENCE:
A STUDY OF THE FmsT YEARS OF OuR OwN TIME. 1912-1917 (1959); M. Wurra. Soc1AL
THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REvoLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1976). It is also difficult to generalize about such complex matters. Cf. supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussion of
288
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quently, women in significantly increased numbers had careers or
were employed, attended college, and advocated social welfare issues, often as members of women's clubs or moral reform
organizations. 200
These phenomena continued and accelerated during much of the
teens, a period that can aptly be characterized as one of considerable ferment and optimism, especially regarding the prospects of
improving society. "Progressivism" reached its zenith. That movement contributed to passage of much reform legislation, notably
meant to protect females and children as family members and in
the workplace.291 Moreover, World War I gave public prominence
to women who left their homes and participated in the war effort.292 Women were involved actively in numerous political movements, most importantly suffrage, and their endeavors culminated
in adoption of the nineteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. 293
At this time, both the absolute number of divorces and divorce
rates rose sharply.294 Most significant was the decisive shift in public opinion toward markedly greater acceptance of divorce, because
it exemplified important changes in American cultural values. 20 G
Thus, by approximately 1915, wives probably were seen as having some separate legal identity, if not as completely independent
individuals. Marriage and the family were perceived less as patriar-

earlier images).
290
See C. CLINTON, supra note 65, at 166-67; A. KRADITOR, supra note 177, nt 5-6; W.
CHAFE, supra note 65, at 27-29, 54-56. Cf. Minow, supra note 9, at 881 (women's voluntary
work led to law reform mentioned infra note 291 and accompanying text); S. EISENSTEIN,
supra note 177, at 13 (large increase in working women from 1890 to 1910).
291
See, e.g., S. WooD, supra note 266, at 47-80 (child labor reform); Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412, 420-23 (1908) (challenge to workplace protective legislation for women); infra note
298 (workers' compensation legislation); L. GORDON, supra note 266.
2 2
•
Professor Chafe found that "during World War I, thousands of women had moved into
jobs formerly held by men, causing many observers to assert that a revolution in the economic role of women had occurred." W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 22. He also found, however, that "only 5 per cent of the women war workers joined the labor force for the first time
in the war years." Id. at 52. Accord B. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 56-57. Cf. A. KESSLER·
HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 217-49
(1982) (data on women workers); W. O'NEILL, supra note 289, at 169-224 ("women's move·
ment and the war").
203
See generally E. F'LEXNER, supra note 96, at 256-337; cf. W. O'NEILL, supra note 289,
at 146-224 ("feminism in the progressive era").
294
W. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 19-21 (1967).
29
• Id. at ix-x, 254-73.
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chal enclaves insulated from public scrutiny.296 These images were
explicitly articulated in some immunity cases, and they may have
been shared by judges.297 When judges looked around at contemporary society, it could have seemed to them that legislators, who already had provided married women various indicia of legal status,
intended to afford battered wives some relief. 298 Some judges may
have thought it eminently sensible that a woman-forced to divorce the man who had infected her with venereal disease or impaired her own earning capacity, desecrating the sacred institution
of marriage and treating her in the least "altruistic" way imaginable-should be able to seek compensation from and hold accountable that man in court. The judges may have intended to deter
others similarly disposed, all to the benefit of the victim and
society.299
The factors considered above were more significant to courts
than tort law, although tort principles had become more important

296
Id. at 268-69 (Progressives believed new, more egalitarian family was evolving); cf. Olsen, supra note 65, at 1509-13, 1516-20, 1530-38 (improved women's legal srotus). See generally Minow, supra note 9, at 827-32 (describing and criticizing traditional view that \\ives
bedune rights holders).
97
•
See, for example, the cases discussed supra notes 255-57 & 263 (regarding family harmony and women as rights holders).
••• See Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U.L. Rsv. 723,
746 (1935) (discussion of Married Women's Acts); Olsen, supra note 65, at 1509-13, 1516-20,
1530-38 (improved women's legal status).
••• The facts are drawn from Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 516, 105 S.E. 206, 206
(1920). Such facts, and the policies invoked, are similar to those in most cases abolishing
immunity. See supra notes 252-63 and accompanying text. Caution is warranted, however,
in concluding that the judiciary viewed women as persons in their own right entitled to all
the rights men possessed. Some courts that abolished immunity did mention such rights, see
supra note 263. Additionally, the Supreme Court observed that "great-not to say revolutionary-changes" in the "contractual, political and civil status of women, culminating in
the Nineteenth Amendment," had brought gender differences almost to the "vanishing
point." Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) (holding Minimum Wage Act of
1918 an unnecessary unconstitutional interference with liberty of contract). The composition of the state judiciary is said to have changed, being comprised or fewer judges wedded
to the common law or "educated in the legal supremacy of the husband." K LLEWELLYN,
supra note 129, at 40-41. But a commanding image of woman as rights-holder did not
emerge. Moreover, the Supreme Court cases yield a mixed picture. Compare the language
above from Adkins with Holmes' dissent in that case, 261 U.S. at 567-71, supra text accompanying note 214, and the patriarchal pronouncements in l\iacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299,
311 (1915), mentioned supra note 227, and in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
394-95 (1937). Cf. Crozier, supra note 298, at 746-49 (Acts weakened common law, creating
hiatus before public policy's rise during which judiciary recognized women's rights but gender discrimination ultimately prevailed).
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than in earlier periods. The authors of the opinions mentioned in a
cursory manner or alluded to the major purposes of tort jurisprudence. Most found more important the nineteenth century concepts of punishment and deterrence than the twentieth century
notion of compensation. 300 A helpful example of this was the incremental character of liability's expansion. Contemporary developments in the substantive field were checkered. The negligence concept retained preeminence, weakening only minimally. Although
numerous courts permitted an intentional tort cause of action for
mental distress against common carriers, many other judges rejected such claims. 301 While the privity of contract requirement
was initially eliminated for products liability actions in both negligence and warranty at this time, the two courts doing so were
among the first to adopt tort immunity and each retained it
throughout the teens. 302 Moreover, the courts effectively maintained the remaining tort immunities nationwide; indeed, immunity between parents and children attained much broader acceptance. 303 Thus, while tort jurisprudence did not figure prominently
in the cases, jurists' articulation of tort law precepts gave that substantive area more significance than before and anticipated future
developments. 304
See the cases discussed supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
For helpful discussion of the cases, see W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 12.
302
See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1050 (1916)
(abolishing privity requirement as to negligence); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622,
622, 135 P. 633, 633 (1913) (abolishing privity requirement as to warranty); cf. Roller v.
Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 242, 79 P. 788, 788 (1905) (third state to recognize parent-child immunity), overruled, Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). For early cases adopting interspousal tort immunity, see Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 366 (N.Y.
1863); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 P. 629 (1911), overruled, Freehe v. Freehe,
81 Wash. 2d 183, 192, 500 P.2d 771, 777 (1972), and overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash.
2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). During the teens, immunity was not challenged in either state.
Many states also passed worker's compensation statutes, though most of the measures
were limited. New York adopted the first statute in 1910, and by 1921 nearly every state
had done so. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 80. Cf. Larson, The Nature
and Origins of Workers Compensation, 37 CORNELL L. Q. 206, 232-33 (1952) (legislation
limited).
303
See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, §§ 131, 133 (governmental, charitable
immunities); Hollister, supra note 11 (parent-child immunity).
30
' Another explanation for the decisions abrogating immunity can be drawn from similar,
contemporary judicial treatment of gender-based discrimination. In that field, the Married
Women's Acts had undermined the common law's strength, creating a legal hiatus before
the rise of public policy, during which some courts recognized that females possessed certain
constitutional rights or additional entitlements. The legal hiatus was said to have been the
300
301

1989]

INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY

419

Although seven courts recognized interspousal tort suits between
1914 and 1920, the same number rejected such claims.3011 Several of
the courts considered themselves bound by earlier precedent.300
But even courts in states that never had addressed immunity denied interspousal litigation by employing logic nearly identical to
that used much earlier. 307
Thus, the judges announced a common-law rule of immunity
which could be changed only by legislation and that their responsibility was to declare and not to make law.308 When the jurists considered the substantially amended Married Women's Acts, they
first determined from a cursory reading that the statutes in terms
did not abolish immunity.309 The courts then ostensibly construed
the enactments, principally by discerning legislative intent. Instead
of examining pertinent legislative information, the judges relied on
variations of the abstract derogation canon310 and recited the nowstandard litany of public policy reasons-conjugal discord, frivolous or trivial actions, provision of alternative relief, juridical
equality-to explain why legislators could not have "intended" interspousal tort suits.311 Courts embellished the longstanding policy
rationales and invested them with more strident rhetoric. Admonitions, replete with Biblical annotations, regarding the sanctity of
the home resonated from the pages of opinions. Courts warned of

apogee in women's constitutional status, but gender discrimination weathered the "change
from ancient to modern nomenclature, and under its new sponsor, public policy, fully
regained its old strength" by 1935. See Crozier, supra note 298, at 746-49.
305
The cases are listed supra note 245.
306
See, e.g., Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 391, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (1920); Butterfield v.
Butterfield, 195 Mo. App. 37, 38, 187 S.W. 295, 295 (1916); Lillienkrunp v. Rippetoo, 133
Tenn. 57, 59, 179 S.W. 628, 628 (1915).
307
See, e.g., Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 639, 92 S.E. 25, 37 (1917); Rogers v.
Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 205-08, 177 S.W. 382, 383-84 (1915); Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157,
160-75, 96 S.E. 315, 316-21 (1918).
308
Heyman, 19 Ga. App. at 636, 92 S.E. at 26; Rogers, 265 Mo. at 202, 177 S.W. at 383-84.
3
"" See, e.g., Heyman, 19 Ga. App. at 636, 92 S.E. at 26; Rogers, 265 Mo. at 202, 177 S.W.
at 383-84. Courts also demanded exacting specificity, finding, for example, that the Acts
only governed property, or were procedural, and did not create new substantive causes of
action. See, e.g., Drake, 145 Minn. at 388, 177 N.W. at 624; Keister, 123 Va. at 157, 96 S.E.
at 316-19.
310
See, e.g., Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915); Keister, 123 Va.
at 157, 96 S.E. at 317. A variation was the assumption that legislatures acted \\ith the common law in mind.
11
•
See, e.g., Rogers, 265 Mo. at 200, 177 S.W. at 384; Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516,
105 S.E. 206 (1920); Lillienkamp, 133 Tenn. at 57, 179 S.W. at 628.
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disturbing the marital relation on which the health, purity and
morals of civilization depended; the dangers of public exposure of
insignificant familial disputes; the need for forgiveness between
husbands and wives; and the importance of self-sacrifice, not only
for the two people involved, but also for the greater good of the
society.312 Accordingly, these courts concluded that interspousal
tort claims had not been prescribed.
The changes in perspectives on judicial decisionmaking and in
societal images of women, marriage, wives, and the family which
had occurred by the teens were not universal. They varied in
scope, as well as geographically and temporally, affecting most
courts differently and some not at all.
Many judges saw their responsibilities much like nineteenth century jurists. They remained strongly influenced by the common
law, viewing statutes as intrusions upon it and, thus, narrowly construed them. Judges who were more receptive to legislation, nevertheless, may have considered it improper to look beyond the express text or to accord statutes precedential value. In fact, Pound
conceded that his prescription for judicial treatment of statutes
would "doubtless appeal to the common law lawyer as absurd."818
Moreover, many judges would have found alien the proposition
that courtS should intervene in the family, even to rectify social ills
like wife battering. Continued widespread reliance on the unity fiction and application of the derogation canon illustrate these ideas.
The changes in societal images of women clearly were not universal. Visions as pervasive and powerful as those that prevailed
before the teens certainly could not be displaced completely, and
many people continued to hold these perspectives. For example,
012
See, e.g., Drake, 145 Minn. at 391, 177 N.W. at 625; Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516,
525-29, 105 S.E. 206, 211-13 (1920) (Walker & Hoke, JJ., dissenting); Lillienkamp, 133
Tenn. at 64, 179 S.W. at 629; Keister, 123 Va. at 176-77, 96 S.E. at 321-22 (Burks, J., concurring); cf. Crowell, 180 N.C. at 522-24, 105 S.E. at 209-10; Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124,
140 P. 1022, 1023-25 (1914) (rhetoric and Biblical allusions in cases abrogating immunity).
Such admonitions ring hollow, however, because nearly all the suits were pursued by, or on
behalf of, a woman battered, or killed, by her husband .
.,. Pound, supra note 214, at 385. Indeed, statutes had not yet been received fully into
the law. An interesting chronology can be traced from Pound, supra note 214, and Holmes,
supra note 213; to Landis, supra note 214, and Stone, supra note 164, in the 1930s: to
Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463, 473 (1962), and
Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 18-21 (1966), in the 1960s; to G.
CALIBRES!, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982), and Williams, supra note 226,
in the 1980s.
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even at the height of the women's suffrage movement, most females were not involved actively, and many remained opposed to
giving women the right to vote. 314
The opinions retaining immunity, nonetheless, convey the sense
that the teens were a transitional time marked by real changes. For
instance, the mechanical reasoning and the stylized format of opinions probably signal a realization that legislatures had captured
primary policymaking authority.31 G More significantly, the vigor
with which the earlier societal images were championed and transformed into arguments of public policy for recognizing immunity
indicates judicial cognizance of several factors. Courts evidently
believed that the older visions had continuing vitality worth defending against the threatening new images. They also seemed to
appreciate that there had been changes in societal views of marriage and the family as manifested in greater public concern for
their individual members316 and that the Married Women's statutes actually had eroded the common law's strength and the
merger :fiction. These factors necessitated increased reliance upon
policy considerations.317
In summary, from 1914 to 1920, courts in seven jurisdictions permitted interspousal tort litigation. These years cannot be characterized as a period of wholesale abandonment, however, because
other jurists recognizing immunity afforded the rule continuing
strength. Moreover, any change in such a longstanding and widely
recognized doctrine which happened so abruptly was unlikely to
continue at a comparable pace. Accordingly, it is not surprising
that during the ensuing half century immunity eroded more
••• See C. DEGLER, supra note 65, at 328-61; cf. A. KRADITOR, supra note 177, at ch. 2
(compromises necessary to ensure suffrage secured); C. DEGLER, supra note 65, at 306 (nineteenth century women's movement left untouched great mass of women, many of whom
scorned it as wrongheaded).
••• Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 157, 96 S.E. 315, 315 (1918) is a classic of the formalistic genre. Indeed, the almost ossified exposition on rights and remedies might indicate a
desire to freeze flagging judicial supremacy, or to recapture now-faded glory, or even to
return to earlier, halcyon days.
••• See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 312 and accompanying text. Indeed, the strident
rhetoric with which courts embellished the images and the strained manner in which courts
deployed the images indicate how very threatening the newer images must have appeared.
317
See supra note 293 and accompanying text. These considerations may give credence to
the "deradicalization" idea, discussed supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. Most interesting is the air of quiet desperation, or even decadence, that pervades certain tort immunity opinions.
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gradually. 318
(iv) 1921-1970. Between 1921 and 1970, tort immunity slowly
eroded nationwide. Some states completely abolished the doctrine,
allowing both intentional tort and negligence interspousal suits.
Most jurisdictions, however, abrogated the rule in a piecemeal
manner, recognizing actions in certain contexts, such as after divorce or one spouse's death. Over time, the percentage of opinions
involving negligence immunity increased significantly. Most interesting, however, was the dearth of novel ideas in the cases, although those previously operating were articulated more explicitly
or applied differently. 319 Thus, throughout the period courts cited
accumulating precedent, relied substantially upon reasoning
processes used earlier, and employed previously stated policy arguments to justify immunity's retention or abrogation. In the first
quarter-century, the Married Women's Acts figured prominently in
most determinations. During the second, however, the emphasis
shifted to policy considerations principally related to torts. In
short, by 1970, most states had permitted tort claims in some context, and the interspousal issue had become essentially a commonlaw policy question of substantive tort jurisprudence.320

1
• • Two interspousal tort immunity cases decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court in
1920 afford a valuable transition. In Dishon v. Dishon, 187 Ky. 497, 497, 219 S.W. 794, 794
(1920), overruled, Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1953), the court's cryptic re·
fusal to recognize a tort action aptly summarized prior similar treatment. Two months Inter
in Robinson v. Robinson, 188 Ky. 49, 49, 220 S.W. 1074, 1074 (1920), the court permitted
the administrator of the estate of a woman killed by her husband to sue the husband, thus
presaging future developments. Before the Robinson case, the seven abolition cases, listed
supra note 245, that involved intentional torts, had had the effect of fully abrogating immu·
nity because courts in those states later held that negligence immunity also wns abolished.
See, e.g., Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 583, 131 A. 432, 432 (1925); Roberts v. Rob·
erts, 185 N.C. 566, 566, 118 S.E. 9, 9 (1923). The Kentucky court was the first to partially
abrogate immunity. It commenced a process which is ongoing, whereby judges or legislators
who are unwilling to eliminate immunity fully, abolish it in specific contexts when nbrogn·
tion is warranted. For instance, the Robinson court recognized that when the reasons for
immunity have ceased to exist, as when murder ends the marriage, so should immunity.
Partial abrogation has been a favored technique, and the piecemeal nature of abolition in
Virginia is a classic, see Comment, The Legislative Abrogation of lnterspousal Immunity in
Virginia, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 939 (1981). Similarly, Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634,
634, 92 S.E. 25, 25 (1917), is a precursor because it is the first case seeking recognition of a
negligence cause of action.
319
The ideas were refined, applied in new contexts, or accorded varying significance at
certain times, depending on their relative relevance.
320
Judicial treatment of immunity by courts abolishing or retaining it was similar during
the first two decades, changed somewhat between 1940 and 1950, and was nearly identical
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From 1920 to 1940, considerably more jurisdictions recognized
immunity than rejected it. In each decade, the same number of
courts asked to allow interspousal tort claims for the first time rejected them as during the teens. 321 Most judges who recognized interspousal actions in the 1920s and 1930s served on courts that already had allowed intentional tort suits.322 During the 1930s,
however, courts that had retained immunity partially eliminated it,
especially in the employer-employee context.323
Many jurists used reasoning similar to that employed before
1920. The Married Women's statutes remained integral, while
judges relied substantially on precedent and the policy arguments
developed earlier.324 Courts rejecting litigation repeated the stock
ideas supporting immunity, including the unity :fiction, the existence of a common-law rule of tort immunity, the derogation ca-

from 1950 until 1970. These similarities allow combined analysis or the initial and Inst score
or years and individualized assessment of the middle decade, while the gradual pace of
change and the paucity of novel concepts in the decisions facilitate examination of such a
lengthy period. Space limitations preclude listing the cases. For specific periods, see Annotation, Modern Status of Interspousal Tort Immunity in Personal Injury and Wrongful
Death Actions, 92 AL.Ran 901 (1979) (and its predecessors).
321
See, e.g., Palmer v. Edwards, 155 So. 483 (La. App. 1934); Furstenberg v. Furstenberg,
152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927); Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932), ouerruled, Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1986); Sargeant v. Fedor, 3 N.J. Misc.
832, 130 A. 207 (1925); Leonardi v. Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 110, 153 N.E. 93 (1925) (the
1920s); Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935) (the 19303), ouerruled, Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 244 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
= See, e.g., Penton v. Penton, 223 Ala. 282, 135 So. 481 (1931); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103
Conn. 583, 131 A. 432 (1925) (superseded by statute as stated in Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200
Conn. 290, 512 A.2d 130 (1986)); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938);
Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932). Cf. Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d
740 (1935); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Wait v. Pierce,
191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926); N.Y. GEN. 0BLIG. § 3-313 (McKinney 1963) (states totally
abolishing for the first time).
323
See, e.g., Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932) (injured plaintiff's subsequent marriage to servant or agent who negligently caused injuries held not to abate
plaintiff's right of action against employer); McLaurin v. McLnurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss.
180, 146 So. 877 (1933) (where husband/servant's tortious act injuring his \',ife is net. of his
master, master is liable to wife, even though wife could not sue husband). Cf. Haglund,
supra note 24, at 897-906 (analysis of employer-employee cases). This is a combined example of partial abrogation, the "Erosion Principle," and the significance or compensation and
insurance.
324
See supra notes 246-312 and accompanying text. Few judges incisively analyzed tort.
immunity or developed new ways of treating it, but there were exceptions. See, e.g., Austin
v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 73-74, 100 So. 591, 593 (1924) (Etheridge, J., dissenting); Courtney
v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 395, 87 P.2d 660, 660 (1938).
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non, and traditional policy contentions such as marital harmony
and frivolous claims.325 Most important, however, were two "modern-day" policy notions which could have evolved from previously
articulated concepts. First, the idea that a wife would raid her husband's estate may have foreshadowed the idea that unscrupulous
spouses might collude to defraud motor vehicle insurers. 326 Second,
the earlier treatment of the Married Women's measures presaged
the notion of judicial deference to legislative public policy
choices. 327 Moreover, the opinions rendered between 1920 and 1940
were less rigid, strained, and strident than cases decided from 1914
to 1920.328 The most interesting aspects of decisions abrogating immunity were the increased judicial willingness to read the relevant
Acts broadly and to abrogate immunity partially, particularly when
the policy reasons for retention would not be contravened. 329
During the 1940s, approximately twice as many courts retained
the doctrine as repudiated it. 33° Courts continued to depend upon
precedent and policy arguments, as the Married Women's legislation remained significant. Close scrutiny of the opinions indicates,
however, that jurists handled immunity somewhat differently, indicating that the decade of the 1940s may have been a transitional
••• See, e.g., Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 523, 263 N.W. 546, 546 (1935), over·
ruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969); Aus·
tin, 136 Miss. at 61, 100 So. at 591; Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 425, 15 P.2d 922, 922
(1932).
••• Perlman v. Brooklyn City Ry. Co., 117 Misc. 353, 354, 191 N.Y.S. 891, 891 (1921),
aff'd, 202 App. Div. 822, 194 N.Y.S. 971 (1922), was the first case to mention the collusion
idea, but many subsequent cases do. See, e.g., Maine v. J. Maine & Sons, Co., 198 Iowa
1278, 1279, 201 N.W. 20, 21 (1924), overruled, Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 720, 74
N.W.2d 212, 219 (1956); Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 41, 198 N.E. 320, 321 (1935).
327
See, e.g., Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 899, 62 S.W. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (1933), over·
ruled, Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986); Emerson v. Western Seed &
Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 184-85, 216 N.W. 297, 298-99 (1927), overruled, Imig v. March,
203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979); Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291, 292-93, 117 A. 357, 358
(1922), overruled, Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 388 A.2d 1 (1978).
••• Compare the cases cited in supra notes 325-27 with those cited in supra note 307.
••• See, e.g., Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice,
62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926). For
examples of partial abrogation, see Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So.
191 (1935); Albrecht v. Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377 (1934); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 A. 663 (1936), overruled, Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d 859
(1981). For citations to the cases decided between 1920 and 1940, see Annotation, supra
note 320.
••• The number considering the question as a matter of first impression was quite small,
so that judges in almost every jurisdiction had some precedent to consider.
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period. The altered treatment was subtle, a matter of degree, and
more pronounced in the decisions retaining immunity.331
These courts de-emphasized the unity fiction, the derogation canon, and the longstanding and less persuasive policy notions relating to alternative relief, "floodgates," and juridical equality. The
judges stressed and continued to refine the fraud and collusion and
judicial deference concepts. Although the marital harmony rationale retained prominence, the tenor of its articulation moderated.
Courts repudiating immunity relied less on the Married
Women's Acts and more on the status of wives as individual rightsholders. In short, the 1940s witnessed alterations in the substance,
emphasis, and tone of interspousal tort immunity opinions. Especially noteworthy is a shift in focus from the common law and statutes to the most convincing public policy considerations.332
Between 1950 and 1970, the pace of abrogation quickened, even
though many more jurisdictions retained than abolished immunity.
During the 1950s numerous courts partially eliminated the rule,
but few completely abolished it. During the 1960s, only a small
number of courts partially abrogated the doctrine and several totally eliminated it.
·
Judicial reasoning processes evolved but resembled those employed before. Precedent assumed greater significance with a
growth in case law, and some jurists relied primarily on it. 333 Although courts mentioned the Married Women's statutes, their importance dwindled. Courts treated immunity almost entirely as a
common-law policy question. 334 The mode of argumentation also
changed, as jurists analyzed immunity more comprehensively, carefully, and candidly.335 The tenor of most cases remained mild, but
331
McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943), is the most "Jnnus·like"
opinion.
332
For citations to the cases decided during this decade, see the sources cited in Annotation, supra note 320.
333
Some opinions, especially those retaining immunity, were cryptic nnd included few
reasons for the conclusion. See, e.g., Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 217, 239 P.2d 933, 933
(1952), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Romero v.
Romero, 58 N.M. 201, 201, 269 P.2d 748, 748 (1954), overruled, Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M.
213, 214, 531 P.2d 947, 948 (1975).
33
• But new policy ideas were not enunciated.
= They thoroughly ventilated the issues at stake and acknowledged the strengths nnd
vulnerabilities of the policy arguments for and against abolition and retention. For example,
the simultaneous ascendance of the fraud and judicial deference contentions on the one
hand and the compensation rationale on the other may have reflected countervailing posi-
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occasional strong language can be found in dissenting opinions. 336
More specifically, nearly all courts rejecting tort suits abandoned
the alternative remedies, frivolous litigation, and juridical equality
ideas and relied principally on the marital harmony, collusion, and
judicial deference notions. During the 1950s, jurists fully abrogating the doctrine primarily depended upon responses to these arguments. Courts partially eliminating immunity expressly observed
that when the reasons for the rule, such as existence of a marital
relationship, had ceased, so should the doctrine's application. By
the next decade, however, some judges enunciated more explicitly
affirmative policy arguments, like compensation for injuries. 337
Courts handled the interspousal question as described above between 1920 and 1970 for numerous reasons, some of which are similar to explanations offered during earlier periods. Factors respecting judicial decisionmaking, tort jurisprudence, and societal images
of females, wedlock, wives, and the family have more comparable
importance than previously.
Considerations regarding judicial decisionmaking, particularly
jurists' views of their roles, evolved during the fifty-year period,
appearing to change somewhat in the 1940s. Statutes remained a
primary source of legal growth338 and, correspondingly, the
strength of the common law, its rules and fictions continued to
dwindle. Yet, opinions included more appeals to public policy, and
courts increasingly treated substantive legal issues as policy questions appropriate for judicial resolution independent of
legislatures. 339
Two identifiable schools of legal thought refined ideas about judicial decisionmaking. The first jurisprudential movement, "Realism," predominated between 1920 and 1945. The second school,

tions developed on a critical policy question.
338
See, e.g., Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 74-76 (Mo. 1960) (Eager, J., dissenting); Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 550-66, 180 A.2d 772, 774-82 (1962) (Musmanno, J,, dissenting), overruled, Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A2d 859 (1962).
337
For citations to the cases decided between 1950 and 1970, see the sources cited in
Annotation, supra note 320.
338
See HURST I, supra note 133, at 188-89.
33
• A classic statement of these ideas in the tort context is R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do
JUSTICE (1969). See also W. PROSSER & W:P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 3. Thus, while legislatures probably retained policymaking primacy, see text accompanying supra note 332,
courts may have regained lost policymaking authority in torts, because legislatures lacked
sufficient time to "seriously consider proposals for law reform," see R. KEETON, supra, at 16.
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denominated "Reasoned Elaboration" or "Process Jurisprudence,"
was preeminent from 1945 until 1970.340
The Realists subscribed to concerns expressed earlier about disadvantaged persons and justice in specific cases. They advocated
reliance on the use of nonlegal materials and criticism of mechanical concepts, legal reasoning, and opinion writing. The Realists also
warned against placing undue reliance on traditional legal authority, including the common law, doctrine, and fictions, while favoring policy-oriented and functional decisionmaking and approaches
that balanced interests, especially those of litigants.341
Realism posed a number of philosophical dilemmas, particularly
irrationality and moral relativism. The Reasoned Elaborationists
responded to such dilemmas by refining certain Realist theories
and offering their own. 342 These judges and scholars emphasized
rationality and consensus thinking. They were concerned about institutional relationships between the legislative and executive
branches of government and the courts, for which they envisioned
a circumscribed role. Thus, the judiciary was to exercise restraint,
limit its lawmaking activity, and defer to the more democratic
branches whenever practicable.343 The Reasoned Elaborationists
admonished courts to observe "neutral principles," respecting precedent. Courts were clearly, candidly, and comprehensively to articulate and balance the issues, interests, and values implicated,
while resolving questions pursuant to societal consensus and refraining from judgment when these goals could not be attained.344

0
"'
I rely most here on the work of those in the jurisprudential movements, such as Karl
Llewellyn and Herbert Wechsler, and on White, supra note 268. See also White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REY.
279 (1973) (secondary treatment).
"'' See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN :MIND (1930); Llewellyn, A Realistic Juris·
prudence-The Next Step, 30 Cotur.t L. REv. 431 (1930). Cf. White, supra note 268, at 101326; White, supra note 340, at 280-82 (secondary treatment).
"'" See, e.g., L. Fuu.ER, Tm: LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); cf. White, supra note 340, at
282-86 (secondary treatment); White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN.
L. REv. 649, 655-56 (1984) (discussing how incremental criticism in this context precipitated
legal change).
"'" See, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lin·
coln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1957); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958
Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959); cf. G. W11rra,
supra note 162, at 323 (secondary treatment).
"'' See, e.g., Hart, supra note 343; Wechsler, Tou:ard Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959); cf. G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 323 (secondary
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Once judges reached decisions, they were to write opinions in a lucid, forthright, and internally consistent manner and to justify
conclusions with thorough, persuasive rationales. 3411
The ideas espoused by these jurisprudential schools may explain
the courts' treatment of immunity. Judges' increasing willingness
to abolish immunity partially manifested numerous Realist tenets.
Jurists may have been attempting to provide equity between the
parties, rejecting the irrelevant unity fiction, or recognizing the underlying social realities of wife battering. 346 Similarly, the judicial
deference policy contention embodied aspects of Reasoned
Elaborationist teachings. 347 Indeed, tort immunity, implicating delicate issues of marriage and the family about which there could be
little societal consensus, might well have been the kind of question
considered more appropriate for legislative resolution. 348 Moreover,
significant changes in immunity's treatment after 1940, such as decreasing dependence on the common law, merger, and the Married
Women's Acts, greater reliance on more salient public policy arguments, and use of more candid, thorough modes of argumentation
reflected integral precepts of each jurisprudential school and of judicial decisionmaking in numerous substantive fields. 349
Tort jurisprudence, particularly after 1945, appears to have been
more important to immunity decisions than before 1920. It seems
equally important as considerations regarding judicial decisionmaking. 350 Moreover, many aspects of courts' treatment of the interspousal question comported with a number of theoretical and
case law developments in tort law.
The theorizing had numerous strands. Several major strains that
developed between 1920 and 1950 can be identified. One group of
treatment) .
... See, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, supra note 343; Sacks, Foreword to the Supreme Court,
1953 Term, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1954); cf. G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 345 (secondnry
treatment).
346
See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
347
See, e.g., supra note 343 and accompanying text.
••• See supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text.
349
For example, the Reasoned Elaborationists evinced most concern about the United
States Supreme Court's treatment of constitutional issues. See supra notes 341-45 nnd nccompanying text (precepts of both schools).
••• See supra notes 338-49 and accompanying text. Tort jurisprudence is relnted to contemporary judicial decisionmaking, for example, because tort law was one focus of the Renlists. I rely most here on work of those, like Leon Green, who advocated tort lnw ideas discussed below, and for secondary treatment on G. WHITE, supra note 124.

1989]

INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY

429

judges and academicians treated torts as a "private law" subject
with discrete boundaries, the primary purpose of which was admonitory. They emphasized the field's doctrinal nature and negligence as its organizing principle. 3111 A second collection of judges
and writers, the Realists, differed with much of this. 3112 They considered torts to be an area of "public law," stressing its compensatory goal and de-emphasizing the field's doctrinal aspects and the
central importance of negligence. 3113
"Tort law was not the same after the impact of Realism."3114 By
the 1940s, however, tort law had become an "unwieldy, diverse,
fluid subject," and Realism's philosophical difficulties had been exposed. 355 Thus, there ensued a search for consensus dominated by
two approaches that grew out of the earlier thinking. The first, a
"traditional" perspective, subscribed to the body of substantive
tort doctrine and considered the field's principal purpose to be
civil punishment of blameworthy behavior.3116 The other approach,
characterized by a "policy" orientation, viewed torts primarily as a
scheme for compensating injured people through insurance.3117 A
surface reconciliation of these perspectives was said to have been
achieved mainly through the efforts of Dean Prosser, who preserved doctrinal approaches to torts while applying Realist methodologies.358 This theorizing contributed to subtle changes between
1945 and 1970, so that by 1970 torts was evolving into a public law
u• Professor White, supra note 124, at 78-83, describes Francis Bohlen as a central figure
in this group. Cf. id. at ch.3 (full discussion of group's views and citations to writings).
u• Professor White, supra note 124, at 75·78, describes Leon Green as a leader of this
group. Cf. id. at ch. 3 (full discussion of group's views and citations to writings).
u• See id. at 106-10, 149-50. Moreover, Professor White has identified a third group that
included Charles Gregory and Fleming James, who also argued that negligence should have
less significance. Id. at 146. The Realists also stressed the policy ramifications of tort law,
urged courts to consider the relationship between parties before them while balancing the
litigants' interests and policy factors, and recommended that strict liability be treated as a
distinct category, rather than as a series of exceptions. Id. at 106-10, 149-50.
Id. at 112.
u• See G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 139-40 (unwieldy); id. at 139-41; text accompan}ing
supra note 342 (exposure of Realism's philosophical difficulties, such as relativism).
u• See id. at 140-53. Professor White identifies certain "Harvard-trained scholars," like
the Keeton brothers, as leaders, see id. at 153. Cf. id. at 140-53 (full discussion of group's
views and citations to writings).
307
See G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 146-53. Professor White identifies Charles Gregory,
Fleming James, and Leon Green as leaders of this group, see id. at 153. Cf. id. at 146-53
(discussion of group's views, the significance of insurance and citations to writings).
$08 For a thorough discussion of Dean Prosser's efforts, see id. at 153-79.
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subject, principally aimed at adjusting societal risks through more
equitable and efficient compensation of injuries. 369
Although little of this thinking was acknowledged expressly in
tort opinions until the 1940s, it may have influenced judicial decisionmaking during the entire half century. Numerous elements of
the case law-including expansion of liability's ambit as well as developments respecting specific doctrine and perceptions of torts'
purposes-were consistent with courts' handling of interspousal
immunity. The patterns of gradual evolution throughout this period, as well as incremental change at the beginning and accelerating change near the end, extended across much of tort law. 36 ° For
instance, the independent intentional tort cause of action for
mental distress was adopted sporadically before mid-century, but
more widely thereafter.361 In products liability, courts slowly abrogated the privity requirement for negligence and warranty actions
nationwide. Courts only recognized strict liability in tort during
the 1960s, after which time it quickly swept the nation. 362 Numerous other tort doctrines slowly eroded over the fifty years, as
judges developed "ameliorating practices and a group of exceptionsfor avoiding" the application of rules believed to "regularly produce unjust results or lag behind social and economic developments. "363 Indeed, the alteration of doctrines that occurred be-

3
•• See id. at 176-79. Professor White finds Prosser most influential, see id. at 176-77, but
others, like James and Harper with their treatise, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956), and Charles
Gregory were influential. Of course, all tort theorizing at this time did not fit neatly into tho
categories above, and tort scholars evinced little interest in tort immunity during tho half
century. There were Haglund, supra note 24, and Sanford, supra note 3, but the seminal
work on tort law in the family realm was by a family law specialist, McCurdy, supra note 3.
36
° For helpful analysis of numerous doctrinal areas that evinced these patterns, sec R.
KEETON, supra note 339.
361
See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 3; Givelber, The Right to Minimum
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1982).
362
For discussion of the slow development before the 1960s, see W. PROSSER & W.P. KEE·
TON, supra note 2, §§ 96-97; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960). For judicial adoption of strict liability during that decade, see Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 57, 377 P.2d 897, 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 697 (1962). Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A)(l965) (Restatement adoption);
PROSSER &
W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 98 (history of products liability).
363
See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 594 (7th ed.
1982). Tort immunity, like these tort doctrines, was a prime candidate for the "erosion prin·
ciple," which also explains judicial willingness to partially abrogate tort immunity. Other
examples of the slow pace of change are Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.)

w.
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tween 1958 and 1968, led numerically by most of the tort
immunities, was so dramatic that it has been characterized as a
"decade of distinctly accelerated overruling."364
In addition to these patterns, courts after 1945 increasingly resolved numerous tort law issues by balancing certain important
policy arguments, especially judicial deference and compensation.365 This treatment reflected shifts in the perception of torts
from a private to a public law field, compensatory in nature, and
that warranted policy-oriented, rather than doctrinal, analysis.366
Finally, many developments in torts specifically relating to immunity can be traced to expanding automobile use and to developing notions of how to handle injuries attributable to negligent driving. For example, motor vehicle operation may underlie the spate
of recognition of tort immunity, passage of guest statutes by half
the states, and emergence of the fraud policy contention between
1920 and 1940, as well as the continuing significance of that argument and the judicial deference and compensation contentions
thereafter. 367
Factors relating to societal images that predominated from 1920
to 1970 comport in a number of ways with courts' treatment of the
interspousal question. Because societal visions as ubiquitous and
strongly held as those that existed before 1910 could not have been
replaced totally and because the images that arose in the teens had
such different and threatening ramifications, the newer images
(first case recognizing wife's suit for consortium), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950); State
Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) (lead case recog·
nizing independent mental distress cause of action); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d lOS,
443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (first case abolishing traditional categories governing
premises liability).
... See R KEE'I'oN, supra note 339, at 3; cf. id. at 45 (immunities led development). None·
theless, before 1960, all the tort immunities eroded slowly. See W. PROSSER & W:P. KEETON,
supra note 2, §§ 122, 131, 133 (parent-child, governmental, and charitable immunity); Hol·
lister, supra note 11 (parent-child immunity).
06
• The rise of the judicial deference and compensation ideas extended across much of
tort law. See W. PROSSER & W:P. KEE'I'oN, supra note 2, §§ 3-4; cf. Keeton, supra note 313
(history of deference's rise); G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 146-53 (history of compen.«ation's
rise).
366
See infra notes 389-91 & 394-95 and accompanying text.
367
See w. PROSSER & W:P. KEE'I'oN, supra note 2, § 34 (discussion or guest statutes). Cf.
id., §§ 34, 122; Hollister, supra note 11 (preeminence of judicial deference and compensation
ideas and juxtaposition of latter with fraud counter-argument evident in cases chnllenging
guest statutes and parent-child immunity). See generally L. Fim:DMAN, supra note 37, at
588-89 (after 1920 tort law increasingly became "law of the automobile").
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could not have been expected to prevail. Indeed, what vitality the
visions had eroded swiftly and dramatically. Consequently, those
that predominated throughout most of this half-century were of
the traditional nuclear family in which the husband was the principal wage earner and the wife functioned primarily as homemaker.
The particulars of these images varied over time, yet the visions
apparently were so strong that they masked and denied the statistical realities, such as escalating divorce rates. 368
Public opinion substantially shifted between the world wars.
World War I, with its aura of "holocaust and meaningless death
and its mood of social instability" precipitated changes: prewar optimism and earnestness became cynicism; "social responsibility
gave way to alienation, virtuousness appeared as hypocrisy."369 Although the Progressive movement did not end during the 1920s, it
wore a "changed face." 370 States still enacted social welfare measures, but many Americans opposed additional change. 371 Moreover, some advances made in the Progressive era, especially for females, were lost or eroded, while the ephemeral quality of others
was revealed. After the Armistice, numerous wives quit the work
place and returned to their households, undermining whatever accomplishments women had achieved. 372 Despite the political gain
that suffrage represented, much of the reform's promise failed to
materialize, because the females who voted made choices remarkably similar to men. 373
The reexamination of traditional mores triggered by the war and
Progressivism may have been detrimental. Many "came to question the inviolability of their own moral principles,'' the number of
divorces continued to soar, and the increased freedom captured in
the "flapper" idea translated into little real political or economic
w.

368
See
CHAFE, supra note 289; N. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE
IN THE UNITED STATES (1962); W. O'NEILL, supra note 294, at 20-21 (divorce rates).
369
White, supra note 268, at 1014. Accord M. COWLEY, EXILE'S RETURN (1934); W.
O'NEILL, supra note 294, at 269-70.
370
White, supra note 268, at 1013. Accord
LEUCHTENBERG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY:
1914-1932 (1958); H. MAY, supra note 289.

w.

371

See White, supra note 268, at 1013 (states enacted social welfare measures); W.
supra note 9, at 90; S. Woon, supra note 266, at 255-56 (opposition to certain
reforms or more change).
372
See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 52-54. Accord B. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 57.
373
See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 26-33; E. Fl.EXNER, supra note 96, at 331; W.
O'NEILL, supra note 9, at 92.
O'NEILL,
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liberty.374 With the stock market crash and the Great Depression,
the public mood became much more "hard-boiled";37 rs women were
excluded from certain occupations, and those who held jobs were
castigated for depriving males of work. 376 Given these societal dislocations, it should not have been surprising that from the 1920s
until the 1940s prominent public figures and organs of popular culture persistently reinforced the notion that a woman's proper place
was in the home. 377 In short, by 1940 women's political, economic,
and social status had improved minimally, while the vision of female as homemaker was strengthened. 378
The Second World War, however, required creation of new
images for women, even as it altered underlying social realities. To
recruit females for the war effort, women workers were portrayed
publicly as fully competent to perform tasks formerly reserved exclusively for males.379 Millions of married and single women entered the job market, and they were paid higher wages and labored
under better conditions than before the war.360 Most salient, however, substantial numbers of females remained permanent members of the work force after the war. These realities undermined
the hegemony of the prevailing visions of women as homemakers
and of husbands as primary breadwinners and heads of their
households. 381
Nevertheless, the images continued to have considerable vitality
throughout the 1950s because of post-war societal uncertainties.
Dislocations caused by World War IT, tensions created by the Cold
War, and McCarthyism contributed to a search for consensus in
American life, pressures to conform, and the desire to reestablish

• White, supra note 268, at 1013-14. For additional discussion, see W. CHAFE, supra note
289, at 51, 94-96; H. MAY, supra note 289.
375
D. WECTER, THE AGE OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 251 (1948). Accord W. O'Nruu., supra
note 294, at 269-70.
378
See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 64, 107-09. Accord B. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 57.
377
See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 64, 107; W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 31-34.
378
See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at ch. 4; W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 29-34.
37
• See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at ch. 6; W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 92-94.
380
See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at ch. 6; W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 92-95. Cf. Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REY. 1, 9 (1975) (equal pay requirement in
force during war, quietly retired later). See generally Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 CotUM. L. REY. 1118, 1176
(1986) (veterans' job protection statute).
38
' See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at ch. 8, 144-46; W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 94-96.
37
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the patterns of a "simpler era."382 Many females experienced conflicts about their appropriate roles and were advised by public
leaders, the media, and health professionals to seek fulfillment in
the successful performance of their natural responsibilities as wives
and mothers. 383 The authority of the predominant images of the
nuclear family was not challenged seriously until the 1960s. That
decade witnessed the rejuvenation of the organized women's movement, which had been comparatively quiet, especially in the political arena, since adoption of the nineteenth amendment. 384
These prevailing visions were enunciated expressly in the immunity opinions and were shared by judges. Indeed, many would have
been reluctant to take any action that might jeopardize the family's well being. Thus, these jurists would have been unwilling to
permit tort suit by a female, separated, but not divorced, from her
battering spouse. They would have allowed the children of a woman murdered by her husband to sue, however. Moreover, the
strength exerted by the predominant images at different times during the half-century paralleled the slow pace of the doctrine's erosion and the preeminence of the marital harmony policy argument
throughout the period. It also was consistent with the flurry of
cases recognizing immunity from 1920 to 1940 and the accelerated

382

W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 208-09; G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 140, 144-45.
See W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 205-09 (writers urged women to return to tho homo,
while educators advocated that child rearing and homemaking be raised to the dignity of n
profession and made the primary purpose of women's colleges); W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at
94-95 (magazines featured pictures of large families, praised women who became professionals at homemaking, and glorified family togetherness).
38
' B. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 56-58; W. CHAFE, supra note 289, at 227. The period of
comparative quiet in the women's movement mirrors the hiatus in the demise of interspousal tort immunity. Whether there is any link between the two phenomena will require
more research. For helpful discussion of the "lag theory," especially how the fomily lags
behind the market, see Olsen, supra note 65, at 1513-20.
During the 50 years, there probably was considerable uncertainty about how to reconcile
the societal visions that obtained in the nineteenth century with those of the teens. Thus,
the views prevailing from 1920 until 1970 may have been an accommodation of the images
of the two earlier periods, so that wives could have been seen anywhere on n spectrum thnt
ranged from chattels to full rights holders. See, e.g., the dissenting and majority opinions in
Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 80, 72, 100 So. 591, 595, 593 (1924): "When the Constitution
and Legislature emancipated women from the disability of coverture, they necessarily made
her a legal person [with] the right under the law to a redress for a personal injury•••.
Secrecy will cure many troubles of the home, while publicity will only add fuel to tho
flames." Accord McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 204, 135 P.2d 940, 940 (1943).
383
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rate of change in the 1960s.385
Thus, between 1920 and 1970, immunity eroded gradually nationwide and within particular jurisdictions. By 1970, the interspousal issue was treated almost exclusively as a policy question.
Most states had allowed tort litigation in some context and the
pace of abolition was accelerating. Predictably, then, after 1970 the
doctrine increasingly came under attack and was transformed
quickly from a majority to a minority rule.
(v) 1970-1989. During the last two decades, interspousal immunity has been severely weakened. 386 Many courts have either completely or partially abolished the doctrine, and legislatures in several jurisdictions have provided for intentional tort actions
between spouses. Most cases involved negligence, the newest manifestation of which was unreasonable household behavior. 387 In
short, approximately one-sixth of the states retain immunity in
some form, and a substantial majority have fully abolished it. 388
Judges no longer relied on the Married Women's statutes but
restated, comprehensively and candidly, refined policy arguments.
For instance, jurists more carefully separated and juxtaposed contentions applicable to intentional, as opposed to negligent, torts. 389
Judges who permitted claims emphasized tort law's compensatory
goal and explicitly acknowledged wives' individual rights. Jurists
retaining immunity stressed the marital tranquility, fraud, and judicial deference concepts. Considerations respecting judicial decisionmaking, torts, and societal images-most of which evolved
from prior developments-appeared more interrelated and quite
significant to resolution of the interspousal question.390 The thorough and rapid abandonment of the longstanding doctrine will be
examined initially.

385
Although a decade-by-decade analysis might yield more refined conclusions, I only discovered numerous, obvious ideas that were apparent from assessing the longer period or
that operated in earlier periods, such as the Acts' amended nature.
386
For helpful lists of the cases, see Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1211-12 (MiEs.
1988); Heino v. Harper, 306 Or. 347, 349-50, 759 P.2d 253, 254-55 (1988) .
..., See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 381 :Mass. 231, 231, 409 N.E.2d 717, 717 (1980); MerenotT v.
Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 535, 388 A.2d 951, 951 (1978).
388
See supra note 2.
389
See, e.g., S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 {Mo. 1986); Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St.
3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985).
••• The quintessential example of the ideas in the text are the developments described
infra note 395 and accompanying text.
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Trends in judicial decisionmaking, especially jurists' perspectives
on their roles and relationships to other societal institutions,
changed substantially. 391 The United States Supreme Court, numerous lower federal courts, and some state courts increasingly
considered it an important judicial responsibility to resolve significant social issues. These new duties included resolution of issues
formerly deemed less appropriate for treatment by courts than by
other government branches or societal entities like the family or
religious organizations.392 Courts were especially receptive when
rights of disadvantaged minorities and women were implicated and
when the legislative and executive branches and other societal institutions had been relatively unresponsive. 393 Correspondingly,
certain state judges apparently believed that they were obligated
to address important familial disputes, even those previously
thought better left to legislatures or extra-legal entities, particularly when individual family members' rights were involved. 394
Moreover, courts addressing tort questions assumed greater responsibility for substantive change in the field. They resolved issues formerly considered more appropriate for treatment by legislatures or other societal institutions; opened new and expanded old
areas of liability; increasingly overruled precedents; and empha-

391
But these trends did evolve from prior developments, see supra notes 338-67 and accompanying text. I rely most here on G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 295-316, 320-24; White,
supra note 268, at 1027-28; White, supra note 340, at 290-302 for secondary treatment and
case law for primary treatment.
92
•
See G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 320-26, 339-41, 357-59; White, supra note 340, at
290-91, 295-96. Cf. A Cox, THEWARREN CouRT (1968); Wright, Professor Bickel, The Schol·
arly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971) (contemporaneous
advocacy of views); G. WHITE, EARL WARREN, A PUBLIC LIFE (1982) (analysis of jurispru·
dence of important advocate of views).
393
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (women's rights); Balter v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) (voting rights); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (blacks' rights); Cf.
G. WHITE, supra note 162, at 320-26, 39-41, 57-59; G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 60-61 (1978) (secondary treatment).
394
Judges intervened in, legalized, and made public the family in fields such as domestic
relations law. See R MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN (1985); Minow, supra note 9,
at 832-33. This also was true of parent-child immunity, see Hollister, supra note 11. Cf.
Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-39 (full discussion of developments); Note, Domestic Violence:
Legislative and Judicial Remedies, 2 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 167 (1979); infra note 413 and
accompanying text (statutory protections for wives); infra note 403 (all tort immunities'
erosion evinces courts' willingness to intervene in institutions earlier considered sacrosanct);
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement,
61 N.Y.U.L. REV. 589, 644 (1986) (judicial protection for battered women).
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sized the judiciary's special obligation to "modernize" the common
law.395
Rapidly expanding and broadly liberalized liability emerged as
the dominant themes in tort jurisprudence. Aimed primarily at
achieving the field's compensatory purpose and premised substantially on the availability of insurance, these themes comported
with the dramatic overthrow of tort immunity. 396 More areas were
governed by strict liability principles. Strict liability in tort for injuries caused by defective products swept the country,397 and many
jurisdictions adopted no-fault automobile compensation
schemes.398 Some authorities have even suggested that courts' abolition of the familial immunities constituted a judicially imposed
no-fault system.399 Moreover, many jurisdictions relaxed doctrinal
categorizations that had served to limit imposition of tort liability.
Numerous states implemented comparative negligence;' 00 and they
modified guest statutes;' 01 status categories governing premises lia-

••• All of these ideas are discussed in the next paragraph. Cf. Townsend v. Townsend, 703
S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986); Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342, 344-45 (Mont. 1986)
(recent tort immunity cases emphasizing obligation to modernize common law).
06
•
The developments described here evolved from prior ones, see supra notes 359-67 and
accompanying text; infra note 406. I rely most on the cases. For helpful secondary treatment, see w. PROSSER & P. KEEToN, supra note 4; 1\1 SHAPO, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF
INJURY (1984); G. WHITE, supra note 124, at 168-243; Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis
and Modern Tort Law, 9 YALE L.J. 1521, 1525 (1987). For helpful discussion of ideas underlying the dominant theme in the text by those who influenced the developments that ensued, see R KEEToN & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948). Cf. W. PROSSER & W.P.
KEEToN, supra note 2, §§ 82-85 (discussion of compensation systems).
1
•• For a helpful discussion of ideas underlying this development by one who influenced
it, see Prosser, supra note 362. Cf. W. PROSSER & W.P. KE&ToN, supra note 2, §§ 95-104A;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (full analysis of strict tort liability).
••• For a helpful discussion of ideas underlying this development by those who influenced
it, see R KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 396; Cf. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEEToN, supra
note 2, § 84; A. WIDISS, No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE lN ACTION (1977) (later
developments).
••• See infra note 472 and accompanying text.
00
•
See Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
858 (1975) (lead case); Wade, Comparative Negligence, 40 LA. L. Rsv. 299 (1980) (chronicling development). For helpful discussion of ideas underlying this development, which was
primarily statutory, and of the concept, see P. KE&ToN, supra note 4, § 67; V. ScmvARTZ.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 1986).
••• See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 855, 506 P.2d 212, 212, 106 Cal Rptr. 383, 383,
(1973) (lead case); W.P. KEEToN, supra note 4, § 34, at 215-17 (chronicling development and
discussing guest statutes).
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bility,402 and parent-child, sovereign, and charitable immunities.408
Novel causes of action such as wrongful birth were recognized." 0 "
Legislators, who evinced greater willingness to pass substantive
tort measures, 405 and judges, who were more ready to act in areas
of legislative inactivity,408 shared responsibility for the expanding
ambit of liability.
Societal visions of women, marriage, wives, and the family also
have been quite important, changing significantly during the past
two decades. This time has been one of considerable social ferment, characterized by disintegrating consensus.407 More women
than ever before work, many in jobs formerly held almost exclusively by men. 408 Divorce rates have continued to rise, and nearly

See Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968) (lead case); J. PAGE,
PREMISES LIABILITY (1984);
PROSSER & .P. KEETON, supra note 2, §§ 58·62 (chronicling
development and discussing premises liability).
403
See Hollister, supra note 11 (parent-child); W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2,
§ 122, at 904-07; 131; 133 (parent-child, sovereign and charitable immunities). California
continued to lead these developments. See supra note 364 (earlier leadership). New Jersey,
however, may now have assumed the mantle.
404
See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 55, at 370·73 (chronicling develop·
ment and discussing concept). Cf. W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 363, at
463-68 (discussing recognition of other new causes of action); Finley, Rescuing a Submerged
Text: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE JL. & FEMINISM (forthcoming
1989).
400
For example, no-fault compensation, see supra note 398, was instituted almost exclu·
sively by legislatures, and comparative negligence, see supra note 400, was primarily a legislative innovation.
406
The increasing "activism" and decreasing deference in the latter half of the 1960a,
mentioned supra notes 359-67 and accompanying text, have since become more pronounced.
See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 3; Henderson, Expanding the Negligence
Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976). Indeed, the latest manifestation of the interplay between the judicial and legislative branches, albeit one generally
aimed at limiting liability, is passage of "tort reform legislation," such as that imposing
"caps" on damages in certain situations. See Priest, supra note 396, at 1587-88; Vetri, The
Integration of Tort Law Reforms and Liability Insurance Ratemaking in the New Age, 66
OR. L. REV. 277 (1987); Symposium: Issues in Tort Reform, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317 (1987); Tort
Reform Symposium Issue, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 613 (1988).
407
J. MITCHELL, WOMAN'S ESTATE 11-42 (1971);
O'NEILL, COMING APART (1971); P.
SLATER, THE PURSUIT OF LONELINESS (1970).
4
•• W. CHAFE, supra note 65, at 119-20; Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the
Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913, 922 (1983); Ginsburg, supra note 380, at 8-9. Cf. Freedman, supra at 921 (feminist goal to gain access for women to opportunities previously reserved for men and equal rewards once access achieved). But cf. W. CHAFE, supra note 289,
at 247; Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1273 n.114 (1986) (discrimination in compensation).
402

w.

w

w.
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all states permit no-fault divorce. 409 Women have participated energetically in the major political movements-protesting American
involvement in Vietnam, opposing racism, pursuing environmental
and consumer protection, and seeking greater rights for themselves.410 The women's movement, relatively inactive since gaining
suffrage, has been revitalized and vigorous, pressing for widespread
reform.411 Further, a number of new economic, political, and civil
rights, and legal causes of action, have been recognized and numerous existing ones expanded.412 For these reasons, images of women,
as well as the family, husbands, and wives, have changed.
Many people have begun to view the family and marriage as
comprised of individuals whose personal fulfillment is as important
as the continued existence of either unit. Married women have
come to be seen as individuals entitled to the same rights and opportunities possessed by others and for whom the government
ought to intervene in the family when necessary. For example,
some states have granted statutory protections to battered wives
and victims of spousal rape.413 Courts articulated these modem
views of women and wives in judicial opinions. Indeed, in contemporary society, it probably seemed appropriate as a matter of pub... See L. WEITZMAN, Tm: DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA, at xvii, 215 (1985) (divorce rotes); id.
at 41-49 (no-fault divorce).
m See M CARDEN, Tm: NEW FE11nNIST MoVE!llENT (1974); A. DOUGLAS, Tm: FEMINIZATION
OF AlllERlcAN CULTURE (1977); J. HoLE & E. LEVINE. REBIRTH OF FE?.ltNISM (1971); J. MrrcHELL, supra note 407. Cf. Freedman, supra note 408, at 916-17 (catalog or rights women
achieved).
m See J. HoLE & E. LEVINE, supra note 410; J. MITCHELL, supra note 407, at.11-96. Cf. M.
CARDEN, supra note 410, at 9-15 (discussion of major ideas of movement); Freedman, supra
note 408, at 915; Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TR.'<. L.
REV. 387, 389 n.7 (1984); Taub & Schneider, supra note 94, at 130 (describing women's
movement's development of rights legal theory and warning or dangers inherent. in
approach).
412
See, e.g., supra notes 393 & 410. Of course many of these rights were recognized at. the
behest of individual women or the women's movement. See supra note 411.
03
See infra notes 590-95 and accompanying text (women as individual rights holders);
Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1657
(1981); Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-39 (intervention in family); id. at 1518; E. PLEcK,
supra note 40, at 182-200 (battered women's protections); Note, supra note 394 (battered
wives' protections); Note, supra note 408 (protections governing spousal rape). Cf. Olsen,
supra note 65, at 1530-39 (other protections). Indeed, recent statutes prescribing interspousal intentional tort suits were included in legislative packages aimed at. v.ife battering
and spouse abuse. See, e.g., Iu.. REv. STAT., ch. 40 para. 1001 (1982), cited in Moran v.
Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245, 1246 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-109 (1984).
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lie policy (1) to intervene in marriages on behalf of abused women,
recognizing their individual rights, and (2) to permit wives whose
husbands negligently hurt them to seek compensation, affording
personal injury causes of action. 414
Of course, a number of judges did not view their roles, torts, or
society as described above. These jurists did not see themselves as
"activist policymakers" but instead believed that other governmental branches or societal institutions could treat more properly
harmful interspousal conduct.4111 Even those who acknowledged the
compensatory purpose of tort law might have found it overridden
in the marital context by the potential for collusion between
spouses or because this goal should be effectuated by legislatures.416 Similarly, judges who recognized women's rights in many
situations could have thought that such rights were superseded by
society's interest in the integrity of the nuclear family. 417 One, or a

14
•
The newer images seem different from those prevailing during the preceding half cen·
tury and more similar to visions extant in the teens. But the prevalence and longevity of tho
newer images are unclear, as illustrated generally by events in the 1980s, when many women
have not improved their conditions or acquired more power, and specifically by recent opin·
ions opposed to abolition.
A miscellany of less compelling reasons exists. For example, the current activity may
evince only judicial willingness to clean up an area of the law long considered untidy, as
evidenced by states that finally eliminated immunity after decades of piecemeal abolition.
See, e.g., the phenomenon in Maryland as traced in Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 250·52,
462 A.2d 506, 510·11 (1983). But this idea, and others, fail to account adequately for the
dramatic doctrinal change.
410
Recent examples are Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1213 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J.,
dissenting); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 654-56 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., dissenting in

part).
418
Recent examples are Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 621·22 (Iowa 1979) (LeGrand,
J., dissenting) (collusion potential); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 759-60 (Tenn. 1983)
(Humphreys, J., dissenting) (legislative effectuation); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1213·
16 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (legislative effectuation); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d
1065, 1070 (Wyo. 1987) (Brown, C.J., dissenting) (encouragement of fraud and collusion and
facilitation of "overly friendly lawsuits between husband and wife").
417
Recent examples are Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 22-24 (Fla. 1982); Bonkowsky v.
Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 155, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (Locher, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982), overruled, Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d
388 (1985). With allusions to the need to protect the beleaguered family as the foundation of
civilization, what appears at stake for these, and other, judges and many members of society
resonates in the opinions. Notwithstanding the rhetoric or the conviction with which judges
hold the views espoused, they seem to overestimate abolition's significance and to be looking
backward through rose-colored glasses at an image of the family which may have never ex·
isted and does not today, given national statistics on wife battering and divorce rates. See
Marcus, supra note 413, at 1662 n.19 (2,000,000 wives battered annually by husbands); L.
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combination, of these considerations plausibly explains the continuing prominence of the marital harmony, fraud, and judicial deference policy arguments, as well as the continuing, though dwindling,
vitality of immunity.418
Thus, interspousal tort immunity has a long, rich, and interesting history. Although courts initially asked to permit personal injury suits between husbands and wives focused almost entirely on
the Married Women's enactments, those statutes rarely are mentioned today. Instead, immunity has become essentially a debate
over the public policy reasons for continued application and abolition. Moreover, although courts and writers have enunciated numerous policy arguments over time, those contentions are now
static. The public policies favoring retention and abrogation will be
examined in the next Part of this Article.
II.

PUBLIC POLICY REASONS FOR RETENTION AND ABOLITION OF
IMMUNITY

A. Reasons for Retention of Immunity and Responses to Those
Reasons
Courts and commentators articulate five recurring public policy
arguments in favor of interspousal tort immunity. First, many
state that immunity preserves marital harmony and that interspousal tort litigation disrupts such tranquility. The oldest and
most frequently invoked rationale, this notion remains quite persuasive. The second important reason for the doctrine's current vitality is the fear that husbands and wives would engage in fraud
and collusion. The third idea, that courts should defer to legislatures in resolving the immunity question, also has considerable
strength today. A fourth rationale is the threat of excessive and
frivolous claims, and the fifth justification is that injured spouses
should pursue alternative remedies. These last two arguments frequently appeared in the early cases, but rarely are mentioned
anymore.
1. Marital Harmony. The policy which was enunciated first, has
been articulated most consistently, and continues to have much vi-

supra note 409, at xvii, 215 (similar divorce rates).
Tort immunity recently has been retained in some form by numerous states. See
supra note 2.
WEITZMAN,
418
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tality is that immunity protects connubial peace while permitting
suit would create, or exacerbate preexisting, disharmony. The formulations of the concept vary. A classic version appears in an early
Pennsylvania opinion: "The flames which litigation would kindle
on the domestic hearth would consume in an instant the conjugal
bond, and bring on a new era indeed-an era of universal discord,
of unchastity, of bastardy, of dissoluteness, of violence, cruelty,
and murders."419 Later decisions proclaimed that interspousal actions would contradict the clear state policy of preserving inviolate
marriage and the family. 420 The most recent variation of this
theme is that such claims would impose one additional burden on
those already beleaguered institutions.421
Unfortunately, very few courts have justified satisfactorily their
reliance upon the domestic harmony rationale. Judges writing early
opinions simply assumed that there is a peculiar societal interest in
protecting marital peace that transcends the needs of the two people involved.422 Recently, several judges have observed that connubial and familial stability should be maintained because marriage
and the family are fundamental structural components of American society.423 Little additional justification for the argument is offered, however. 424
Moreover, few courts explain precisely how immunity preserves
conjugal tranquility or how permitting suit leads to, or aggravates
prior, dissension. Several authors of early opinions apparently believed that immunity protects connubial harmony by shielding

"" Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858). I provide the obligatory reference to Ritter, but
it was not a tort case.
••• See, e.g., Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 162 (Del. 1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S.
931 (1980); Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 525-26, 263 N.W. 546, 547-48 (1935),
overruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969);
Counts v. Counts, 221 Va. 151, 155-56, 266 S.E.2d 895, 897-98 (1980).
421
See, e.g., Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Iowa 1979) (Le Grand, J., dissenting);
Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 155, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1000, (Locher, J., con·
curring), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 759·60 (Tonn.
1983) (Humphreys, J., dissenting).
••• See, e.g., Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tonn.
57, 64, 179 S.W. 628, 629 (1915). Accord Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wife, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1650, 1651 (1966); supra note 145 and accompanying text.
••• See, e.g., Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 1982); Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97
Idaho 14, 24, 539 P.2d 566, 576 (1975) (Shepard, C.J., dissenting).
••• Of course, if judges assumed marital harmony to be "good," they probably deemed
justification unnecessary. See supra note 422 and accompanying text.
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from public scrutiny sensitive information that a tort suit might
reveal425 or by requiring spouses to resolve their differences, essentially by forgiving and forgetting. 426 Most courts seem to have been
concerned primarily, however, about the burden imposed upon
marital relationships by the adversary roles that spouses as litigants would be required to adopt. 427 Because judges provide little
guidance, it is appropriate to examine more comprehensively how
these actions might threaten tranquility.
Intentional tort cases could jeopardize peace by creating tension
that increases throughout the tort litigation process." 28 There are
several reasons for this: the behavior in question, while morally
reprehensible, degrading, and embarrassing, also may be considered personal and private; a conjugal relationship so insecure that
one individual would deliberately injure the other will be quite
tenuous;429 and insurance will not cover the defendant's litigation
expenditures or any damages awarded.
There may be friction at each stage of an intentional tort suit.
The injured spouse must employ counsel and pay all expenses, perhaps from scarce familial resources.430 Even under a contingent fee
arrangement the plaintiff will be responsible for any costs incurred.431 Merely filing suit could end the marriage or drastically
reduce the possibility of reconciliation. The complaint may be the
initial public acknowledgement of the challenged conduct and may
include bitterly contested accusations that are exaggerated and hu425
See, e.g., Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 72, 100 So. 591, 592-93 (1924); Lillienknmp v.
Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 64, 179 S.W. 628, 629 (1915). Accord Note, supra note 420, at 1652;
supra note 144 and accompanying text.
••• See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 71 (Me. 1980); Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 391, 177 N.W. 624, 625
(1920), overruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 :Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10
(1969); supra note 148.
27
•
See, e.g., Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 1982); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243,
244, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1965), overruled, Morgan v. Biro :Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474
N.E.2d 286 (1984), and overruled, Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388
(1985).
20
•
It is important to distinguish between negligent and intentional torts because different
policy and practical considerations apply to retention and abolition of the immunity for
each.
••• See infra notes 447-48 and accompanying text.
0
. . See Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 24 (Fla. 1982). The plaintiff also may lose wages and
incur medical costs prior to the resolution of the dispute.
01
Cf. id. at 24 (intentional tort suit inconsistent with public policy proscribing contingent fees in domestic relations matters because can adversely affect reconciliation).
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miliating and which reopen old wounds. 432 The defendant must
hire a lawyer, who will be paid by the litigant, not an insurer, and
may file an equally divisive answer.
During discovery the parties will become more adversarial, essentially proving the "paper" allegations in the pleadings. They
may retell, and perhaps relive, the story of how one person willfully, and even maliciously, harmed the other; confront one another with acerbic charges and countercharges involving intimate
details of domestic life; and violently disagree over the facts possibly inflated in the pursuit of success.433 Moreover, these cases are
unlikely to settle. They peculiarly become matters of principle, and
the parties are not influenced by pressures that insurers can
exert.434
At trial, the potential for creating connubial discord will be
greater. The individuals must testify in the highly-charged atmosphere of a public courtroom. The nature of the behavior-wife
battering, sexual abuse, or murder-means that there will be embarrassing media coverage. Moreover, any relief awarded will be
divisive because the defendant must pay the damages and may resent the remedy's imposition for other reasons. 435
Connubial peace may be disturbed even in negligence actions in
which the moral tinge of purposeful behavior is absent and insurance coverage ostensibly insulates the marriage from certain tensions. Vehicle collision litigation is illustrative. Filing suit may be
unsettling. Use of different counsel and their admonitions against
discussing the case can be disconcerting. Recurring recriminations
relating to the defendant's driving abilities may be more disruptive. Such allegations, made initially in the complaint, continue
throughout discovery, and culminate at trial. Even when spouses
are mutually supportive, the reconsideration of how one's carelessne~s injured the other can be corrosive.436 Finally, the temptation
432
Of course, the police and relatives or friends of the spouses may be aware of the
conduct.
433
See Note, supra note 422, at 1652; Miller v. Miller, 78 Iowa 177, 183, 42 N.W. 641, 642
(1889); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 245, 208 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1965) (specific ideas),
overruled, Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984), and over·
ruled, Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985).
434
See infra note 442 and accompanying text.
43
• See Note, supra note 422, at 1652-53 (discussing "other" reasons).
436
See Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 475 So. 2d 1211, 1212 (Fla.
1985). A few courts have articulated the "family exchequer" concept, a corollary of the mari-
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to defraud insurers may be substantial; acting on that possibility
could undermine future familial trust." 37
There are many responses to these ideas. The contentions that
immunity preserves marital harmony while interspousal litigation
threatens it can be challenged. The possibility of discord depends
substantially on numerous variables that may be present in specific
situations. The marital harmony argument is premised on the paternalistic assumption that husbands and wives cannot safeguard
their own relationships. But because most people wish to protect
their marriages,438 they should be more competent than courts to
ascertain the effect of litigation on domestic life." 39 A number of
judges also have observed that when harmony exists, either an action will not be filed, or, if instituted, will not be maintained once
peace is endangered;"' 0
When the relationship is less secure, so that litigation could be
more threatening, different considerations may prevail. If spouses
negligently hurt each other, the unintentional character of the conduct and the widespread existence of insurance may minimize potential disruption. The behavior generally lacks the moral reprehensibility, disregard for another's dignity, and insensitivity
inherent in willful activity; thus the case probably would not be
publicized.441 Moreover, insurance diminishes the possibility of discord because insurance will pay for defense of the suit and any
damages awarded, and settlement is more likely, particularly when
tal harmony idea, that tort suits will deplete scarce family resources. See Ashdovm, In·
trafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclusion Clause, 60 lowA L.
REv. 239, 247-48 (1974) (helpful analysis).
31
•
See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1969); Rubalcava v.
Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 349, 384 P.2d 389, 392 (1963).
39
•
See Note, supra note 422, at 1652.
••• See Miller v. Fallon County, 721P.2d342, 345 (Mont. 1986); Merenoff'v. Merenoff', 76
N.J. 535, 551-52, 557, 388 A.2d 951, 959-60, 962 (1978); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183,
187, 500 P.2d 771, 774 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207
(1984).
••• See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 48-49, 89 A. 889, 891-92 (1914); Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 488, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970); Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 304, 388 A.2d
1, 3 (1978); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 187, 500 P.2d 771, 774 (1972) overruled,
Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984) .
.., "Garden-variety" negligence cases are not very newsworthy. Even if the dispute were
publicized, the information is unlikely to threaten marital harmony because that data would
not be embarrassing and might even evoke public sympathy. See, e.g., Guffy v. Guffy, 230
Kan. 89, 89, 631 P.2d 646, 646 (1981), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Knn. 216, 225, 734 P.2d
1183, 1190 (1987).
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liability is clear. 442 Some courts have expressed difficulty understanding how precluding interspousal suits for negligently inflicted
injury could foster harmony. 443 Other courts have declared that
preventing claims might be more divisive than allowing them:'""
Indeed, litigation frequently could preserve, and actually may promote, tranquility. For instance, successful tort actions can eliminate economic burdens like lost wages and medical expenses imposed upon families by negligently caused interspousal harm for
which payment otherwise could not be recovered;m
The marital harmony rationale for interspousal tort immunity
for intentional injury is more problematic. Abolition's proponents
have contended, with little elaboration, that when spouses deliberately hurt one another, civil litigation will not endanger harmony
because none remains to be preserved.446 In fact, most actions will
only be pursued after separation, divorce, or death, and there
probably are a few additional instances in which such claims might
not disturb domestic accord.4 47 Nevertheless, in some situations,
suit could upset the delicate balance theretofore maintained:'" 0
442
See Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1986); Digby v. Digby,
120 R.I. 299, 304, 388 A.2d l, 3 (1978); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 194, 183 S.E.2d
200, 202 (1971). Insurance also increases the potential for interspousal fraud and collusion.
See infra notes 457-503 and accompanying text.
443
See, e.g., Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Iowa 1979); Miller v. Fallon County,
721 P.2d 342, 345 (Mont. 1986); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. 1987); Coffindaffer
v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 565, 244 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1978).
444
See, e.g., Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986); Immer v. Risko, 56
N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 314, 433 A.2d 859, 866
(1981).
440
See Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1986); lmmer v. Risko,
56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970); Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 98, 480
N.E.2d 388, 393 (1985); accord Note, supra note 422, at 1652-53. Cf. Cutright, Income and
Family Events: Marital Stability, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 291 (1971) (data).
446
See, e.g., Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245, 1247 (7th Cir. 1984); Ebert v. Ebert, 232 Kan.
502, 504, 656 P.2d 766, 768 (1983); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (1978);
Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1210 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J., dissenting); Townsend v.
Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986). Some courts do state that intentional behavior
or the pursuit of tort litigation indicates marital disharmony.
447
For example, the behavior may be so blatant that the perpetrator must acknowledge
it, and intentional tort suit then might (1) "bring into the open" a smoldering controversy
and resolve it, or (2) eliminate a major source of marital discord. See Note, supra note 422,
at 1652-53. Cf. Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 567, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343.44
(1978); Note, supra note 422, at 1653; Comment, Toward Abolition of lnterspousal Tort
Immunity, 36 MONT. L. REV. 251, 256 (1975) (suggesting that possibility of interspousal tort
suit might preserve marital peace by deterring tortious conduct).
448
Recent data indicate that 2,000,000 wives are battered annually by husbands. See
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Thus, it is impossible to verify the accuracy of Professor McCurdy's declaration in 1930 that "there is nothing to show that in
the states which permit such actions the peace and harmony of the
home are disrupted to any greater extent . . . than in the states
which deny the action," or of subsequent, similar pronouncements.449 It appears, nonetheless, that interspousal tort claims vlill
have little detrimental impact on marital tranquility in numerous
circumstances and may protect or even foster peace in some but
will seriously jeopardize harmony in only a few.
Even assuming interspousal suits do threaten marital harmony,
the validity of the conjugal peace idea itself can be questioned.
The litigants' tranquility is not relevant in tort actions involving
unrelated individuals, yet their equanimity may be disturbed as
much as that of husband and wives in interspousal tort suits.4no
Moreover, the value of attempting to maintain harmony may be
debatable in certain situations. For example, the interests of all the
family members and society might be served better by ending,
rather than perpetuating, marriages in which physical abuse occurs.451 Some writers have attacked the continuing viability of
marriage as an institution,452 while others have "argued over the
nature and extent of a general social interest in marriage stability"
and challenged "the fundamental premise that organization into
stable families is best for society."4n3 Regardless of whether these
views are widely shared in America, the citizens of a country in

Marcus, supra note 413, at 1662 n.19. Cf. c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES
ON LIFE AND LAw 14 (1987) (battery of women systematic in one-quarter to one-third of
American homes).
••• McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1053. See Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d
1187, 1190 {1986); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 105, 300 A.2d 637, 641 {1973); W. PROSSER
& W.P. KEEToN, supra note 2, § 122 {subsequent similar pronouncements). Cf. Heino v.
Harper, 306 Or. 347, 377, 759 P.2d 253, 270 {1988) {no studies, resources, or authorities
definitively answer question).
0
•• The "matter seems to be inappropriate for judicial consideration." Note, supra note
422, at 1651.
'"' See Marcus, supra note 413, at 1670 {effects on children from families where mother
battered by father). Moreover, the marriages most likely to be disrupted by intentional tort
suit may least warrant protection. Cf. Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 24, 539
P.2d 566, 576 {1975) {Shepard, C.J., dissenting) {questionable value in perpetuating mar·
riages "which exist in name only").
2
'" See M BARRE'IT, WOMEN'S OPPRESSION TODAY {1980); E. ZARE'I'sKY, CAPITALISM. THE
FAMILY, AND PERSONAL LIFE (1976).
, .. See the sources cited in Note, supra note 422, at 1651-52.
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which divorce essentially is available on demand, more than forty
percent of all marriages are dissolved, and single persons are the
heads of an increasing percentage of households, view wedlock and
the family very di:fferently than when the connubial peace concept
initially was enunciated.4114 It is also ironic that courts, which rely
upon the domestic harmony rationale as the principal policy reason for retaining immunity, relegate married individuals to alternative divorce and criminal remedies, the attempted invocation of
which effectively terminates the conjugal relationship. 41111 Finally,
tort cases are said to be less disruptive than other interspousal actions, such as property claims, permitted today nationwide. 4116
Thus, while the marital harmony concept seems most persuasive
of all the contentions traditionally articulated for immunity, the
argument is deficient in important respects. It is appropriate,
therefore, to examine another significant reason for the rule's continuing strength: the concern that abolition would lead to fraud
and collusion between spousal litigants.
••• See E. GoLANTY & B. HARRIS, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE 366, 453-54 (1982) (statistical
data). Cf. Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 109, 631 P.2d 646, 658 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting),
overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Bonkowsky v.
Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 162-63, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1004, (Brown, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 565, 244 S.E.2d
338, 342 (1978) (facetious suggestion that if marital harmony is purpose of immunity wife
should have no legal actions against husband). The data indicate that forces at work in
society are (1) at once broader, and more fundamental, than interspousal immunity, such as
those underlying no-fault divorce; (2) ones that have been influenced minimally by abolition; and (3) ones that immunity's retention is essentially powerless to affect. Thus, while it
is arguable that the data make immunity's retention more compelling, and that spouses
whose marriages deserve protection, but may be jeopardized by tort suit, should be protected, these ideas should not outweigh the important interests of numerous injured
spouses. Nevertheless, alternatives to tort suit should be explored for spouses whose marriages may be threatened. See Note, supra note 422, at 1655 (discussing some options).
Wives battered by their husbands also might pursue compensation in dissolution proceedings. See infra note 546 and accompanying text. This would protect tenuous marriages from
problems created by tort suit, afford battered wives some relief, and eliminate multiple proceedings. Cf. Counts v. Counts, 221 Va. 151, 155-56, 266 S.E.2d 895, 897-98 (1980) (option
might encourage divorce).
••• See infra notes 542-63 and accompanying text.
••• See Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 20-21, 284 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1972); Townsend v.
Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 488-89, 267 A.2d
481, 484 (1970); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. 1987). Courts also observe that
tort suits are less disruptive than divorce or criminal actions. See, e.g., Shook v. Crabb, 281
N.W.2d 616, 619 (Iowa 1979). This seems disingenuous because these are the "alternative
remedies" to which spouses are relegated by jurisdictions retaining immunity, for which relegation they are criticized by courts abolishing immunity.
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2. Fraud and Collusion. Some courts retain immunity because
they fear that allowing husbands and wives to sue each other will
result in fraud and collusion, especially when insurance companies
are the real parties in interest;m This rationale is the most recent
of the five arguments enunciated.4158 Although many cases retaining
immunity between 1920 and 1940 involved negligent driving, few
mention fraud. Those that do merely include cryptic allusions to
the possibility that spouses will raid insurers.4159 Subsequent judicial treatment, however, has been more comprehensive and e:A.-plicit
and is integral to the discussion below.
There are several reasons why the threat of unscrupulous behavior, inherent in all negligence suits when the defendant has insurance coverage, is said to be substantial in interspousal tort actions."60 The litigants, husband and wife, ordinarily have an
intimate personal and confidential relationship." 61 Liability insurance also substitutes the prospect of profit for the risk of financial
loss. That potential loss can be great, especially when the victim
suffers serious injury and neither other coverage nor familial resources is available."62 This means that each party and the rest of
the family will benefit from a judgment for the plaintiff and will be
affected adversely by a verdict for defendant." 63 Moreover, a
Indeed, Ashdown, supra note 436, is premised on this thesis.
It did have an early predecessor, however. See supra note 154 and accompanying texL
Cf. Ashdown, supra note 436, at 249 (more background).
•••Perlman v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 117 :Misc. 353, 354, 191 N.Y.S. 891, 891 (1921),
apparently was the first case to mention fraud. Cf. Maine v. J. Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa
1278, 1279, 201 N.W. 20, 21 (1924), overruled, Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 720, 74
N.W.2d 212, 219 (1956); Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 146, 214 N.W. 305, 306 (1927)
(similar cryptic allusions), overruled, Hasko v. Hasko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971).
60
'
See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1969); Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 490, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970) .
.., See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 701, 376 P.2d 70, 76, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 108 (1962)
(Schauer, J., dissenting); Ra.isen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla.. 1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 886 (1980); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 348, 384 P.2d 389, 391 (1963);
Ta.der v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1070 (Wyo. 1987) (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
••• See Lea.ch v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15, 18 (1957) (Harris, C.J., dissenting);
Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 245, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535-36 (1965), overruled, Morgan v.
Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984), and overruled, Shearer v. Shearer,
18 Ohio ST. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 310-11, 287 P.2d
572, 583 (1955). Such factors may be exacerbated because those with the least familial resources available also will be least likely to have other coverage.
63
'
See Ra.isen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla.. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. SSS (1980);
Robeson v. International Indem. Co., 248 Ga. 306, 308-09, 282 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1981); Tader
v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1070 (Wyo. 1987) (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
401
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tortfeasor could profit from the initial wrongdoing by sharing in
the recovery. 464 There also may be powerful temptations to fabricate claims, exaggerate the gravity of the defendant's conduct and
the severity of the damage suffered, admit liability, and conceal
potential defenses. 465
Fraud and collusion between spouses may well succeed. Most
married individuals are very close and will appreciate the detrimental implications of failure. Evidence favorable to the plaintiff
probably will be plentiful and convincing, particularly when no one
else witnessed the injurious activity.466 Jurors usually are sympathetic to any person hurt by someone who appears to be insured.467
Moreover, the inappropriate behavior of the litigants will be difficult to detect because the spouses usually control the facts and the
tortfeasor has little incentive to avert the loss. 468 Consequently, the
carrier has been perceived by judges and writers as the defenseless
target of scheming spouses.469
The resolution of potentially fraudulent disputes can entail substantial costs: those incurred by insurers, and ultimately by policy-

... See Burns v. Burns, 111Ariz.178, 180, 526 P.2d 717, 719 (1974), overruled, Fernandez
v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 646 P.2d 878 (1982); Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 95, 631 P.2d 646,
650 (1981), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Vasey v.
Snohomish County, 44 Wash. App. 83, 93-95, 721 P.2d 524, 529-30 (1986). Cf. Apitz v.
Dames, 205 Or. 242, 274-75, 287 P.2d 585, 599-603 (1955) (discussing typical probate code
proscription on profiting by spouse who murders spouse).
4
• • See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 699-700, 376 P.2d 70, 75-76, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 107·
08 (1962) (Schauer, J., dissenting); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416,
419 (1969); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 245, 208 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1965), overruled,
Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co. 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984), and overruled, Shearer
v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1070
(Wyo. 1987) (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
468
See Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15, 18 (1957) (Harris, C.J., dissenting);
Ashdown, supra note 436, at 250.
467
See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 701, 376 P.2d 70, 76, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 108 (1962)
(Schauer, J., dissenting); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 311, 287 P.2d 572, 583 (1955).
••• See Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15, 18 (1975) (Harris, C.J., dissenting);
Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979) (defendant's incentive), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 886 (1980); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 245, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535-36 (1965),
overruled, Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co. 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984), and over·
ruled, Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985); Ashdown, supra note
436, at 252 (spouses control facts).
••• See Matthews v. State Farm Ins. Co., 471 So. 2d 1223, 1225 (Miss. 1985); Varholla v.
Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 270, 383 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1978), overruled, Shearer v. Shearer,
18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985). Cf. supra note 437 and accompanying text (future
trust could be impaired when spouses collude).
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holders, in litigating these cases, including money paid for judgments and for settlement;m and those imposed on the civil justice
system in processing claims and in maintaining credibility and
public trust.471 Indeed, some authorities have asserted that courts'
abolition of negligence immunity is simply a judicially instituted
no-fault compensation scheme.472
These concerns about the substantial threat of fraud in interspousal claims have been addressed in numerous ways. Many
judges and writers contend that courts in jurisdictions that permit
interspousal tort suits have not been burdened with dishonest
spouses, even though minimal data support these conclusions;m
Some observers claim that when harm is perpetrated intentionally,
spouses will not conspire because liability insurance never covers
that type of damage.474 In negligence suits, however, other factors
apply. Although a few judges acknowledge that this class of cases
presents considerable potential for fraud, many have stated that
courts should not refuse to hear every such claim:m The judges
observe that it would be unfair to deny valid claims of numerous
married people out of fear that some may act incorrectly476 and to
disappoint the reasonable expectations of those who purchase in"" See Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979) cert. denied, 449 U.S. SSS (1980);
Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Ky. 1953) (Sims, C.J., dissenting); Rubalcava\'. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 348, 384 P.2d 389, 391-92 (1963).
m See Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 451, 646 P.2d 878, 882 (1982); Leach v. Leach,
227 Ark. 599, 604, 300 S.W.2d 15, 19 (1957) (Harris, C.J., dissenting) (credibility and public
trust); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1070 (Wyo. 1987) (Brown, C.J., dissenting) (costs to
civil justice system). Cf. Henderson, supra note 406, at 468-84, 501·05 (systemic integrity
impugned by difficulties of defining contours of interspousal relationship).
472
See, e.g., Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 496, 267 A.2d 481, 489 (1970) (Francis, J., dissenting); Ashdown, supra note 434, at 251-53; Henderson, supra note 406, at 503·05.
473
See Mosier v. Camey, 376 Mich. 532, 548-49, 138 N.W.2d 343, 347 (1965); Baits v.
Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 430, 142 N.W.2d 66, 73 (1966), ouerruled, Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) as stated in American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 330 N.W.2d
113 (Minn. 1983); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652-53 (Mo. 1986); Shearer v. Shearer,
18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 98-99, 480 N.E.2d 388, 393.94 (1985); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1016
(R.I. 1982) (observers); infra notes 530; 532 (lack of data).
474
See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Flores v.
Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (1973); Givelber, supra note 361, at 55 n.65.
"" See, e.g., Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 159, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1002 (W.
Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 315,
433 A.2d 859, 866 (1981).
476
See, e.g., Campo v. Taboada, 720 P.2d 181, 183 (Hawaii 1986); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296
Md. 242, 268, 462 A.2d 506, 518 (1983); Digby v. Digby, 120 R.L 299, 304, 388 A.2d 1, 4
(1978); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 757-58 (Tenn. 1983) (Humphries, J., dissenting).
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surance to pay for negligently suffered damages:m They also believe that persons hurt by another's unreasonable conduct are entitled to seek redress478 and that judges cannot abdicate their
responsibility to adjudicate potentially legitimate disputes, but
must rely upon the safeguards of the tort litigation system to separate fraudulent claims from meritorious ones:m
Safeguards do exist, as early as the time of injury, to protect
courts against fraud by spouses. For instance, independent witnesses may have observed the allegedly harmful behavior,480 and
the insured is obligated to cooperate with his or her insurance carrier.481 During discovery, several techniques can be employed to
guard against colluding plaintiffs and defendants. 482 Similarly,
many procedures available at trial afford protection. For example,
defense counsel's cross-examination may expose dishonest conduct.483 The testimony of spouses will be especially susceptible to

m See Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970); cf. Beaudette v. Frana,
285 Minn. 366, 371, 173 N.W.2d 416, 419 (1969); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 105, 300
A.2d 637, 641 (1973) (similar allusions).
••• See, e.g., S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Mo. 1986); Veazey v. Doremus, 103
N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1986); Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 304-05, 388 A.2d 1, 4
(1978). Cf. infra note 568 and accompanying text (concept in many state constitutions).
••• See Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 220-21, 734 P.2d 1183, 1186-87 (1987); Burns v. Burns,
518 So. 2d 1205, 1211 (Miss. 1988); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. 1987). Relevant
experience is derived from states that did not use an elevated standard of care in the guest
passenger situation or adopted it and later abolished it. See S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d
651, 652-53 (Mo. 1986); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 490-95, 267 A.2d 481, 485·88 (1970).
Some courts and writers have argued that many jurisdictions already permit suits between
individuals in relationships equally close to marriage, which pose equivalent danger. See
Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 695-96, 376 P.2d 70, 72-73, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104-05 (1962);
Campo v. Taboada 720 P.2d 181, 183 (Hawaii 1986); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 553·
54, 388 A.2d 951, 960-61 (1978).
••• See Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 402, 528 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1974); Merenoff v. Mere·
noff, 76 N.J. 535, 558, 388 A.2d 951, 963 (1978); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1016 (R.I.
1982) (this and other protective measures).
••• See Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 111, 631 P.2d 646, 659 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting),
overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); cf. Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 769, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1016
(R.I. 1982) (parent-child immunity cases discussing obligation and insurers' protections).
••• See Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1979); Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69
Ohio St. 2d 152, 163, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1005, (C. Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1135 (1982). Cf. Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 565, 244 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1978)
(it becomes "totally strained to believe a substantial personal injury can be faked through
the rigors of available discovery techniques").
••• See Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 549, 138 N.W.2d 343, 347 (1965); Rupert v.
Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 402, 528 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1974); Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio
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impeachment on the basis of partiality and interest:m The trial
judge's obligation to instruct jurors on witness credibility and requirements respecting the weight of evidence remain the same in
these cases.485 Moreover, juries generally are quite capable of ascertaining the falsity of claims that present as much potential for incorrect activity as interspousal suits:' 86 Furthermore, when a trial
judge believes that jurors have failed to detect fraud or collusion,
he or she always can modify the jury determination:m Finally, a
number of persons may be deterred from acting improperly by the
rigorous efforts of insurance companies and defense counsel and by
the threat of criminal prosecution.488
Courts and commentators have suggested that safeguards other
than these tested devices be employed when they are found inadequate to protect against fraud and collusion. Judges could impose
an elevated standard of conduct or burden of proof tailored to the
misbehavior perceived in specific circumstances.489 The aggravated
misconduct requirement imposed in many vehicle guest statutes
might seem to afford a convenient antidote.490 A standard of care
St. 2d 152, 157 n.2, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1001 n.2 (W. Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1135 (1982) .
... See Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 22, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972). Cf. Guffy v.
Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 111, 631 P.2d 646, 659 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting), overruled, Flagg 1:.
Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342,
345 (Mont. 1986) (judges and juries naturally mindful of relationship and alert to improper
conduct).
••• See Brooks, 259 Ind. at 22, 284 N.E.2d at 797; Merenoff v. MerenotT, 76 N.J. 535, 554,
388 A.2d 951, 961 (1978).
•ss See Brooks, 259 Ind. at 22, 284 N.E.2d at 797; Shook, 281 N.W.2d at 620; Bums v.
Bums, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1210-11 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J., dissenting); Rupert, 90 Nev. at 401,
528 P.2d at 1015.
.., Courts can grant motions for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Experience indicates that trial judges can detect fraud in intrafamily tort litigation.
See Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768-69, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980); Briere v.
Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 434-35, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966); Hollister, supra note 11, at 501-02
n.89.
... See Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 451, 646 P.2d 878, 882 (1982); Shook v. Crabb,
281 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1979); Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 157 n.2,
431 N.E.2d 998, 1001 n.2 (W. Brown, J., dissenting) (deterrent effect of perjury charge),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 565-66, 244
S.E.2d 338, 342-43 (1978) (efforts of insurers and counsel). Of course, the potential for marital disharmony can be directly proportional to the rigor with which the mechanisms available are applied.
••• See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969); Mereno{f, 76
N.J. at 554, 388 A.2d at 961.
<0o "In addition to 'gross negligence,' the required form of aggravation is variously speci-
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analogous to gross negligence should not be employed in interspousal suits, however, because alternatives, such as safeguards in
the tort litigation process, can better combat fraud. 491 A few courts
even have suggested that an insurance carrier might disclose its
interest in the case and designate the defendant an adverse witness
to show that the parties may be conspiring.492 Finally, numerous
jurists have remarked that dishonest interspousal activity will become a matter for legislatures, should all the protections examined
above prove insufiicient.493
There are additional responses to the more tangential elements
of the fraud and collusion rationale. Some authorities have recognized that this rationale and the marital harmony argument are
essentially contradictory. One court observed:
To the extent the threat of marital disharmony can be
removed or reduced by the presence or availability of insurance, the potential for fraud is increased; conversely,
when the threat of fraud is minimized or eliminated because there is no insurance or insurer to be victimized,
the risk of creating marital friction is correspondingly
augmented."94
In response to the concern that individuals who negligently hurt
their spouses might benefit, courts have stated that they can tailor
appropriate relief to newly recognized causes of action. 49 1> Moretied as 'intentional,' 'willful,' 'wanton,' or 'reckless' misconduct, acting 'in disregard of the
safety of others,' 'intoxication,' or some combination of these." W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON,
supra note 2, § 34.
491
The safeguards mentioned supra notes 480-88 and infra note 492 and in the text accompanying those notes should protect insurers. Insurers also can rely upon spousal exclusion clauses. See infra notes 498-500 and accompanying text. Cf. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d
855, 872-88, 506 P.2d 212, 224-28, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 400-404, (1973); W. PROSSEll & W.P.
KEETON, supra note 2, § 34 (more discussion of "collusion prevention").
••• See Merenoff v. Merenoft', 76 N.J. 535, 554, 388 A.2d 951, 961 (1978); Cof/inda/fer, 161
W. Va. at 567, 244 S.E.2d at 343. Accord S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 653 n.2 (Mo.
1986).
••• See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 695-96, 376 P.2d 70, 73, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 105
(1962); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1206, 1211 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J., dissenting); Digby v.
Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 305, 388 A.2d 1, 4 (1978); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 189, 500
P.2d 771, 775 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984).
04
•
Merenoff, 76 N.J. at 552-53, 388 A.2d at 960. Accord S.A. V., 708 S.W.2d at 653 n.2;
Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 314, 433 A.2d 859, 866 (1981); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 317
(Tex. 1987).
••• See, e.g., Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 113-14, 631 P.2d 646, 661 (1981) (Prager, J.,
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over, although the resolution of potentially fraudulent suits can be
expensive, the costs are not greater than those imposed by much
similar litigation496 or by systematically excluding an entire class of
claimants.497 Another observation made by some judges who abolished immunity is that insurers can protect themselves against
fraudulent litigants by refusing to provide spousal coverage.498 In
jurisdictions that permit such exclusions, however, the purpose of
abrogation would be vitiated;' 99 and a few courts have expressly
held that spousal exclusion clauses violate public policy.Goo

dissenting), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Flores v.
Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 604, 506 P.2d 345, 348, cert. denied, 84 N.l\f. 592, 506 P.2d 336 (1973);
cf. Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 451-52, 646 P.2d 878, 882-83 (1982); Freehe, 81 Wash.
2d at 191-92, 500 P.2d at 776-77 (community property context).
496
An example is suit filed by a passenger injured because of the insured operator's negligent driving when the two parties are friends. See supra note 479 and accompanying text.
Moreover, no evidence indicates that large costs have been imposed on the civil justice S}'Stem due to the processing of potentially fraudulent interspousal suits. See supra note 471.
Cf. McCurdy, supra note 3, at 334-35; Comment, Interspousal Immunity Rule and the Effect of Liability Insurance in Automobile Accidents, 11 S.D.L. REv. 144, 151 (1966) (no
evidence in states abolishing immunity that abrogation caused large insurance rate increase). But cf. supra text accompanying note 473 (minimal data support conclusion that
courts not burdened with dishonest spouses).
497
Indeed, the credibility of the civil justice system and public trust, see supra note 472,
may be undermined more by denying numerous spouses tort suits, see supra notes 474-78
and accompanying text, especially in states whose constitutions mandate that injured persons be permitted to pursue relief, see infra note 571 and accompanying text. One response
to the concern that systemic integrity will be impugned because of the difficulty of defining
the contours of interspousal relationships, see supra note 471, is that judges and juries can
differentiate similar conduct involving strangers which would be actionable from that between spouses which would not. See infra notes 538-40 and accompanying text.
••• See, e.g., Shook v. Crabb, 281N.W.2d616, 620 (Iowa 1979); Bonkowsky v. Bonkows1.')',
69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 158 n.5, 431 N.E.2d 998, 1002 n.5 (W. Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 315, 433 A.2d 859, 866 (1981). Cf.
Ashdown, supra note 436, at 254-60 (analysis of exclusionary clauses).
499
Exclusions allow insurers to avoid compensating persons negligently injured by their
spouses, a principal purpose of allowing interspousal claims. See infra notes 569-73 and
accompanying text; Ashdown, supra note 436, at 255. Exclusionary clauses nre widely used
today, see id. at 253, and most states do allow them, see infra note 500. See also Dairyland
Ins. Co. v. Finch, 32 Ohio St. 3d 360, 366, 513 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (1987) (Sweeney, J., dissenting); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. 1987) (Mauzy, J., concurring).
000
The leading case invalidating family exclusion clauses is Meyer v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1984). Cf. Transamerica Ins. C-0. v. Royle, 202
Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 820 (1983) (same in parent-child immunity context). A few legislatures
have proscribed the clauses. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.32(6)(b) (West 1980). Most nofault statutes so provide. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. .ANN. § 39:6A-4 (West 1972); On. RE\•. STAT. §
743.800 (1974). But cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elwell, 513 A.2d 269, 273 (Me. 1985); Dair)•!and
Ins. Co. v. Finch, 32 Ohio St. 3d 360, 364, 513 N.E.2d 1324, 1329 (1987) (clear majority or
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Because the collusion rationale does not seem to be supported by
the experience of states eliminating the doctrine, is overinclusive,
and frustrates achievement of the compensatory goal of tort law,
the argument is not very persuasive.G 01 Nevertheless, it is naive to
ignore the "potential for recovery based on fraud [that] clearly exists and cannot be lightly dismissed through judicial rationalizations about the inherent ability of the system to determine the
truth."G 02 The Minnesota Supreme Court accurately summarized
the difficulty posed by collusion when it declared that a "minimum
challenge to judicial resourcefulness will be to act promptly and
firmly at any appearance of ... fraudulent interspousal claims."1103
The only additional argument that now has much vitality is that
courts should defer to legislatures.
3. Deference to the Legislature. Numerous judges have held that
the abrogation issue should be resolved by legislators and not by
courts. 1104 The principal form in which the deference concept was
cast prior to 1950, however, was as a response to the question of
whether the Married Women's statutes prescribed interspousal
tort claims. Cases decided before 1950 invariably included passages
like the following:
If such a radical change is to be made in the common-law

rights and liabilities of married persons, [authorizing a
wife to sue her husband for negligently inflicted injuries,]
it must be made by clear enactment of the General Assembly, and not by this court in giving an unwarranted
construction to the meaning of the statute law relating to
the property rights of married women. GOG

courts uphold clauses).
001
See infra note 561 and accompanying text (persuasiveness); infra notes 569-73 and
accompanying text (compensatory goal).
00
• Ashdown, supra note 436, at 251. Ashdovm did say, however, that "indictment of im·
munity-free systems may be premature" because "there is no evidence that fraudulent or
collusive actions have increased in jurisdictions" abolishing immunity. Id.
00
• Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 372, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969).
004
The election of judges in some states adds an interesting dimension to the deference
question. See, e.g., MONT. ConE ANN. § 3-2-101 (1981); N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2. For valuable
treatment of many issues considered here, see R. KEETON, supra note 339.
000
Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291, 293, 117 A. 357, 358 (1922), overruled, Digby v. Digby, 120
R.I. 299, 388 A.2d (1978). The passages always appear in early cases but they also are in
some more recent opinions. See, e.g., Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fin. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980); Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641, 644-45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865);
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The authors of those opinions also seemed to be saying that legislatures, by passing such measures, effectively had "preempted" judicial alteration of the immunity concept.1106
Judges writing decisions after mid-century offer additional reasons for acceding to legislatures. Many courts have premised deference on the authority possessed by legislators1107 or on the need for
certainty in the legal system.1108 Numerous judges have found the
abolition of immunity to have such farreaching implications1:1oa or
to be so affected with a public interest in marriage1110 that it must
be left to legislatures. Courts also have evinced concern about the
comparative qualifications of the two branches of government.
Legislative bodies are said to be better equipped to investigate and
study issues pertaining to abrogation, m free of the constraints that
litigants impose in a specific judicial proceeding,m and more competent to treat abolition comprehensively. This last idea is especially significant because abrogation could affect many areas of law

McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 219-21, 231-33, 135 P.2d 940, 944-45, 950 (1943). Of
course, when a statute proscribes immunity the "rule is not for judicial discard without
compelling reasons." Peters v. Peters, 63 Haw. 653, 658, 634 P.2d 586, 590 (1981).
006
The authors simply proclaimed that the Acts did not abrogate immunity and rarely
treated immunity as a public policy issue. See, e.g., Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 428, 107
N.W. 1047, 1048 (1906), overruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.\V.2d
416, 420 n.10 (1969); Von Laszewski v. Von Laszewski, 99 N.J. Eq. 255, 133 A. 179, 180
(1926). Indeed, there is a sense in which Acts not specifically prescribing tort suit were
treated as a sixth traditionally espoused reason for retention.
007
See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 697-99, 376 P.2d 70, 74-75, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102,
106-07 (1962) (Schauer, J., dissenting}; Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1217 (Miss. 1958)
(Griffin, J., dissenting}; Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Mo. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 964 (1960), overruled, Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986); Stoker
v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah 1980) (Crockett, C.J., dissenting).
0
• • See, e.g., Robeson v. International Indem. Co., 248 Ga. 306, 309, 282 S.E.2d 896, 899
(1981); Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 96, 631 P.2d 646, 651 (1981), overruled, Flagg v. Loy,
241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 351,
384 P.2d 389, 393 (1963).
08
•
See, e.g., S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W. 2d 651, 655-56 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., concurring in part); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 525-31, 105 S.E. 206, 211-14 (1920) (Walker
& Hoke, JJ., dissenting).
010
See, e.g., Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 162 (Del 1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S.
931 (1980); Peters v. Peters, 63 Haw. 653, 659, 634 P.2d 586, 590 (1981); Guffy v. Guffy, 230
Kan. 89, 97, 631 P.2d 646, 651 (1981), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d
1183, 1190 (1987).
011
See Robeson, 248 Ga. at 310, 282 S.E.2d at 899; Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 28288, 462 A.2d 506, 524-27 (1983) (Couch, J., dissenting); S.A. V., 708 S.W.2d at 655-56 (Blackmar, J, concurring}.
••• See Alfree, 410 A.2d at 163.

458

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:359

and policy, particularly those in which elected representatives already have spoken. Gia
Judges in a substantial majority of jurisdictions, however, have
not deferred to the legislatures. These courts have determined that
immunity was not statutory. Instead, they found that immunity
was created and preserved by the judiciary, or originated at common law and, therefore, could be modified on policy grounds by
courts. Gi 4 They assume that those Married Women's Acts that fail
to prescribe expressly interspousal tort suits do not address immunity with sufficient precision to preclude subsequent judicial
modification. GIG
There are numerous additional responses to the deference argument that relate less directly to the Married Women's Acts. Alteration of immunity is neither more radical nor engenders greater uncertainty than modification of many other tort rules that
originated at common law.G16 Courts also need not accede on the

13
•
See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 697-99, 376 P.2d 70, 74-75, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102,
106-07 (1962) (Schauer, J., dissenting); Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 813 (Mo.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 759 (Tenn. 1983)
(Harbison, J., dissenting). The insurance and family law fields are classic examples.
014
See, e.g., Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 449, 646 P.2d 878, 880 (1982); Townsend
v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 649-50 (Mo. 1986); Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342, 344
(Mont. 1986); Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 99, 480 N.E.2d 388, 394 (1985); Flagg v.
Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 222, 734 P.2d 1183, 1188 (1987); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1208
(Miss. 1988). Cf. Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 301, 388 A.2d 1, 2 (1978) (judicial abdication
by refusal to reconsider unsatisfactory court-made rule). See generally Fernandez v. Romo,
132 Ariz. 447, 448-49, 646 P.2d 878, 879-80 (1982); supra note 123 and accompanying text
(although tort immunity arguably "statutory" to same extent any rule that existed at com·
mon law was made so by passing common law "reception" statute; immunity technically not
a common law rule as such).
••• Such treatment is appropriate given the lack of clarity regarding legislative intent as
to tort immunity. See supra notes 66-114 and accompanying text. If legislators did not ad·
dress immunity, they could not have meant to "occupy the field." Indeed, the Oregon Su·
preme Court recently stated that tort immunity was not a "matter in which the legislature
has purported to pre-empt the field." Heino v. Harper, 306 Or. 347, 378, 759 P.2d 253, 271
(1988). In any event, courts today should not be bound by unclear, old statutes; judges
simply should treat immunity, like any other tort doctrine said to arise at common law, as
one to be modified on public policy grounds.
••• For example, the remaining immunities and contributory negligence have been modi·
fied by courts in many states. The California Supreme Court has altered each. See Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (contributory
negligence); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (abro·
gating parent-child immunity); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d
457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (abrogating governmental immunity), modified sub nom. Corn·
ing Hosp. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 57 Cal. 2d 488, 370 P.2d 325, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1962); Malloy
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basis of legislatures' relative competence. The problem of abrogation, in contrast to questions like the adoption of no-fault compensation, is not complex and requires minimal data for its resolution.
Indeed, most of that small number of important policy issues to be
addressed can be treated more effectively by judges than legislators. Disputes involving questions of marital harmony constitute a
staple of state court workloads. Moreover, judges have greater experience with fraud in the tort litigation process, know more about
the difficulties presented by excessive and trivial claims, and have
greater familiarity with the relief actually provided by the alternative remedies. 1517 Numerous fields of law and policy said to be influenced by abolition would be affected only slightly.1118 Furthermore,
in those few remaining areas in which abrogation might have more
impact that courts cannot handle proficiently, legislatures always
can augment judicial pronouncements.1519
Thus, the litany of reasons recited for deference is less convincing than the opposing arguments. An explanation for this is that
courts may have resolved the abolition issue on more "substantive"
grounds, such as marital harmony, and then conformed their treatment of deference to that determination. 1120 Moreover, the deference rationale could be applied to most requests to recognize new
causes of action, and, in this way, is similar to the contention that
abrogation would "open the floodgates" of litigation.
4. Quantity and Quality of Litigation. Judges have feared that

v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951) (abrogating charitable immunity). There is no
reliance interest worthy of protection because few spouses modify their behavior to accord
with interspousal tort rules. Cf. supra note 498 (insurers can exclude spouses or modify rate
structures).
17
•
The traditional arguments favoring immunity are discussed in the rest of this subsec·
tion of the Article. Courts also are as competent as legislatures to treat the traditional ideas
favoring immunity's abolition, discussed infra notes 546-78 and accompanying text.
1
• • For example, issues of insurance law are said to be affected. Most would be influenced
indirectly, however, and those affected more directly can be otherwise treated. See supra
notes 489-92 and accompanying text.
10
•
For instance, issues of family law are said to be affected. Some, such as whether interspousal communications are privileged, now have been resolved, but others may warrant
legislative treatment.
20
•
See infra note 564 and accompanying text. Cf. Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 97, 106-07,
631 P.2d 646, 651, 656 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216,
225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987) (authors of majority, dissenting opinions reach opposite
conclusions on deference by relying upon ideas at different pages of same book by Judge
Cardozo).
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abolition would result in too many suits and would permit frivolous or trivial claims. An early opinion addressed the issue of excessive litigation:
If the wife can sue the husband, he can sue her. If an

assault was actionable, then would slander and libel and
other torts be . . . . The statute of limitations could not
cut off actions . . . with divorces as common as they are
now-a-days, there would be new harvests of litigation
521

In examining the problem of meritless claims, most courts only
provide examples, expressing concern about matters like petty domestic quarrels. 522 Several judges have conjured up a "parade of
horribles," such as imposing liability upon one who leaves shoes
where his or her spouse can trip over them. 523 A recent illustration
is the claim filed by a wife against her husband for injuries she
sustained because he failed to shovel their sidewalk. G2" Another potential difficulty is vindictive intentional tort actions pursued upon
divorce. 525 Professor McCurdy found that courts apparently are
saying that it would be "undesirable to make possible liability for
assault and battery every time one spouse touches the other, or
liability for negligence every time the household is improperly
managed. " 526
The cases afford little additional guidance, especially regarding
21

Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 308 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412
A.2d 71, 71 (Me. 1980). Later cases add little. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S.
611, 617-18 (1910). Cf. infra note 547 and accompanying text (judicial economy argument
for requiring spouses to seek relief from tortious injury under divorce law).
••• See, e.g., Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 82, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898) (suit over
"every real and fancied wrong"), overruled, Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236
(1971); Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 391, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (1920) (suits by "peevish
fault-finding husband ... or ... nagging ill-tempered wife"), overruled, Beaudette v. Frana,
285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969). Cf. Harris v. Harris, 252 Ga. 387,
389, 313 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1984) (Weltner, J., dissenting); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 653
(Mo. 1986) (uninvited kiss upon unconsenting brow could be assault).
••• See, e.g., Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 22, 25, 539 P.2d 566, 574, 577
(1975) (Shepard, C.J.; Bakes, J., dissenting); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 499, 267 A.2d 481,
490 (1970) (Francis, J., dissenting).
24
•
The case is Brown v. Brown, 381 Mass. 231, 231, 409 N.E.2d 717, 717 (1980),
••• See, e.g., Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Ky. 1979); Weicker v. Weicker,
22 N.Y.2d 8, 11, 237 N.E.2d 876, 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (1968).
••• McCurdy, supra note 2, at 1053. Accord Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 402, 87
P.2d 660, 667 (1938).
•
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the implications of "opening the floodgates." Many courts seem
concerned about maintaining the integrity of the civil justice system. 527 A few have mentioned the problems entailed in distinguishing similar behavior between strangers which would be tortious
from that involving spouses which would not/ 28 and a number appear troubled by the same uncertainties that traditionally have
plagued judges when they are asked to modify a longstanding tort
doctrine. 529
There are numerous responses to these considerations. No evidence suggests that the elimination of interspousal immunity actually has fostered too much litigation or encouraged frivolous or
trivial suits. A number of courts have observed that states abolishing the doctrine have not been inundated, although minimal evidence appears to underlie these assertions.1130 Even were the
caseload larger, potentially legitimate claims should not be excluded because they might be burdensome: fundamental purposes
of the judicial system are to afford individuals a "day in court" and
to redress injury. 531
A few judges maintain that jurisdictions abrogating immunity

27
•
Courts are concerned about the need for judicial economy and efficiency and maintain·
ing credibility and public trust. See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 252 Ga. 387, 389, 313 S.E.2d 88,
90 (1984) (Weltner, J., dissenting) (every cruel word discussed for days before jury, consuming court time and taxpayer resources).
028
The idea, mentioned first a century ago, see Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 34
(Davis, J., dissenting), reu'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882), has been raised recently, see, e.g., S.A.V. v.
K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 656 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., concurring); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76
N.J. 535, 555-59, 388 A.2d 951, 961-63 (1978). Cf. Henderson, supra note 406, at 501-05
(interspousal tort suit requires defining contours of relationship).
••• "Fear of the new" seems to be particularly troublesome. Cf. W. PROSSER & Wl'. KEE·
TON, supra note 2, § 4, citing L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 77-99 (1930) (courts always dread
"flood of litigation" involving problems they are not prepared to treat). In fairness, however,
burdening an overworked judiciary with trivial cases certainly is a valid concern. See supra
note 527.
030
See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal Rptr. 102, 104 (1962);
Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1979); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 403, 528
P.2d 1013, 1016 {1974); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 105, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (1973); Freehe
v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 188, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100
Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). Cf. infra note 532 (lack of data) •
.., See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); infra notes 570-71 and
accompanying text. The requirement that spouses seek relief from tortious harm in dissolution proceedings, see supra note 521, may conserve some judicial resources. But the savings
will be small, and the requirement may have disadvantages. See infra notes 542-63 and
accompanying text. Should interspousal tort litigation increase caseloads, courts could apply
ameliorative measures.
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also have not been overrun by spouses pursuing frivolous litigation,
although, here as well little data seem to support the observations.1132 Moreover, similar tort doctrines have been altered with
minimal apparent consequence.1133 The prosecution of insignificant
actions frequently should be deterred by the good sense and restraint of married persons and their attorneys534 and by the difficulty of securing judgments that make suit worthwhile. 113 G Should
the threat of nonmeritorious claims materialize, protections of the
tort litigation process can be invoked. 1136 For instance, most safeguards used to combat fraud could be equally efficacious in this

3
• • See Klein, 58 Cal. 2d at 694, 376 P.2d at 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 104; Guffy v. Guffy, 230
Kan. 89, 111-12, 631 P.2d 646, 660 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting), overruled, Flagg v. Loy,
241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 403, 87
P.2d 660, 668 (1938). Accord McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1053. The difficulty with the judicial observations, see text accompanying this note and supra note 530, is that they appear
not to be based upon reliable evidence. Several cases rely upon prior decisions: Shook citing
Richard, Rupert citing Freehe, and Guffy citing Richard and Rupert. The earlier decisions,
in tum, rely upon commentators. See, e.g., Richard, 131 Vt. at 105, 300 A.2d at 641; Freehe,
81 Wash. 2d at 188, 500 P.2d at 775. A few courts simply conclude without substantiation
that there is nothing detrimental in the experience of states abolishing immunity. See, e.g.,
Klein, 58 Cal. 2d at 694, 376 P.2d at 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 104; Richard, 131 Vt. at 105, 300
A.2d at 641. No systematic study apparently has been undertaken. See Letter from Marilyn
M. Roberts, Research Director, National Center for State Courts, to Carl Tobias (April 22,
1981).
33
•
Parent-child tort immunity provides the most relevant example. See Rupert v.
Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 403, 405 528 P.2d 1013, 1016, 1018 (1974) Cf. Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595, 600 (Minn. 1980); Hollister, supra note 11, at 525-27 (minor adjustments): W.
PROSSER & W:P. KEETON, supra note 2, § 4, at 23-24 (other tort areas).
3
• • Cf. Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 433, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966) (same in context of
parent-child tort immunity), overruled, Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980),
as stated in American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 1983); id., 273
Minn. at 430, 142 N.W. at 73 (lawyers unlikely to encourage meritless suits when contingent
fee arrangement exists).
3
• • See Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 234, 361 P.2d 941, 944 (1961). Litigants must
(1) hire counsel, (2) prove injury and damage, and (3) have incurred damages that, and ho
married to someone whose assets, make litigation worthwhile. Cf. Baits, 273 Minn. at 430,
142 N.W.2d at 73 (holding that family members unlikely to incur large legal expense whon
no promise of success exists).
3
• • See S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 654-55 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., concurring in
part); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 188, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972), overruled, Brown v.
Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). Some courts mention specifically the de·
fenses of assumption of risk and consent, see, e.g., Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 315-16, 433
A.2d 859, 867 (1981); Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d at 188, 500 P.2d at 775, or adjusting the duty of
care to the " 'give-and-take' of married life," S.A. V., 708 S.W.2d at 653. The protections
also can apply to the vindictive intentional tort action pursued upon divorce. See supra note
525 and accompanying text.
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context.537 Furthermore, judges and juries generally should be able
to distinguish similar behavior between strangers which would be
actionable from that involving spouses which is not.ll 38 Several jurists and the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recently have addressed this difficulty, although they have "not yet
worked out a full analysis of the proper legal treatment."ll39 Nonetheless, both have developed numerous suggestions for handling
the problem, and it appears solvable. 540
Therefore, the "floodgates" argument, like the fraud idea, does
not appear to be substantiated by the experience of jurisdictions
abrogating immunity. Its application would be overinclusive and
would violate basic tenets of the legal system, while most difficulties posed would be amenable to resolution. Consequently, the rationale has virtually no strength today. Indeed, it may have been
employed to buttress other rationales, particularly marital harmony, as the following quotation suggests:
[Abolition would] open up a field for marring or disturbing the tranquility of family relations ... by dragging
into court for judicial investigation at the suit of a peevish, fault.finding husband, or at the suit of a nagging, illtempered wife, matters of no serious moment, which if
permitted to slumber in the home closet would silently
be forgiven or forgotten. 541

See supra notes 480-92 and accompanying text.
See Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 545-46, 138 N. W.2d 343, 345 (1965); S.A. V., 708
S.W.2d at 653; Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 403-04, 87 P.2d 660, 668-69 (1938).
03
• REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 895F (1979). The Restatement drafters and the
New Jersey Supreme Court have provided especially cogent treatment and recommendations. See id.; Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 535, 388 A.2d 951, 951 (1978). Cf. Heino v.
Harper, 306 Or. 347, 377-78, 759 P.2d 253, 270-71 (1988) (subscribing to treatment. and offering additional suggestions).
Mo Certain difficulties do remain. For example, the Restatement's "reasonable spouse"
approach may need elaboration, and its explanations or available defenses are unclear.
Moreover, Merenotf's application of vestigial immunity to trivial claims is unwarranted, 76
N.J. at 555, 388 A.2d at 961. In response to the uncertainties that plague judges when asked
to modify traditional tort doctrines, see supra note 529 and accompanying text, some have
said that often these fears are inflated and courts "find some workable method of !lfi'ording
redress." W.P. KEEToN, supra note 3, § 4, at 23-24. Accord Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla.
395, 403, 87 P.2d 660, 668 (1938); L. GREEN, supra note 529, at 77-99. Cf. supra notes 496-97
and accompanying text (response to concerns about integrity of civil justice system, see
supra note 527).
Ml Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 391, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (1920) (emphasis added), ouer037
038
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5. Alternative Remedies. A final argument to which "no court in
this day and age subscribes seriously [is] that the abrogation of
marital immunity for tortious injury is 'unnecessary' because redress for the wrong can be obtained through other means." 11 ' 2
Judges deciding early cases, however, found that immunity should
be recognized because married people could secure adequate relief,
primarily through criminal litigation and civil actions for divorce.1543 Thus, in 1877, the Maine Supreme Court observed that a
"married woman has remedy enough [in] the criminal courts [and]
can prosecute at her husband's expense a suit for divorce."G" Perhaps the most comprehensive description of the idea appears in
the majority opinion in Thompson:

Nor is the wife left without remedy .... She may resort
to the criminal courts, which, it is to be presumed, will
inflict punishment commensurate with the offense committed. She may sue for divorce or separation and for alimony. The court, in protecting her rights and awarding
relief in such cases, may consider, and, so far as possible,
redress her wrongs and protect her rights. 114 n
More recently, the Florida judiciary articulated a variation on the
old theme, proclaiming that women intentionally hurt by their
spouses during marriage can be awarded compensation in the dissolution decree. 1146 By stating that spouses must seek relief under
ruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969). Accord
cases cited in supra note 522.
... Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 556, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (1978). But see Burns v.
Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1213-14 (Miss. 1988) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (subscribing to alternative remedy argument) .
... Other alternatives are said to be "private sanctions," such as refusing sexual activity.
See Merenoff, 76 N.J. at 556-57, 388 A.2d at 962. Cf. Note, supra note 422, nt 1655-59
(discussing many related ideas not developed in cases) .
... Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412
A.2d 71, 71 (Me. 1980). Accord Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 36, 103 P. 219, 221 (1909),
overruled, Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 684, 376 P.2d 65, 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 97 (1962);
Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 83, 75 N.W. 287, 288 (1898), overruled, Rosko v.
Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971) .
... Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 619 (1910); accord Drake v. Droke, 145 Minn.
388, 391, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (1920), overruled, Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373 n.10,
173 N.W.2d 416, 420 n.10 (1969); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1213-14 (Miss. 1988)
(Griffin, J., dissenting); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 72, 100 So. 591, 592 (1924) •
... See Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 21 (Fla. 1982). Cf. S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 653
(Mo. 1986); Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 433-34, 400 A.2d 1189, 1196 (1979) (wife's tort suit
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divorce law, so that all disputes between them might be resolved in
a single proceeding, the Maine and Florida courts suggest a judicial
economy argument. 547 But other jurists say little more, particularly
about the sufficiency of the redress available or why spouses should
be relegated to the criminal and divorce courts.548
The alternative remedies contention can be countered in several
ways. The relief ostensibly provided is essentially illusory. Criminal and divorce law might not apply to the challenged behavior.
For example, no jurisdiction makes ordinary negligence a crime or
a ground for dissolution. 1549 Similarly, a majority of states still does
not permit prosecution of husbands for rape of their wives.1uio Even
if the conduct is covered, many may be unable to pursue the remedy afforded. For example, criminal prosecution would not offer a
realistic solution for women who want to continue living with their
husbands. 15151 For other women, incarceration of the offending
spouse could excuse him from providing necessary support to his
wife and their children. 5152 Moreover, imposition of a fine could deplete already scarce family resources. 15153 Divorce also may not be an
option for numerous spouses. They could be deterred by religious
convictions, economic constraints, the wish to preserve the family
unit, or pressures that relatives, friends, and employers can

relevant to divorce proceeding).
041
See Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 23-24 (Fla. 1982); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307
(1877), overruled, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 71 (Me. 1980). Cf. Tevis v. Tevis,
79 N.J. 422, 434, 400 A.2d 1189, 1196 (1979) (presenting tort claim in divorce action avoids
prolongation and "fractionalization" of litigation). l\farital harmony remains paramount for
these courts.
048
These judges also appear troubled primarily about conjugal tranquility. See, e.g., the
cases cited in supra note 544.
040
See Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 556, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (1978); Hack v. Hack,
495 Pa. 300, 311 n.10, 433 A.2d 859, 864 n.10 (1981); W. PROSSER & W.P. KmmlN, supra
note 2, § 122. Cf. Finley, supra note 404 (helpful treatment of ideas in this paragraph). Of
course, states permitting "no-fault" divorce do not require parties to prove grounds for dissolution. See, e.g., S.A. V., 708 S.W.2d at 653 n.3.
0
•• This has changed considerably since 1980. Compare Barry, Spousal Rape: The Un·
common Law, 66 A.BA J. 1088 (1980) (status then) with Note, supra note 389, at 1258-62
(current status).
051
See Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity-California Follows the Trend, 36 S. CAL.
L. REv. 456, 466 (1963); Comment, supra note 447, at 259.
••• See Comment, supra note 551, at 466; Comment supra note 447 at 259. Although the
text accompanying this note is the only specific reference to the alternative remedies' implications for the spouses' children, they apply to much of the remaining analysis.
• 53 See supra note 430 and accompanying text.
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exert. 654
When married persons can seek an alternative remedy, important types of redress might not be provided. For instance, neither
criminal nor divorce law typically permits compensation for damages555 or affords much deterrence. 556 When a desirable remedy exists, it can be notoriously difficult to secure, as experience with the
pervasive problem of conjugal violence illustrates.m
Indeed, requiring husbands and wives to pursue redress through
criminal and divorce actions may deny them any meaningful relief
and, thus, effectively disrupt marital harmony more than allowing
tort claims. 558 But even were more satisfactory redress available,
the validity of relegating married individuals to alternative remedies is questionable. Very few other classes of potential litigants
are similarly constrained. 559 Moreover, constitutions, statutes, or
cases in every jurisdiction specifically provide that all persons are
entitled to seek redress for tortious harm. 560 It also is difficult to
understand why spouses should be restricted to relief that essentially ends the relationship when preservation of marriages is the
principal justification for immunity's continued application. 561 Per-

004
See Comment, supra note 551, at 462-63; Comment, supra note 447, at 259 (first foe·
tor); supra note 430 and accompanying text (second factor); supra note 450 and accompany·
ing text (divorce statistics).
••• See Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 546-47, 138 N.W.2d 343, 346 (1965); S.A.V. v.
K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., concurring in part); Kobe v. Kobe, 61
Ohio App. 2d 67, 70-71, 399 N.E.2d 124, 126 (1978). But see supra note 546 and accompany·
ing text.
..e "[Immunity] permitted the wifebeater to practice his twisted frustrations [knowing]
any criminal penalty would ordinarily be a modest fine." Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W.
Va. 557, 567, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343-44 (1978). Tort law is unlikely to deter spouses who engage
in conjugal violence. See Marcus, supra note 413, at 1661-62; infra note 598 and accompany·
ing text. But tort law might help some of the many victims by affording compensatory relief,
see infra note 573 and accompanying text, or by deterring some wife beating, see infra note
568. Cf. Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 401, 87 P.2d 660, 666 (1938); Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 234, 361 P.2d 941, 944 (1961) (alternative relief "may be adequate to
prevent future wrongs").
1
•• See Marcus, supra note 413.
••• See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
••• Cf. supra note 450 and accompanying text (litigants' tranquility irrelevant in tort suits
between strangers). One class even more constrained is parents and children who injure one
another, but immunity as to them apparently is eroding more rapidly than interspousal
immunity. See F. HARPER, supra note 27, at § 8.11; Hollister, supra note 11.
OGo See infra notes 570-71 and accompanying text.
061
See, e.g., Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 546, 138 N.W.2d 343, 345-46 (1965); Frcehe
v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 188, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972), overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100
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haps judges espousing the alternative remedies idea have been attempting to protect conjugal peace by making relief so costly or
illusory that no one would seek it. 662
Thus, this rationale, while one of the first to be enunciated, is
now the least convincing. 663 All five of the ideas, however, lack substantiation, are overinclusive, internally inconsistent, contradictory, and ultimately unpersuasive. 66' Yet, these considerations do
not mean that the responses to them or the rationales supporting
abrogation are completely satisfactory. Those arguments and responses to them are examined next.
B. Reasons for Abolition of Immunity and Responses to Those
Reasons
As seen above, numerous courts that eliminated interspousal immunity rationalized this result simply by relying upon the Married
Women's Acts or by repudiating the policies enunciated for the
doctrine's continuation. 666 Many other judges, however, developed
affirmative policy arguments for recognizing interspousal suits. Although these concepts have not always been articulated clearly, the
foremost are that abolition would permit the purposes of modern
tort law to be realized and the individual rights of women to be

Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). Cf. Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 126, 140 P. 1022,
1023-24 (1914) (criminal and divorce suits most public, embarrassing and divisive). In states
unwilling to abolish immunity totally, permitting intentionally harmed \\ives to recover
compensation upon divorce, see supra note 546 and accompanying text, could protect some
tenuous marriages, afford compensatory relief, conserve judicial resources, and have some
deterrent effect. Of course, divorce is the price of these benefits, and this option might encourage dissolution. See Counts v. Counts, 221 Va. 151, 155-56, 266 S.E.2d 895, 897-98
(1980). Cf. Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180 (1988) (permitting intentional
interspousal tort suit for claim not raised in divorce proceeding).
06
• A few judges mention the reliers illusory nature, see, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 201
Ala. 41, 44, 77 So. 335, 338 (1917). Responses to concern about conserving judicial resources,
see supra note 547, are that important purposes of the judicial system nre to afi'ord a "day
in court" and to redress injury, see supra note 531 and accompanying text. The "private
sanctions," mentioned supra note 543, simply "do not add up to an enforceable civil right of
recovery for damages." Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 557, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (1978).
063
Rationales other than the five analyzed support immunity, but none has been enunci·
ated as explicitly or as often as those five. See, e.g., supra notes 153-55 and accompanying
text.
... Writers perceptively observe that judges make broader presumptions than factual generalization reasonably supports and depend on superficially pertinent concepts to conceal
other policies. See McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1052-54; Note, supra note 422, at 1663.
06
• See, e.g., supra notes 245-58 and accompanying text.
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vindicated. 1166
1. Tort Law Purposes. The abrogation of immunity facilitates
realization of numerous goals of tort jurisprudence. Courts mention occasionally the notion of holding responsible each individual,
regardless of marital status, for his or her own harmful conduct. 667
The policies of punishing and deterring injurious interspousal behavior are enunciated less frequently, although they have special
significance when harm has been perpetrated intentionally.1168 The
principal concern today, however, is providing married people
wrongfully hurt by their spouses an opportunity to recover
compensation.1169
A number of judges who rely upon this rationale fail to explain it
comprehensively, apparently deeming more expansive treatment
unnecessary. Some merely proclaim that an important goal of tort
law is to afford anyone harmed by another's blameworthy conduct
the chance to pursue monetary relief.1170 Numerous courts cite state

••• Courts rarely espouse explicitly ideas on the rights of women, see infra notes 590·97
and accompanying text, but concern about such rights may underlie abrogation. Other poli·
cies have been developed. For example, some courts advocate that immunities should be
retained only for compelling policy reasons. See Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629, 351
N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 192, 500 P.2d 771, 777 (1972),
overruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). Others believe that
abolition will keep the peace. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
061
See, e.g., Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 98, 631 P.2d 646, 651-52 (1981) (Prager, J.,
dissenting), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan. 216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987); Lewis,
370 Mass. at 629, 351 N.E.2d at 532; Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d at 191-92, 500 P.2d at 777. Cf.
Finley, supra note 380 (advocating broader "responsibilities" approach).
068
See Schultz v. Schultz, 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 28-29, 33 (encouraging preservation of
peace, prevention of cruel acts), rev'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516,
523, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920); Coffindafi'er v. Coffindafi'er, 161 W. Va. 557, 567, 244 S.E.2d
338, 343-44 (1978) (cases enunciating policies); supra note 448; infra note 570 and accompa·
nying text (wife battering so ubiquitous as to compel intentional tort suit's recognition if
only to offer possible deterrent).
9
•• For a classic statement of the compensatory goal, see James, supra note 396. Cf. supra
notes 396-406 and accompanying text (more discussion of goal and its "triumph"), Of
course, abolition would facilitate realization of tort law's other generic purposes, such as
promoting safety; however, courts rarely mention them. Cf. James, supra note 396; W. PROS·
SER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 2; M. SHAPO, supra note 396, at chs. 3-4, 11 (more discussion
of generic purposes); Smith, The Critics and the 'Crisis': A Reassessment of Current Con·
ceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 765, 766 (1987) (arguing that torts' primary func·
tion should be resolving disputes arising from perceived breaches of important societal
norms, not compensation, deterrence or punishment); Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Femi·
nist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL Enuc. 3 (1988) (advocating application of feminist theory
to doctrinal tort law); Finley, supra note 404 (same).
070
See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976); Townsend v.
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constitutional or statutory provisions similar to that in the Nebraska constitution: "[A]ll courts shall be open, and every person,
for any injury done him in his land, goods, person or reputation,
shall have a remedy by due course of law, and justice administered
without denial or delay."1171
A few judges, refuting the conjugal harmony argument, have
contended that allowing spouses to seek reparations can actually
promote marital peace because such suits might alleviate the financial burden imposed by harm for which damages otherwise could
not be recovered.1172 A smaller number appear to believe that the
damage award in a tort case may be the only form of relief available to battered wives. 1173
The compensation concept, however, seems to be premised primarily on the widespread existence of liability insurance. Indeed,
some courts candidly rely upon such coverage,1174 although most are
less explicit.11711 Judges who adopt the compensation argument because of the availability of insurance apparently think that many
married individuals negligently hurt each other and that vehicular
or household insurance coverage will pay for most of this damage
as well as the defendants' litigation expenses, and thus minimize
the potential for connubial discord. 1176 A few courts even state that
Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Mo. 1986); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 402, 528 P.2d
1013, 1016 (1974); Vea:z.ey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1980).
1
••
NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 13, cited in Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 545, 279 N.W.2d 382,
386 (1979). Many judges rely on similar provisions. See, e.g., Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind.
16, 24, 284 N.E.2d 794, 798 (1972); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (Miss. 1988);
Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 106, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (1973). A few judges do not premise
the "open courts" idea on constitutional authority. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42,
49, 89 A. 889, 892 (1914); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 320 (TeL 1987). Indeed, its origin
may be the Magna Carta.
072
See, e.g., Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342, 345 (Mont. 1980); Veazey v. Doremus,
103 N.J. 244, 249, 510 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1980).
073
See, e.g., Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1980); Coffindaffer v. Corfindaffer, 161 W. Va. 557, 567, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343-44 (1978).
"'' See, e.g., Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 194, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1971); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 \V. Va. 557, 566, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978).
"'" But recent cases are most explicit. See, e.g., Miller, 721 P.2d at 345; Veazey, 103 N.J.
at 249, 510 A.2d at 1190; Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 2d 94, 99-101, 480 N.E.2d 388, 39495 (1985).
••• See, e.g., Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 449-50, 646 P.2d 878, 881-82 (1982);
Miller, 721 P.2d at 345; Digby v. Digby, 120 R.L 299, 304, 388 A.2d 1, 3 (1978). To the
extent the compensation idea is premised on insurance, it does not apply to intentional
behavior. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 699-700, 376 P.2d 70, 75, 26 Cal. Rptr.
102, 107 (1962). This does not denigrate intentional tort suit; indeed, unnvoilnbility of insur-
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it is unfair to penalize spouses who have purchased insurance to
cover this very eventuality.1177
There are numerous responses to the idea that permitting interspousal suits facilitates vindication of the compensation goal. n79
One is the contention that providing for recovery in the tort system is unnecessary or unwarranted. Authors of early opinions observed that spouses should forgive one another for harm inflicted
wrongfully1179 or that adequate relief could be secured through alternatives to tort litigation, such as divorce. 1180 Today, there is
widespread insurance coverage for the special damages that negligently harmed spouses incur,681 while pain and suffering are said to
be intangible, difficult to measure, and less appropriate for compensation in this context. 1182
Even when there is substantial need for married individuals to
pursue compensation, additional considerations may be more compelling. Allowing husbands and wives to .seek monetary damages
can threaten conjugal tranquility. 1183 In fact, pursuit of an intenance adds a punitive element to any recovery. See Givelber, supra note 361, at 54·55; supra
note 568 and accompanying text.
077
See, e.g., Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970); Shearer v.
Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 101, 480 N.E.2d 388, 395 (1985). But cf. Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan.
89, 95-96, 631 P.2d 646, 650 (1981) (Prager, J., dissenting), overruled, Flagg v. Loy, 241 Kan.
216, 225, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987) (recovery fair if accident coverage, unfair if liability
insurance).
078
There also are responses to the policies favoring abolition that are not related to tort
law's generic purposes or its compensatory goal. See supra notes 566-68 and accompanying
text. None warrant textual treatment, however, because they consist primarily of the five
policies favoring immunity's retention, discussed supra notes 419-564 and accompanying
text.
070
See, e.g., the cases cited in supra note 148. But see infra note 612 and accompanying
text. But cf. supra note 445 and accompanying text (tort suit can promote harmony by
eliminating economic burden).
080
See, e.g., the cases cited in supra notes 543-45. But see supra notes 549-58 and accom·
panying text.
08
' Most spouses have medical insurance and many have wage loss protection. Most
homeowners' insurance policies provide some medical coverage, and no-fault automobile
benefits are available in numerous states. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
082
See M SHAPO, supra note 396, at 5-176 to 5-183 (discussion of criticisms of pain and
suffering damages); Rheinstein, Challenge and Response in Family Law, 17 VAND. L. REV.
239, 247-48 (1963) (impropriety in interspousal context). Those spouses least able to afford
expenses imposed by negligently caused injury, however, are also least likely to have other
coverage. Furthermore, spouses who have coverage are entitled to seek damages because
they have paid for coverage. See supra note 577 and accompanying text. Cf. M. SHAPO,
supra note 396, at 5-201 to 5-207 (similar idea as to collateral benefits rule).
083
See supra notes 419-37, 448 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 438·47, 449·
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tional tort action by a battered woman is more likely to end the
marital relationship than to provide significant compensation.0 sc
Permitting personal injury suits could result in frivolous claims as
well as excessive litigation. 585 Perhaps most significant, however, is
the argument that spouses will collude, undermining familial trust
and the integrity of the tort law system. 088 Indeed, judges who subscribe to the compensation rationale on the basis of the prevalence
of insurance give credence to the fraud contention. 087 Concomitantly, the allegation that courts allowing suit effectively impose a
no-fault compensation system implicates the idea of deference to
the legislature. 588
2. Individual Rights. Few jurists have articulated very explicitly
or comprehensively the idea that affording women tort suits facilitates the vindication of their rights. 589 As early as 1920, however,
one judge eliminating immunity declared that "wives are no longer
chattels [that] need to beg for protection for their persons" but are
voters who "can command it." 590 There have been similar pronouncements since then. 591 Some courts have premised abrogation
on specific constitutional provisions, such as those entitling tortiously harmed people to seek relief without qualification, especially as to marital status. 592 Similarly, the United States Court of
56 and accompanying text.
084
See infra note 618 and accompanying text.
""" See supra notes 521-29 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 530-41 and accompanying text.
08
• See supra notes 457-72, 502-03 and accompanying text (interspousal collusion). But
see supra notes 473-501 and accompanying text (erosion of familial trust and tort law
system) .
.., See supra notes 574-77 and accompanying text.
088
See supra note 472 and accompanying text (no-fault allegation); supra notes 504-20
and accompanying text (deference).
08
• For helpful analysis of the debate over the efficacy of a rights strategy for women, see
C. MAcK!NNoN, supra note 448, at 32-45; Finley, supra note 380; Freedman, supra note 408;
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1279 (1987); Olsen, supra note 411; Note, supra
note 408. Cf. infra notes 614-19 (in tort immunity context).
90
•
Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920). See also Schultz v. Schultz,
34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26, 33 (earlier allusion), reu'd, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882).
1
•• See, e.g., Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 449-50, 646 P.2d 878, 880-81 (1982);
Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 395, 87 P.2d 660, 660 (1938); Freehe v. Freehe, 81
Wash. 2d 183, 186-87, 500 P.2d 771, 773-74 (1972), ouerruled, Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash.
2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984).
••• See supra note 571 and accompanying text. But see Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425,
425, 15 P.2d 922, 922 (1932), ouerruled, Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1985);
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently invoked the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to invalidate Illinois'
statutory proscription of interspousal tort litigation. noa Although
judges are unlikely to acknowledge openly that abolition constitutes state intervention in the family, affording individual rights to
certain members against others, these are important consequences
of abrogation. Gs•
Because so few courts have enunciated expressly or thoroughly
the individual rights notion, most judicial responses to the concept
have been indirect. Had jurists answered directly, the responses
probably would have been couched principally in terms of the marital harmony contention.GsG Even judges who might have been willing to accord females rights in other contexts may have been reluctant to do so within the family. Another response, especially to the
equal protection idea, is that a wife should not be afforded a tort
cause of action because her husband does not have one against
her.Goa Moreover, the notion that abolition involves state intervention in the family to provide wives with rights would offend many
jurists.Gs7
In summary, these concepts may be somewhat more persuasive
than the litany recited for immunity's continued application.
Neither set of arguments is compelling, however. Nevertheless, abrogation does at least afford certain benefits in specific situations.
It is appropriate, therefore, to analyze some significant consequences of fully abolishing the doctrine.
Ill. IMPLICATIONS OF TOTAL ABOLITION
Much of the analysis in the initial two Parts of this Article illus-

Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 290-97, 287 P.2d 572, 574-77 (1955).
••• Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245, 1245 (7th Cir. 1984). Accord Jones v. Jones, 376 S.E.2d
674 (Sup. Ct. Ga. 1989). Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1211 (Miss. 1988); Price v. Price,
732 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. 1987). But see Williams v. Williams, 108 Ill. App. 3d 936, 936, 439
N.E.2d 1055, 1055 (1982), modified, 98 Ill. 2d 128, 455 N.E.2d 1388 (1983); Vnrholln v.
Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 270-71, 383 N.E.2d 888, 889-90 (1978). Cf. Pniewonsky v.
Paiewonsky, 446 F.2d 178, 178 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972); Smith v.
Smith, 240 Pa. Super. 97, 97, 361 A.2d 756, 756 (1976) (rejecting claims premised on due
process or equal rights provisions).
••• See supra notes 392-94 & 414 and accompanying text.
••• See supra notes 419-56 and accompanying text.
••• See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
••• See supra notes 415-17 and accompanying text.
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trates that courts and legislatures in jurisdictions that retain immunity should eliminate it totally, and complete abrogation is indicated and likely by the turn of the century. Thus, it is important
to explore what the ultimate demise of immunity might portend,
particularly for the tort law system and for women, wives, marriage, and the family.
A. Implications for the Tort Law System

The impact of complete abolition on the tort law process ·will be
relatively insubstantial, although on balance there will be greater
benefit. Elimination of the doctrine will facilitate realization of
many tort law goals. When spouses willfully hurt one another, personal injury suits afford possibilities for punishment and deterrence and some likelihood of compensation. Moreover, intentional
tort litigation may be the sole relief available to battered wives.
Abrogation of negligence immunity provides the opportunity to recover compensatory damages, alleviating the potential economic
burden that could be imposed. It also may have some deterrent
effect.
Certain purposes of tort law, however, will not be achieved, and
there may be detrimental implications for the system. Compensation, deterrence, and punishment are unlikely to be attained in
many of the intractable cases of wife battering.1598 Providing access
to the courts for interspousal tort disputes will increase the
caseload, if only minimally. There will be occasional frivolous or
vindictive suits or ones involving the type of interspousal behavior
that makes it difficult for trial judges and juries to ascertain
whether liability should be imposed. 1199 More frequent and more
troubling, however, will be situations in which married individuals
successfully defraud insurers. Most of these difficulties could undermine public trust in the tort law system, but all are amenable
to amelioration. 600

B. Implications for Society
Abrogation may have numerous salutary effects for women,
wives, marriage, and the family. It could enhance the dignity of
••• See supra notes 555-57 & 568; infra notes 604-05 & 618 and accompanying text.
99
•
See supra notes 521-25 & 528 and accompanying text.
600 See supra notes 481-92 & 538-40 and accompanying text (ameliorative measures).
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married people by recognizing that husbands and wives are separate, unique individuals with their own rights which they do not
forfeit upon marriage. When the state denies an innocent party
hurt by another's blameworthy behavior access to its civil justice
system on the basis of marital status, the harmed spouse's full
worth as a human may be diminished and that individual's unique,
independent identity compromised. 801 Because society expresses
respect for people by treating each individual with equal regard,002
it should extend to every community member the complete panoply of rights accorded all others, including a cause of action for
personal injuries suffered.803
These considerations have especially telling application to the
intentional infliction of harm. Such conduct is morally wrong. It
invades the valuable dignity interest in freedom from willful interference with one's person and involves the type of disregard for the
integrity of another human that ought to be unacceptable in a civilized society. Moreover, behavior that the community ordinarily
considers so reprehensible as to warrant criminalization should not
be excused from civil liability. 804 Wife battering is so ubiquitous in
the United States as to compel recognition of an intentional tort
cause of action, if only to a:fford one possible means for deterring
the heinous conduct.

801

Many courts have said that an individual's right to pursue relief in tort should not ho
denied because of marital status. See, e.g., MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 75 (Mo.
1980); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 557, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (1978); Hack v. Huck, 495
Pa. 300, 303, 433 A.2d 859, 860-61 (1981). Moreover, when the state stumps its imprimatur
upon the unequal treatment of any citizen it diminishes the respect of citizens for govern·
ment. Cf. Karst, "A Discrimination So Trivial": A Note on Law and the Symbolism of
Women's Dependency, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 546, 552 (1974) (very destructive when judiciary
places special imprimatur of legitimacy on symbolism of women's dependency). Tho govorn·
ment additionally denigrates the injured person by allowing the individual to suo his or hor
spouse in property or contract, but not in tort. See Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 19·20,
284 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1972); Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Mo. 1986);
Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 97-98, 480 N.E.2d 388, 392-93 (1985). Cf. supra note
456 and accompanying text (widespread recognition of interspousal property and contract
suits).
802
Many writers have addressed this idea. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEIU·
OUSLY 223-39 (1977).
0
• • Most state constitutions provide a right to seek redress for personal injuries. Sec
supra note 571 and accompanying text.
80
' Of course, one difficulty in analogizing from criminal to civil law is that certain con·
duct that is criminal between strangers is not criminal between spouses. See, e.g., supra
note 550 and accompanying text.
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Of course, it is married women who typically are relegated to
"second-class citizenship" by application of immunity. In overwhelming numbers, married men commit the intentional torts, especially battering,605 operate the vehicles in which spouses ride, 600
and are responsible for a significant percentage of household
accidents.
Abrogation offers additional benefits that clarify, alter, and even
can reverse certain deleterious images of women. By continuing to
treat interspousal injury as a private, domestic matter, immunity
perpetuates an antiquated world view that considered married individuals as one autonomous unit-the man; wives as property to
be managed by their husbands; and such harm the personal business of the head of the household. In contrast abolition allows injurious interspousal activity to become public. It acknowledges the
public nature of the harm done to the individual, as well as to family, friends, and society. Abrogation also provides a public forum in
which disputes can be aired without resort to force 607 and in which
spouses who commit torts can be held accountable for their wrongdoing. 608 Publicity even may deter others from engaging in similar
behavior.609
In addition to "de-privatizing" injurious conduct between husbands and wives, abolition can modify somewhat family hierarchy
by affording rights to both spouses. 610 Moreover, abrogation acknowledges that the altruistic image of wedlock nearly always demanded sacrifice by the wife611 and that forgiveness, while integral
to the institution of marriage, simply is insufficient when serious

600
See Marcus, supra note 413, at 1661-62, 76-77; supra notes 156 & 312 (early interspousal tort suits).
06
•
In interspousal tort immunity cases involving vehicular collisions reported since 1920,
wives comprised more than 75% of the plaintiffs.
607
See supra notes 260 & 443-45 and accompanying text. Cf. Olsen, supra note 65, at
1529-38, ("de-privitization" and legalization of family); 1\1. SHAPO, supra note 396, at 3-16 to
3-20 (tort law as "grievance mechanism"). One problem, of course, is that force already may
have been used.
608
See supra notes 567-68 and accompanying text.
609
See supra note 568 and accompanying text. Cf. MacKinnon, supra note 146, nt 656-57
(trenchant analysis of devastating effect the "private" has hnd on women); infra note 613
and accompanying text (abolition could cause intentional interspousal activity to lose social
approval). But see infra notes 618-19 and accompanying text.
610
See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1532.
611
See id. at 1523; supra notes 148 & 605-06 and accompanying text.
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misbehavior or severe harm is involved.612 Abolition, therefore,
could alter the perception of married women as weaker beings with
fewer rights and cause such activities as wife battering and marital
rape to lose some of their social approval. 613
Notwithstanding these benefits, there are disadvantages and limitations. Legalization can endanger family solidarity and altruism
by enforcing individual rights against the family. 614 This kind of
state intervention equalizes the results of interspousal interaction,
but does not democratize the family. 615 It promotes individualism,
but particularizes and may legitimate, instead of eliminate, hierarchy. 616 Thus, legalization and intervention, in the context of tort
immunity's abolition, may not improve husband-wife or male-female relationships or familial existence, or substantially emancipate or empower married women, but merely serve to perpetuate
and justify the status quo. 617 The problem of wife battering illustrates these constraints. Abrogation frees battered women to exercise a right that, if pursued, effectively ends the marriage, is unlikely to provide much compensation in any event, and contributes
to the isolation of women.618 Abolition thus does little to prevent
or deter battering in specific instances or in society, and even may
812
See supra note 148, and accompanying text (forgiveness idea). Cf. Marcus, supra note
413; Note, supra note 408 (insufficiency where wife battering or marital rape).
813
See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1529-38. Cf. Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986)
(when males prosecuted successfully for rape, men learn that rape is not appropriate
behavior).
814
See Minow, supra note 9, at 893-94; Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-38. For helpful
analyses of limitations entailed in a rights-based approach, see the sources cited in supra
note 589.
81
• See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-38. Cf. Minow, supra note 9, at 893-94 (family law
measures can liberate individual family members from hierarchical control by one but can
also neglect communal life).
818
See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-38. For helpful analysis of individualization, see C.
MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 87-90; Note, supra note 389, at 1266. For helpful analysis of
particularization, see C. MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 83-90. For helpful analysis of legitimation, see id. at 159-74; Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis•
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV, 1049
(1978); Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme
Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265 (1984).
617
See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1530-38. Accord as to sexual harassment in the workplace,
C. MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 83-90, 158-61; as to marital rape, Note, supra note 408, at
1265-66, 1273.
818
See supra notes 409-16 & 428-29 and accompanying text (ending the marriage), Cf.
Olsen, supra note 65, at 1533 (wives' exercise of rights could isolate or could empower
women); C. MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 83-90, 158-61 (similar as to sexual harassment).
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serve to legitimate the domination experienced by wives who
"choose" to remain in marriages in which they are beaten.619 Indeed, the tort law remedy, by individualizing and personalizing
marital rape and wife battering, can obscure the fact that millions
of women in bedrooms and homes throughout the nation are raped
and beaten by their husbands and, therefore, that this is genderbased discrimination. 620
Thus, intervention in the family and its legalization and de-privitization, as reflected in abrogation, offer benefits. There are, however, disadvantages, so that the change cannot be accepted without
qualifications.621 Abolition is like similar liberal reforms. It does
not affect substantially, and even may deflect consideration of,
more fundamental issues within marriage, such as power allocation, and within society, such as how male-female relationships

1
• •

See Olsen, supra note 65; at 1537 ("wife who does not pres5 criminnl assault charges
against battering husband ... may be blamed for allowing herself to be a victim" or does
not seek divorce "may be said to have consented" to abuse); C. 11.fAcKINNON, supra note 146,
at 83-90, 158-61 (similar to sexual harassment).
620
Professor MacKinnon incisively explains these ideas in the context of sexual harassment, which explanation is equally applicable to marital rape and wife battering:
[T]ort is conceptually inadequate to the problem of sexual harassment to the
extent that it rips injuries to women's sexuality out of the context of women's
social circumstances as a whole••.• Unsituated in a recognition of the context
that keeps women secondary and powerless, sexual injuries appear as incidental or deviant aberrations which arise in one-to-one relationships gone wrong.
[Sexual harassment) is not merely a parade of interconnected consequences
with the potential for discrete repetition by other individuals •••• Rather, it is
group-defined injury which occurs to many different individuals regardless of
unique qualities or circumstances, in ways that connect with other deprivations
of the same individuals, among all of whom a single characteristic-female
sex-is shared. Such an injury is in essence a group injury.
C. MAcKlNNoN, supra note 146, at 171-72 (emphasis in original). Accord Olsen, supra note
411, at 431-32; Note, supra note 408.
21
•
See Olsen, supra note 65, at 1559-60; cf. Note, supra note 408, at 1273 (similar to
rights approach to marital rape). Cf. C. 11.fAcKINNON, supra note 146, at 1-7; Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1007-08 (1984) (extending to women
rights that men have fails to develop rights recognizing women's experiences); Schneider,
supra note 394 (same, and advocating litigation strategy recognizing women's needs); West.
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHL L. REv. 1 (1988) (advocating truly feminist jurisprudence}; Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989) (sameness/differences
debate). Professor Finley, supra note 380, at 1165 n.198, captures well what these, and many
other, writers say in different ways: "[l]t is necessary to analyze the ultimate goal-mere
access to male prerogatives, or a more profound change in values, structures, and policies"
in treating issues facing women. Cf. infra note 623 (discussing numerous approaches).
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might be improved.622 Nevertheless, while work continues on these
essential questions, abrogation can afford advantages in specific
situations, it can challenge the points at which power a:ffects the
daily existence of people, and perhaps it can bring about that incremental adjustment of power which leads to more fundamental
change. 623
Thus, for the tort law system and society, the potential benefits
of total abolition outweigh its detrimental aspects. Accordingly,
complete abolition is appropriate.
CONCLUSION

Interspousal tort immunity has enjoyed a long, rich history, but
the rule is now one of the truly "sick men" of American tort jurisprudence for whom the requiem may soon play. The story of the
doctrine affords insights on judicial decisionmaking, tort law development, and societal views of women, marriage, wives and the family. Nonetheless, the demise of immunity is unlikely to empower
females, improve significantly their circumstances within the family, or enhance substantially relations between men and women.

22
•
This is an important thesis of Littleton, supra note 589; C. MACKINNON, supra note
146; Olsen, supra note 65; Note, supra note 408. Accord POLAN, supra note 146, at 299·300.
23
•
For example, some wives battered during marriage by their husbands may be able to
recover compensation after divorce. Cf. Note, supra note 408, at 1273 (rights approach can
attack points at which power affects daily lives of, and take step toward power equality
between, men and women). For examples of valuable work on the more important questions,
see sources cited in supra notes 589 & 621-22.

